How terrorist campaigns end : the campaigns of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States by Malkki, Leena
Department of Economic and Political Studies 
University of Helsinki 
Finland 
Acta Politica 41 
How Terrorist Campaigns End 
The Campaigns of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the 
Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States 
Leena Malkki 
ACADEMIC DISSERTATION 
To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the 
University of Helsinki, for public examination in the lecture room 5, University main 
building,  
on June 11, 2010, at 12 noon. 
Helsinki 2010 
ISBN 978-952-10-6266-7 (pbk.) 
ISSN 0515-3093 
Helsinki University Print 
Helsinki 2010 
Abstract 
This study explores the decline of terrorism by conducting source-based case studies on 
two left-wing terrorist campaigns in the 1970s, those of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands 
and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States. The purpose of the case studies 
is to bring more light into the interplay of different external and internal factors in the 
development  of  terrorist  campaigns.  This  is  done  by  presenting  the  history  of  the  two  
chosen campaigns as narratives from the participants’ points of view, based on interviews 
with participants and extensive archival material.  
Organizational resources and dynamics clearly influenced the course of the two 
campaigns,  but  in  different  ways.  This  divergence  derives  at  least  partly  from  
dissimilarities in organizational design and the incentive structure. Comparison of even 
these two cases shows that organizations using terrorism as a strategy can differ 
significantly,  even  when  they  share  ideological  orientation,  are  of  the  same  size  and  
operate in the same time period. Theories on the dynamics of terrorist campaigns would 
benefit from being more sensitive to this. The study also highlights that the demise of a 
terrorist organization does not necessarily lead to the decline of the terrorist campaign. 
Therefore,  research  should  look  at  the  development  of  terrorist  activity  beyond  the  life-
span of a single organization. 
The collective ideological beliefs and goals functioned primarily as a sustaining force, 
a lens through which the participants interpreted all developments. On the other hand, it 
appears that the role of ideology should not be overstated. Namely, not all participants in 
the campaigns under study fully internalized the radical ideology. Rather, their 
participation was mainly based on their friendship with other participants. 
Instead of ideology per se, it is more instructive to look at how those involved 
described their organization, themselves and their role in the revolutionary struggle. In 
both  cases  under  study,  the  choice  of  the  terrorist  strategy  was  not  merely  a  result  of  a  
cost-benefit calculation, but an important part of the participants’ self-image. Indeed, the 
way the groups portrayed themselves corresponded closely with the forms of action that 
they got involved in. 
Countermeasures and the lack of support were major reasons for the decline of the 
campaigns. However, what is noteworthy is that the countermeasures would not have had 
the same kind of impact had it not been for certain weaknesses of the groups themselves. 
Moreover, besides the direct impact the countermeasures had on the campaign, equally 
important was how they affected the attitudes of the larger left-wing community and the 
public in general. In this context, both the attitudes towards the terrorist campaign and the 
authorities were relevant to the outcome of the campaigns. 
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This study started out as a simple idea about a topic and a method. When I completed my 
Master’s thesis in the late 1990s, I noticed that there were few studies on the dynamics of 
terrorist campaigns and in particular, few on the last phases of the life cycle of these 
campaigns. Another observation I made was that there were generally not too many 
studies on terrorist movements, especially historical ones, that made extensive use of first 
hand sources. What seemed to be lacking in particular was literature that combined 
theoretical discussion with carefully researched case studies.  
As a consequence, I decided to explore the questions about the decline of terrorism in 
my dissertation by making source-based in-depth studies on specific terrorist campaigns. I 
looked for case studies among the left-wing movements that were active in the Western 
countries around the 1970s. In the end, I selected two terrorist campaigns that had not 
been studied in-depth: those of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese 
Liberation Army in the United States.  
In the following, I introduce the theoretical background, approach, methods and 
sources in more detail. There are new studies on the decline of terrorism that have been 
published after this study was designed.1 As these studies have not influenced the design 
of my study, I find it more suitable to include them in the concluding discussion. Overall, 
these studies provide support both to the relevance of my approach and to the research 
results obtained from my case studies. 
1.1 Theoretical background 
Since there was so little literature on how terrorism ends, it was clear from the beginning 
that my study would be explorative. The design of this study has been influenced in 
particular by two articles that explicitly discussed the end of terrorism that were available 
when I began: Martha Crenshaw’s article entitled “How terrorism declines” (1991) and the 
article “Why terrorism subsides: A comparative study of Canada and the United States” by 
Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr (1989). Besides these articles, Donatella della 
Porta’s study entitled Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. A Comparative 
Analysis of Italy and Germany (1995) and Alison Jamieson’s work on the Italian Brigate
Rosse (both 1990) were a source of ideas and inspiration.  
What is common to all these studies is that they raise doubts about the validity of many 
popular  clear-cut  explanations  for  the  decline  of  terrorism.  For  example,  the  decline  of  
1 The most important of these publications are Cronin 2008, 2009a & 2009b; Horgan 2009a & 2009b; 
Bjørgo & Horgan (eds.) 2009, Jones & Libicki 2008. See also Gupta 2008; Demant et al. 2008. There are 
more ongoing research projects that have not published their results yet. These include e.g. “Why Do 
Terrorists Stop?”, a project led by Dr. Timothy Naftali and financed by the Smith Richardson Foundation. 
My case study of the Rode Jeugd is also part of the project.  The aim of the project is to produce in-depth 
case studies of the decline of various left-wing, ethno-nationalist and religious groups. For a tentative 
summary of research results of these case studies, see http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-
berlin.de/index.asp?id=2416&view=pdf&pn=tagungsberichte (retrieved on January 14, 2008). 
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terrorism does not seem to find its explanation from the success in reaching political goals, 
or from the failure to do so. Neither does terrorism seem to end generally because of the 
countermeasures taken by the authorities, although these clearly play a role. The studies 
also do not lend support to the popular notion that in order to stop terrorism, one should 
deal with its root causes.2 In fact, the process of decline is more complicated than any of 
these explanations suggest. 
In her above-mentioned study, Martha Crenshaw analyzes the life-span of 77 terrorist 
organizations. From this analysis, she concludes that the decline of terrorism could be best 
analyzed as interplay of three factors: the government response to terrorism, the strategic 
choices of the terrorist organization and its organizational resources. The key word for 
understanding the process is the interplay. There are often various developments that 
contribute to the decline of terrorism and the impact of individual developments is 
ultimately determined by how they are intertwined. For example, measures taken against 
the senior leaders of the Black Panthers did take the sharpest edge from the movement. 
However, Crenshaw argues that “its decline was also the result of organizational over-
extension, inexperienced cadres, loss of leadership through defections as well as arrests, 
unrestrained factionalism, and poor strategic choices”.3
Jeffrey  Ian  Ross  and  Ted  Robert  Gurr4 analyze the decline of terrorism by adopting 
Andrew Mack’s general analysis of the strategy of conflict as their framework. They start 
from Mack’s observation that the strength of the contending parties in violent 
confrontations is determined by their coercive and political capabilities. This means that 
terrorist campaigns presumably subside when the group loses a significant number of its 
capabilities. This loss can happen either internally to the group or to the larger 
environment. As a result of their investigation, Ross and Gurr identify four general 
conditions that can lead to a decline in terrorism. The first two, pre-emption and 
deterrence, result from counterterrorist policies that lead to the loss of a group’s coercive 
capabilities. More critical for terrorist movements, however, is the loss of political 
capabilities. This can generally happen either in the form of backlash or burnout. Burnout 
refers to the declining commitment to the group and its purposes within the group itself 
and backlash to the declining political support that the group enjoys.  
When  using  this  model  to  compare  the  development  of  terrorism  in  Canada  and  the  
United States in recent decades, Ross and Gurr discovered that terrorism often subsided 
due to a combination of these conditions, thus also lending support for the importance of 
examining the interplay of the different processes. Their study also emphasizes the notion 
that there are developments originating both externally as well as internally to the group 
that affect the development of terrorist campaigns. 
In a later article, Ted Robert Gurr has emphasized the role of a supportive climate.5 He 
argues that an erosion of political support is an underlying rather than an immediate reason 
for  a  decline  in  terrorist  campaigns.  Public  support  may  decline  for  many  reasons.  The  
first is the aforementioned backlash. The second reason is the increased risk involved in 
2 On the root causes discussion, see Bjørgo (ed.) 2005; Richardson (ed.) 2006; also e.g. Horgan 2005, 83–85; 
Richardson 2006, 55–59. 
3 Crenshaw 1991, 81. 
4 Ross & Gurr 1989. 
5 Gurr 1990. 
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supporting a terrorist group, which is called deterrence. The third reason for decline in 
support are reforms that meet some of the grievances of potential supporters of a terrorist 
campaign. Such reform may also be a policy that opens up alternative means to attain the 
objectives.  
Gurr points out that backlash within the wider public is not necessarily fatal. What 
matters much more is how the group’s (potential) supporters react. Further, the effects of 
deterrence depend on whether there has been any backlash or reforms. If no considerable 
backlash has taken place within the supporters, the deterrent effect is not likely to last 
long. Finally, Gurr notes that reforms are hardly going to affect people who are already 
strongly committed to a cause. Instead, the main effect that reforms can have is to 
undermine the political basis of the support for the campaign. 
It seems that the relationship between political support and the development of terrorist 
campaigns is by no means simple and straightforward. While the lack of any support 
clearly makes it difficult to continue terrorist action, a decline in support as such cannot be 
assumed to lead to decline in terrorist action. As it will become clear later in this study, 
one reason the Rode Jeugd decided to opt for more radical means of action was precisely 
its declining number of supporters. Since there were less people involved, they felt a need 
to look for new tactics that would compensate for their lack in numbers. A similar kind of 
observation has been made by Donatella della Porta with regard to the left-wing 
movements  in  West  Germany  and  Italy.  She  argues  that  the  more  organized  forms  of  
violence came into the picture when the mass mobilization started to ebb away and the 
movements returned to more institutionalized forms of action.6 Furthermore, in the later 
stages of a campaign, the declining support can lead a group to step up violence, for 
example, in an effort to polarize the society in order to avoid becoming irrelevant.7
One relevant question for evaluating the impact of various developments into the terrorist 
campaigns concerns the decision-making and priorities in terrorist organizations. There 
have been two common models into explaining terrorist behavior in the studies of 
terrorism, which are referred to as the instrumental model and the organizational model.8
The instrumental model looks at terrorism as an instrumental strategy, which is used 
for advancing political objectives.9 This  approach  is  basically  an  application  of  Thomas  
Schelling’s  theories  on  conflicts  to  the  use  of  terrorist  tactics.  According  to  this  line  of  
explanation, the decision to use or not to use terrorism is based on the calculation of the 
costs and benefits involved in alternative courses of action. Characteristic to this approach 
is also that the choices that the actors make are viewed as a chain of actions where actors 
react to each others’ actual or anticipated actions.  
6 Della Porta 1995, 53. Moreover Rubenstein (1987) argues, although from different grounds, that terrorism 
results from the failure of mass political movements. 
7 One of many examples of this is the escalation of the ETA campaign in the mid-1970s, a time when the 
dictatorship of Franco was replaced by a more democratic system. 
8 These are, by no means, the only models used in the studies of terrorism. Models and frameworks have 
also been derived from social movement studies (e.g. Della Porta 1995), conflict studies (Weinberg & 
Richardson 2004), and psychology (Taylor & Horgan 2006; see also reviews in Victoroff 2005; Kruglanski 
& Fishman 2006), to mention a few examples. For an overview, see Ranstorp 2007. 
9 See e.g. Crenshaw 1987 and 1990; McCormick 2003. 
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There are several contributions that discuss how exactly the strategy of terrorism 
works to further the group’s political goals (and whether it works at all).10 Terrorist acts 
can  be  designed  to  intimidate  or  wear  out  the  enemy  to  make  concessions,  spoil  
negotiations, provoke the enemy to actions that work in the terrorist group’s favor, 
polarize the society, or outbid the competitors with the show of strength and resolve. 
Terrorism has been viewed both as an overall strategy to achieve long-term political 
objectives and as a tactic by which to achieve smaller victories that contribute to the long-
term objectives.  
The calculations are obviously conducted under constraints and possibilities offered by 
the prevailing situation. There are various versions of this instrumental approach in terms 
of what kinds of assumptions are made about the constraints that bound the rational 
decision-making process. At the one end, one can assume an ideal-type situation where the 
actors have all the information they need for predicting the consequences of their actions. 
By knowing the actors’ objectives and the constraints and possibilities, one can therefore 
predict their choices. Other variants acknowledge that the actors do not have complete 
information about their operational environment, but that they act on their beliefs that do 
not fully correspond with “reality”. 
Following the logic of the instrumental model, terrorism would be abandoned when 
the situation changes in such a way that terrorism is no longer the preferred choice. The 
balance of costs and benefits may have altered, for example, because the authorities have 
introduced countermeasures that raise the costs of involvement in terrorism significantly. 
The  strategy  of  terrorism may also  become abandoned when new alternatives  arise  with  
better cost-benefit ratios. Such a situation may develop, for instance, when the government 
agrees to start negotiations with the organization. On the other hand, the organization may 
continue to apply its terrorist strategy despite its weak leverage and high costs if no better 
alternatives are available. Furthermore, the strategy of terrorism can be abandoned 
because the political objectives that the organization advocates are reached and therefore 
there no longer is a need to use the terrorist strategy. That is, at least, if the success does 
not lead the actors to use that strategy to achieve new goals.11
As  for  the  organizational  model,  it  starts  from  the  notion  that  terrorism  is  usually  a  
group action and thereby significantly influenced by organizational processes.12 This 
model derives extensively from organizational theory and from the natural systems model 
in particular.13 This model normally shares the instrumental model’s assumption that 
terrorists behave rationally14,  but it  proposes a different set  of goals and incentives.  Like 
any other organizations, an organization involved in terrorism is subject to various kinds 
of organizational dynamics and considerations that shape its actions. People who join 
these organizations have other incentives for participating than only working for the 
political goals that the particular organization represents. These other incentives may 
10 See e.g. Merari 1993; Kydd & Walter 2006; Neumann & Smith 2005; Abrahms 2006. 
11 Ross & Gurr 1989, 408.  
12 This approach is elaborated on especially in Crenshaw 1985; Crenshaw 1987; Abrahms 2008. See also 
McCormick 2003; Taylor & Horgan 2006; Oots 1989.  
13 For  example,  Crenshaw  draws  largely  from  the  writings  of  James  Q.  Wilson  (1973)  and  Albert  O.  
Hirschman (1970) while Abrahms refers especially to Chester I. Barnard (1938). 
14 On rationality of terrorism, see Caplan 2006; Gupta 2008. 
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prove to be even more powerful as a motivation for participation because they are more 
immediate and more likely to materialize.15
One of the more important of these incentives is the need to belong to a group, or “the 
sense of solidarity from participating in a social collectivity”16.  Along  with  the  need  to  
belong, other considerations such as the opportunity for action may weigh heavily. People 
may also join terrorist campaigns because of their desire for social status. Being part of a 
terrorist organization may provide its members respect and renown among their 
community  or  at  least  give  an  ego  boost  to  the  person  him/herself.  Generally,  the  
acquisition of material rewards often motivates individuals to join organizations, but it 
may play a lesser role in the case of the organizations using terrorism.17
This all has profound implications for the dynamics of terrorist campaigns. The 
presence of these other incentives makes the terrorist organization something other than a 
vehicle for political work. Thereby, the decision-making in the organization is influenced 
by various other considerations than merely furthering its stated political objectives. 
Sageman claims that organizational issues are likely to play an important role as early as 
in the beginning stages. Entrepreneurship may contribute significantly to the formation of 
political organizations and at the individual level, the need to belong to a group may be an 
important motivation.18 Their role may become even more important over time. James Q. 
Wilson,  one  of  the  key  theorists  of  this  approach,  has  observed  that  all  conspiratorial  
organizations tend to substitute group solidarity for a political purpose as their dominant 
incentive.19 The willingness to preserve the organization, and thereby the benefits that it 
brings to its members, may thus provide the primary logic for its action.  
Following from this, the objective (or even subjective) success or failure in reaching 
the stated political goals do not necessarily lead to the end of a terrorist campaign. Neither 
does it necessarily depend on the costs and benefits of other alternatives for achieving 
political goals. Instead, it can be expected that the group fights for its existence as long as 
it is able to provide those incentives that make it valuable to its members. Terrorism 
would, however, end when these incentives cease to be available, for example, if the 
solidarity and cohesion among the group breaks down, its members lose social status 
within their community or the group is not able to provide its members material 
incentives. 
The relevance of organizational concerns for the decline of terrorist campaigns finds 
further  support  in  several  studies,  among  others,  the  work  by  Donatella  della  Porta  and  
Alison Jamieson. In her study about the left-wing terrorist movements in Italy and West 
Germany, della Porta made the observation that the decline was “related to unforeseen 
consequences of the very choice of clandestinity made by small groups in democratic 
regimes”.20 These  led  them to  a  vicious  circle,  where  protecting  their  organization  from 
the repressive measures taken by the authorities led to increased isolation. According to 
15 See for example, the discussion in Richardson 2006, 71–103. 
16 Abrahms 2008, 95.  
17 Crenshaw 1985, 474–479.  
18 E.g. Sageman 2004.  
19 Ref. in Crenshaw 1985, 480. Also Della Porta’s study (1995) on the left-wing organizations in Italy and 
West Germany points to this direction. 
20 Della Porta 1995, 135. 
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della Porta, once a group started to operate underground, external aims tended to be given 
up and their efforts and resources were directed increasingly to survival. As survival 
required more and more of their resources, less was left for political actions. Furthermore, 
because the groups went underground, they were necessarily separated from their social 
settings. While many organizations tried to “keep their structures more open and 
decentralized”, the less clandestine model seemed to work for short periods only. As the 
groups tended to become more isolated, they were pushed to adopt more closed 
organizational models in order to survive the counterterrorist measures. As a result, their 
organizations became more and more introverted and less sensitive to external 
developments.21 The deteriorating effect of increasing isolation as well as internal fighting 
also stands out from Jamieson’s research on Brigate Rosse.22
Another interesting dimension of what an organization using terrorist tactics needs to 
do in order to stay functional concerns the maintenance of focus. As, for example, Martha 
Crenshaw and later John Horgan have brought up,23 these kind of organizations must 
prioritize action over talk in order to facilitate sustained involvement. This means that 
when the focus on violence or struggle against a clearly defined enemy is lost, the 
organization can then be in trouble. To counter this danger, organizations have directed 
their activities towards preparations and training in times when there has for one reason or 
another been less political action. From this point of view, allowing the organization to 
lose direction and organizational capacity emerge as possible contributing factors to the 
deterioration of a terrorist campaign.  
Soon after I began the present research, John Horgan published his first article about 
the disengagement from terrorism at the individual level.24 It brought further support for 
my tentative observations about some critical analytical distinctions. Disengagement from 
terrorism can, he argued, be either physical or psychological. In the case of physical 
disengagement, an individual no longer has opportunities to engage in violent behavior. 
This kind of change in an individual’s position may result, for instance from imprisonment 
or from being expelled or moved (voluntarily or involuntarily) to another role in the 
organization. Furthermore, physical disengagement from terrorist attacks does not 
necessarily mean that the individual stops his or her involvement in the organization. 
Psychological disengagement, on its part, is often a lengthy process, although some 
people who have left terrorist organizations have sometimes cited particular incidents or 
experiences as important catalysts. The seeds for psychological disengagement may have 
existed in an individual’s mind almost from the beginning if an individual has not been 
able  to  come  to  terms  with  all  aspects  of  their  involvement  in  the  campaign.  Horgan  
tentatively identifies three kinds of factors that seem to contribute to a move towards 
psychological disengagement.25 The first is the negative intensity of the group. In other 
words, while the group may be able to offer an individual such valued things as feelings of 
comradeship, a sense of purpose and admiration, the pressure and isolation resulting from 
living underground and how it makes the group increasingly isolated may at some point 
21 Della Porta 1995, 113–135. Similar kind of observations have been made by Martha Crenshaw (1991, 87). 
22 Jamieson 1990a; Jamieson 1990b. 
23 Crenshaw 1985, 476; Horgan 2005, 151. 
24 Horgan 2003. 
25 Horgan 2003, 115–120; also Horgan 2005, 149. 
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start to weigh heavily on the participants. The second factor identified by Horgan is the 
sense of changing priorities or the feeling that the prolonged investment in the campaign 
has provided the participants with little return. Thirdly, the individual may become 
increasingly disillusioned with the avenues being pursued, either concerning the political 
aims, the operational tactics, or the attitudes underpinning them.  
An important observation that arises from Horgan’s study is that physical 
disengagement does not necessarily lead to a lessening of commitment to the group. It also 
seems that physical disengagement does not necessarily indicate or result in psychological 
disengagement. Therefore, it seems appropriate to treat the abandonment of terrorist 
strategy and the development of the ideological beliefs and political goals of those 
involved as analytically separate processes.  
Horgan also brings up those dynamics that may complicate the decision to disengage 
from a campaign. One of these is the fear of retribution by others involved in the 
campaign. Even when there is no such fear, once an individual has physically disengaged, 
he or she probably has to escape law enforcement. For this reason, return to a normal life 
is  often  not  a  realistic  or  at  least  an  easy  option.  Furthermore,  as  Martha  Crenshaw  has  
suggested, the different environments may vary in their hospitality extended to re-entry. In 
her view, the ease by which the former terrorists can find their way afterwards in the 
society may depend on the public attitudes among the society or the current public 
policies. In cases where terrorism is continuous with non-violent forms of collective 
action, as often is the case in divided societies, reintegration may be easier. While offering 
reduced sentences or negotiations does not always lead to the desired outcome, Crenshaw 
believes  that  some  factors  can  be  helpful  such  as  “a  social  environment  that  does  not  
provide justifications for terrorism but permits integration, appropriate government 
policies that reward exit and institutions that facilitate the process”.26 Many observations 
similar to those of Horgan and Crenshaw regarding factors inhibiting or encouraging 
disengagement have been brought up in Tore Bjørgo’s studies on why people leave racist 
or nationalist youth organizations.27
To summarize, several important observations arise from these studies with regard to 
explaining the decline of terrorist campaigns. Researchers have identified significant 
developments and factors that can have an impact on the dynamics of terrorist campaigns 
on several levels. At the system level, we can point to the counterterrorist decisions and 
measures taken by the authorities, the development of larger political movement, and to 
the public support and attitudes of the mainstream society. At the group level, the internal 
dynamics that develop within the groups involved in a campaign clearly play an important 
role. At the individual level, we can point to developments such as a growing 
disillusionment with the attitudes and actions of those involved in the campaign and 
changing priorities. Common to all these previous studies and discussions is that all of 
them stress that the developments at different levels are interrelated and therefore their 
impact is conditioned by how they intertwine.  
26 Crenshaw 1995, 23–24. 
27 Bjørgo 1998; also Bjørgo 2009. 
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Furthermore, when assessing the impact of different factors, it is important not only to 
look at how things develop, but also at how they are interpreted by those involved in the 
terrorist campaign. As people act not based solely on the facts but also on their beliefs, 
then it is necessary to know the beliefs to understand the decisions. That the leader gets 
arrested, the group’s safe house is raided, or that the group faces increasing challenges 
with finding people to help it with logistics, are objectively verifiable incidents in 
themselves. Whether these incidents are akin to failure and what kinds of conclusions the 
group should draw from them, is a matter of their interpretation. 
Another important consideration that rises from these studies, and especially from the 
one by John Horgan, is that one needs to be clear about what the “end of terrorism” 
means. Horgan mentions that one should not equate the disengagement from taking part in 
terrorist attacks with the deradicalization of beliefs and goals, because neither one leads 
necessarily to the other. Furthermore, neither physical nor psychological disengagement 
necessarily leads to leaving the organization responsible for terrorism. While Horgan 
makes this observation at the individual level, my initial observations about the case 
studies suggested that the same may be true at the collective level. In other words, the 
demise of a terrorist organization, the decline of a terrorist campaign and the (collective) 
deradicalization of the beliefs and goals of the participants, should be treated as 
analytically separate processes that may or may not coincide with each other. 
1.2 Design of this study 
In my view, the most promising way to bring more light into processes that lead to the end 
of terrorism is to look at the development of the campaigns from the participants’ 
perspectives. In this study, my aim is to present the history of the two chosen campaigns 
as narratives that describe the situation from the participants’ points of view as accurately 
as possible. This, I believe, provides a good basis for evaluating the impact of various 
internal and external factors on the campaign. 
Such a narrative will by necessity be an approximation. To begin with, there are no 
sources that would enable the investigation of all aspects of the process (I will return to 
methodological questions later). Furthermore, I share the commonly held skepticism 
among historians about whether a historical account can ever truly capture the past, even 
when  it  is  based  on  the  best  selection  of  sources.  One  reason  is  that  there  is  always  an  
agent involved in putting together the narrative and the end result is always his/her 
interpretation.28 Therefore, the narratives that I provide of the campaigns reflect my best 
understanding of how the situation may have looked from the participants’ perspectives. 
A common objection against an approach that emphasizes the actors’ points of view is 
that the narrative easily becomes apologetic for the violent movement. Focusing too much 
on the inner world of the group also has the danger of portraying the movement 
28 See e.g. Collingwood 1946/1994 or, for a more radical deconstructivist view on history, e.g. Munslow 
1997.
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excessively as reacting to what the authorities or its other enemies have done.29 This 
danger certainly applies to all actor-oriented studies. In other words, the researcher should 
stay alert and explore his/her attitudes against the research topic to avoid bias.  
Besides apologies, in my opinion, a researcher of terrorism should be equally worried 
about the bias of condemnation. Alex P. Schmid made the observation two decades ago 
that most researchers of terrorism seem to have no reservations of adopting the “fire-
fighter” role with regard to terrorism. If one is interested in doing research that fulfils 
academic criteria, the role should rather be the student of combustion.30 That observation 
seems still largely relevant. Besides compromising the objectivity of the research, it is 
questionable whether approaching terrorism with this kind of “hermeneutic of crisis 
management”31 is going to yield good results. Just as much as the “interpretative 
approach”, this approach includes the danger that it leads to exaggerating the influence of 
measures taken by the authorities against the terrorist campaign.  
The purpose of this study is to improve our understanding of the dynamics of terrorist 
campaigns, not to evaluate or develop counterterrorist policies. I have therefore 
consciously distanced myself from the debate concerning what kind of counterterrorist 
measures could be recommendable and I have omitted a considerable body of theoretical 
literature about that. To be clear, the purpose of this study is not to justify or condemn the 
deeds by those who took part in the terrorist campaigns. Instead, my objective has been to 
take seriously the notion that terrorism can be studied like any other social phenomenon 
and try to conduct case studies that meet the academic standards as fully as possible. 
Before moving on to research questions, some of the key terms used in this study have 
to be defined. To describe the type of campaigns under study, I use the word “terrorist”. 
Since this term has strong pejorative connotations, it is not the best of terms to be used in 
academic research.32 To be sure, my use of the term should not be viewed as a political or 
moral evaluation. I use it simply to refer to a certain method of action. By terrorism, I refer 
to the premeditated (threatened) use of violence against people or property in order to 
provoke psychological reactions in a wider audience than the immediate victims and 
thereby to advance political objectives. A campaign can be referred to as being “terrorist” 
when terrorist means are used systematically and when these means play a central role in 
the campaign’s strategy.  
It  is  also  important  to  define  what  exactly  the  change  is  that  I  seek  to  explain.  
Generally speaking, the question “how terrorism ends” at the collective level can be 
understood either as a question about “how terrorist campaigns end” or “how terrorist 
groups dissolve”. It is true that the end of a terrorist campaign has often coincided with the 
demise of the organization that was responsible for it. However, splintering is also a very 
common  phenomenon  among  the  terrorist  groups.  It  is  also  common  that  when  the  
29 These issues are discussed in length e.g. in Thomas Robbins’ critique of Jeffrey Kaplan’s approach 
(Robbins 1997) and Kaplan’s response (1997). See also e.g. Guelke 1995/1998, 1417; Silke 2004a, 1922;
Silke 2004b. 
30 Schmid & Jongman 1988, 179. About this and the relationship between the policy-makers and research on 
terrorism, see e.g. Gurr 1988, 143–144; McCauley 1991 (and other articles in the first issue of Volume 3 in 
Terrorism and Political Violence); Silke 2004a. 
31 Brannan et al. 2001. 
32 About the history of the term terrorism and its problematic nature, see e.g. Schmid 1983; Schmid 1997; 
Hoffman 2006, 1–41. 
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original organization ceases to exist, a successor group continues terrorism, perhaps in an 
even more radical form than before. There are also several examples of cases where the 
organization prevails after terrorism has been abandoned. For this reason, it seems 
analytically more accurate to treat the abandonment of a terrorist strategy and the demise 
of that organization as separate processes.  
A third dimension of the “end of terrorism” is that of ideology, worldview and political 
goals. Previous studies on why people join terrorist organizations and on why they 
disengage from terrorism point to the fact that the changes in the participation in terrorist 
actions does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with changes in one’s political beliefs and 
goals. While this observation has been made primarily on the level of individuals, it seems 
sound also not to assume on the collective level that a change of strategy indicates a 
change in beliefs and goals.  
Therefore,  I  suggest  that  an  analysis  of  the  “end  of  terrorism”  should  make  the  
distinction between changes in strategy, organization and beliefs/goals. The change that 
this study seeks to explain is the abandonment of a terrorist strategy, that is, the end of a 
terrorist  campaign.  By campaign,  I  refer  to  a  series  of  violent  acts  committed  by  people  
who identify with the same terrorist network. This network may change its name or shape. 
Furthermore, I call these campaigns by the name of the principal organization that was 
involved in it.  
What constitutes a campaign is also a question of definition. The choice of the word 
campaign derives mainly from the desire to employ a category that would include not only 
the original group, but also its successor organizations or organizations where a significant 
number of people involved in the original group have continued their involvement in 
terrorist action. For a group to be considered a successor organization there must be 
continuity at the level of persons (people from the earlier organization playing significant 
roles) and ideology (the goals and ideologies are broadly speaking similar). I consider a 
terrorist campaign to have ended when the key persons involved in the campaign have 
ceased both the execution and planning of terrorist attacks. 
What  also  needs  to  be  expressed  in  more  detail  is  what  I  mean  by  a  group  or  an  
organization. Firstly, in the case of many groups involved in the use of terrorism in the 
Western countries, it would be misleading to treat them as solid organizations. Their 
organizational structure can be loose, sometimes to a degree that a good case can be made 
for them being mainly state-of-mind organizations.33 The  adherents  of  a  group  can  
therefore range from the core members to the more passive supporters who have not taken 
part in the actions themselves but have provided, for example, logistic support. What is 
also important to note is that while I speak about the group as a singular entity, I do not 
assume that these groups act unanimously and speak with one voice. It is clear that the 
members may have contrasting objectives and ideas and that this evidently also plays a 
role in the actions that are taken in the name of the group.  
In  this  study,  I  concentrate  on  examining  five  sets  of  questions  which  emerge  to  me  as  
important on the basis of previous research on the decline of these kinds of campaigns. 
33 Illustrative is the article of Roland D. Crelinsten about the FLQ, which demonstrates that contrary to what 
many people believe, the FLQ was hardly an organization at all (Crelinsten 1987). 
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The first three sets of questions involve the developments in strategy, organizations and 
ideology. As stated above, the abandonment of terrorist tactics does not necessarily result 
from, coincide with, or lead to, the disbanding of organizations, nor do they indicate 
changes in the political views of those who have been involved in the campaign. However, 
previous studies on the topic suggest that the factors contributing to the end of a campaign 
may include the internal group dynamics as well as disillusionment with the campaign’s 
goals or methods. Therefore it is of interest to know how the developments in each of 
these areas are linked in the cases under study. 
To outline the development of strategy, organizations and ideology, the following 
questions are of importance: 
Strategy: How did the strategy/means employed in the campaign evolve? How and 
why were decisions regarding the tactics and concrete actions reached? Furthermore, on 
what kinds of information and beliefs were those decisions based on? What results were 
then expected from the actions? And after the action was taken how was the actual 
outcome evaluated? Finally, how were the decisions regarding the strategy influenced by 
the availability of resources? 
Organization: What do we know about the development of organizational dynamics? 
Why and how was the “original” organization disbanded? Moreover, why and by whom 
were the possible successor organizations established? Why have there not been any 
(more) successor organizations committed to violent actions when the campaign had 
definitely ceased? How were the developments in organization linked to the changes in 
strategy? 
Ideology and political objectives: What kind of collective belief system did campaigns 
have?  How  and  why  did  that  change?  What  were  the  official  political  objectives  of  the  
organization?  How  did  they  change?  How  did  these  changes  affect  the  strategy  and  
organization of the campaign? Finally, how did those involved assess their success in 
terms of reaching political goals? 
The fourth set of questions concerns the incentives and interests that  affected  the  
development of the campaign. As it has been suggested above, the decisions that an 
organization makes are not likely to be based solely on determining how to work for the 
political goals most efficiently, but also the fact that the individuals and the group 
collectively have other interests and priorities that have a significant impact on their 
decisions. Based on previous research, the importance of these other considerations rather 
increase than decrease during the campaign. 
The fifth area of focus is the effect of external factors to the campaign. I concentrate 
particularly on the organizations’ interplay with the potential and actual supporters. The 
first step is to determine who they were, in other words, who those involved in the 
campaigns considered as their (potential) supporters and who reacted to the campaign in a 
manner that indicates that they saw themselves as representing the same kind of 
objectives. The next step involves examining the evolution of the interaction and 
communication between those parties. Secondly, I look at the countermeasures taken 
against the campaign by the authorities. This means that I will focus mainly on the police 
and on the other authorities responsible for internal security as well as the government. 
The analysis concentrates primarily on finding out what those involved in the campaign 
thought of the authorities and what they expected of them, how those in the campaign 
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viewed the countermeasures and the kind of effect  they had on the campaign. Thirdly,  I  
look at the type of media attention that the campaign attracted and the nature of the impact 
it had on the campaign.  
To gain a longer historical perspective on the end of terrorism, an attempt has been 
made to follow up on what the key participants in the campaigns have done afterwards. 
The reason for this is to determine whether or not these people have remained politically 
active and how their ideological beliefs have changed. This also allows us to see if and 
how they managed to re-enter society after their disengagement from terrorism.  
1.3 Methods and sources 
Since the case studies deal with campaigns that have ended decades ago, the methodology 
employed derives largely from the field of history. Following from this and the fact this 
study is about finding out how those involved saw their situation, primary source material 
on these campaigns constitute the backbone of the study. 
With the help of this primary source material, which I have supplemented by previous 
studies and press reporting, I have attempted to construct a narrative of the development of 
the terrorist campaign in the way they themselves saw it. To put this narrative into its 
context, I have used previous literature to describe the larger political and social 
environment in which they operated.  
In  this  endeavor,  this  study  has  drawn  on  Bonnie  Cordes’  article  on  the  terrorist  
literature.34 Cordes argues that “terrorist literature” provides a good window to the mind-
set of those involved in the campaigns. The documents do not generally serve only as 
propaganda for explaining and legitimizing the violent actions, but they also have an 
aspect of auto-propaganda. With the texts, those involved in terrorism introduce the 
political context of their struggle they way they see it and explain why those tactics they 
have chosen are both legitimate and necessary. The writings also often include references 
to current events and thereby give clues to the events and developments that may have 
shaped their ideas and evaluations. 
In  order  to  extract  this  kind  of  information  from  the  writings,  I  have  conducted  a  
simple content analysis on the written material produced by those involved in terrorist 
campaigns along the lines suggested by Bonnie Cordes. In particular, I have paid attention 
to such matters as their analyses of the prevailing situation, their identification of possible 
allies, their description of the enemy, the legitimization of their violent acts and their 
expressions that indicate the presence of mechanisms of moral disengagement as 
described by Albert Bandura.35
One of the major complaints about the state of terrorism studies has been the lack of 
source-based research on terrorist movements. Andrew Silke, for example, has claimed 
that the studies on terrorism live on a fast food diet by which he means that studies are 
34 Cordes 1988. 
35 Bandura 1990.  
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often conducted very quickly and utilizing questionable “ingredients”.36 It has often been 
claimed that source-based research on terrorist campaigns is particularly difficult. Such 
organizations are not famous for their activities being publicly documented in great detail. 
Moreover, getting interviews from those currently involved in terrorism is considered to 
be extremely difficult or even dangerous.  
In the face of many challenges, the researchers have become arguably lenient with 
themselves and other researchers on the methodological issues. One illustration of this is 
Silke’s analysis of the methods used in the articles published in the two major academic 
journals  of  the  field.  A  majority  of  articles  (62  per  cent)  were  based  on  a  documentary  
analysis  and  review,  while  interviews  of  any  kind  were  used  in  only  one-fifth  of  the  
articles.37
It  is  true that terrorist  movements are difficult  objects of study and that any study on 
terrorist movements is bound to encounter methodological problems. However, it is 
clearly  not  impossible  to  conduct  research  on  them based  on  primary  sources.  In  fact,  it  
may not even be as hard as it is often claimed. To mention a few examples, several 
scholars,  most  famously  J.  Bowyer  Bell,  have  managed  to  get  an  extensive  number  of  
interviews with people involved in the IRA.38 Another example is Mark Juergensmeyer’s 
study39 on religious terrorism, which is based on interviews with people from different 
religious denominations. In addition, Marc Sageman’s famous study on the al-Qaida 
networks relies heavily on interview material.40 Other scholars such as Jeffrey Kaplan and 
Helene Lööw have conducted studies on the far-right groupings relying heavily on 
fieldwork and interviews.41 Furthermore, members of the left-wing groups that were active 
in the 1970s have been extensively interviewed, for example, by Donatella della Porta42
and Jeremy Varon43.  What  is  also  worth  noting  is  that  while  active  key  members  of  the  
organizations are often indeed difficult to reach, it is easier to obtain interviews from less 
prominent members or people who are no longer actively involved in violent actions. 
Besides the interviews, many groupings have produced an astonishing amount of written 
material which is much more easily accessible than interviews.  
For this study, I have consulted four types of source material: communiqués and other 
publicized documents by the groupings involved in the two campaigns, other documents 
and correspondence that are available, autobiographies of the people involved in the 
36 Silke 2001, 12. For a review and criticism about the state of terrorism studies, see Silke (ed.) 2004; 
Ranstorp (ed.) 2007; Schmid 1983; Schmid & Jongman 1988; Zulaika & Douglass 1996 as well as articles 
in the recently established Critical Studies in Terrorism.
37 Silke 2001, 6. The analysis covers the articles published in Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism in 1995–1999. The exact results were: documentary analysis/review 62 per cent, 
documentary analysis/review combined with interviews 11 per cent, unstructured non-systematic interviews 
9 per cent, structured systematic interviews 1 per cent, database 7 per cent, surveys/questionnaires 3 per cent 
and no source, 6 per cent. According to a recent follow-up article, the situation has improved somewhat, but 
there is still a lot to do (Silke 2007). For the methodological critique of terrorism studies, see also Gurr 1988; 
Horgan 2004; White 2000; Schulze 2004. 
38 See e.g. Bell 2000. 
39 Juergensmeyer 2000/2001. 
40 Sageman 2004. 
41 Kaplan 1995; Lööw 1998. 
42 Della Porta 1995. 
43 Varon 2004. 
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events, and interviews conducted by this author with former participants. I will describe 
the material I have used in more detail in the later section dealing with the case studies. 
Obtaining  the  relevant  written  source  material  required  visits  to  several  archives  and  
libraries, but it did not pose any difficulties. Part of the material included in this study was 
obtained from the personal archives of the former members and Dutch journalist Frans 
Dekkers.  
Getting interviews from the former members of the groups under study proved to be a 
time-consuming project. In the end, however, I managed to get a comparably extensive 
and unique set of interviews for both cases, although “extensive” is a relative concept in 
this context. While hardly anyone responded with hostility to my first letter introducing 
my study, it sometimes took years before the initial hesitation turned into an approval. 
Had I not had the perseverance to write a letter every now and then to inform them that I 
would still be interested in an interview, I would have ended up with a much smaller 
number of interviews. 
Before undertaking this research, I had no contact whatsoever with either the people 
involved in the terrorist campaigns under study or with the journalists or scholars who had 
studied them. In the case of the Rode Jeugd, I had some help in locating the former 
members from the Dutch journalists Frans Dekkers and Antoine Verbij, but I took care of 
establishing those contacts myself. In the case of the Symbionese Liberation Army, I 
approached most former members directly. One interview request was mediated by an 
attorney because it was the only contact information I was able to find and in two cases, 
one respondent helped me contact other persons. 
Besides persistence, I noticed that my age and background worked in my favor.44 The 
fact that a postgraduate student from Helsinki, of all people, was asking for an interview, 
seemed to help me get their attention. At times, it almost seemed like my interview request 
was partly accepted because the person was curious to meet me. Furthermore, for someone 
who came from a distant country and was only born in the 1970s, it seemed easier to win 
trust as an objective researcher who was genuinely interested in hearing what they had to 
say. In the case of the Rode Jeugd, I am the only researcher who has managed to interview 
all the key members since the late 1980s. Several Dutch researchers have tried to 
interview the same people after me, but they had much poorer results. In the case of the 
Symbionese Liberation Army, I have had the opportunity to interview people who have 
never been interviewed about their part in the campaign before. 
The interviews I conducted could be best described as semi-structured theme 
interviews. As basis for the first interview with each respondent, I used the same 
questionnaire, which included questions about their involvement in the campaign and their 
life afterwards. The questions were largely arranged in chronological order and content of 
the interview came close to an oral life history. These interviews lasted between one and 
three hours. With several respondents, I had two or more interviews. The further 
interviews were arranged around themes that emerged as being important on the basis of 
the first interview and interviews with other respondents. All interviews were conducted in 
the native language of the respondent without an interpreter. I asked each respondent to 
sign a consent form explicating the terms under which the interview was granted. The 
44 A similar observation has been made by John Horgan (2004, 33). 
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respondent  was  also  asked  to  indicate  whether  s/he  would  like  to  remain  anonymous  or  
not. Part of the contract was also that the respondent had the right to check the accuracy of 
the direct references to the interviews with him/her before the publication of the study. It 
was agreed that the interviews could be used solely for academic purposes and by me 
only. The terms created many obligations and limitations for me, but I opted for such 
agreement in the hope that it would help me win their trust. In retrospect, I think that was a 
wise decision. 
While written source material indeed exists and it is possible to be granted interviews, 
the source material is at the same time limited in quantity and quality. There are not many 
documents produced by the participants that deal directly with the groups’ evaluation of 
the situation, the internal conflicts or a change of mind regarding the justifiable means. 
Some material that may have existed before has been destroyed in the 30 years that have 
taken place between the time this study was conducted and the developments under study 
took place.  
There are also several methodological challenges with using interviews as source 
material. One complicating factor is that the number of potential respondents is relatively 
small since very few people have been involved in the campaigns first-hand. Some of 
those have already died, others were difficult to locate, and still others were unwilling to 
talk about their experiences. The snowball sampling was not very efficient, either, because 
those  involved  were  generally  no  longer  actively  in  touch  with  each  other.  Therefore,  it  
was a challenge to obtain a representative sample of the participants to be interviewed and 
thereby to insure that all points of view have been taken into account in this study.  
The researchers have also called for a prolonged interaction with the movement under 
study to become immersed in the research field and to enable the researcher to penetrate 
the facade that the movement presents of itself to outsiders.45 Proper  field  work  in  the  
form of participant observation was naturally impossible in this case, because the groups 
were no longer active. However, I tried to address this challenge by interviewing the same 
people several times.  
Secondly, when drawing conclusions from the interview material, it is very important 
to  keep  in  mind  what  the  interviews  reveal.  The  first  point  is  that  the  respondents  may  
have their own agenda when agreeing to be interviewed, which can have a significant 
impact on the content and tone of the interview. As John Horgan has noted, terrorist 
organizations are aware of how they can benefit from academic research.46 Since the 
groups under study are not active, their political agendas are not such a concern as they are 
with active movements. Many other concerns, however, prevail. For example, even if 
there were no conscious agendas, the accounts may be colored by things such as the 
respondent’s need to justify his or her actions to him/herself or to others, or to make a 
point of him/ her having been right.  
Sometimes interviews on this kind of topic come to touch closely to very personal and 
emotional  memories.  Group  dynamics,  arrests  and  organizational  disintegration  are  
clinical terms, which actually refer to fierce disagreements between old friends involving 
feelings of betrayal and sometimes personal losses. Although a long time has passed since 
45 E. g. White 2000, 101. 
46 Horgan 2004, 34. 
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then, some of those involved are still not eager to elaborate, or to even to think back on 
these matters. In some cases, the matter is further complicated by legal considerations. The 
people involved in the campaigns have not always been sentenced for all of their illegal 
actions. For many of these crimes, they no longer can be prosecuted, but that this is not 
always the case. This can set considerable limitations for what the respondent can talk 
about, as well as create ethical questions for the researcher. Furthermore, the fact that 
there have been prosecutions on several cases of the political violence that took place in 
the 1970s in the United States in recent years, does not encourage the interviewees to be 
open about the more controversial sides of those times in their interviews. Concerning 
these issues, I found it best to try to avoid the problem beforehand by restraining from 
asking too detailed questions on the more sensitive issues, especially in areas that were of 
secondary importance for my research. 
As for the present study, matters were further complicated by the distance in time. 
There are various ways in which memory can become distorted. Daniel L. Schacter has 
summarized these as the seven sins of memory. Particularly relevant in this context are 
those of transience, misattribution and bias. With time, the memories tend to lose their 
specificity and lack details. They become blurred with other recollections and become 
more  general  descriptions.  The  person  may  also  fail  to  recall  the  source  of  information  
correctly  and  therefore  misattribute  it.  A  common  example  of  this  is  that  a  person  may  
think s/he remembers a situation from the childhood because s/he has seen photos of it. 
The sin of bias, on its part, “refers to distorting influences of our present knowledge, 
beliefs, and feeling on new experiences or our later memories of them”. What an 
individual believes in and is interested in now, influences also how and what s/he 
remembers his/her past actions.47
These kinds of issues of memory influence all interviewing, because interviews almost 
without  exception  deal  with  the  (more  or  less  distant)  past.  In  this  case,  however,  the  
distance in time was measured not only in weeks or years, but decades. There is evidence, 
however, that memories are rather stable when they become “archived”.48 Matters and 
events that prevail in this archival memory are typically experiences that are unique and 
salient and “relevant to the way one defines oneself”.49
As a result, recollections tell us basically how the respondent now remembers and 
views his/her past actions – or to be more precise, how he/she chooses to share these 
recollections with a researcher. These recollections are unavoidably influenced by 
hindsight, since an individual keeps on interpreting and evaluating his or her experiences 
and thereby possibly acquiring different meanings in different phases of his or her life. For 
these reasons, I am quite hesitant whether or not even the most honest interviews can 
provide the researcher with a fully reliable picture of the respondent’s images and 
perceptions of historical events. As with any other source material, interview accounts 
have to be compared with other sources. 
However, the issues of bias and transience by no means make oral history interviews 
useless for the researcher. From this study’s point of view, getting to know how people 
who were involved in the campaigns view their past actions, objectives and ideological 
47 Schacter 2001. 
48 See e.g. Hoffman & Hoffman 2006, 275–281. 
49 Hoffman & Hoffman 2006, 289. 
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beliefs today is very valuable. Examining these narratives and retrospective evaluations, as 
well as the present political activities and objectives of these people, constitute part of the 
efforts to understand how the change in political beliefs and objectives is linked to the end 
of their involvement in terrorist action. 
Furthermore, the fact that the recollections are always biased and selective does not 
mean that the information and perceptions provided by the respondents would be 
completely misleading – quite the contrary. Interviews can provide invaluable clues for 
the analysis of written source material. Moreover, arranging meetings with people who 
were involved in the campaigns can also open opportunities for obtaining access to 
personal archives. All information from the interviews and autobiographies has been 
carefully compared with other interviews and written source material to see whether 
information finds support elsewhere. I have also included detailed and extensive footnotes 
to the case studies to make it as transparent as possible as to the sources of my information 
and views. 
To help to situate the campaign into its context, I have collected media reports, both 
from the mainstream media and what may be called the “movement press”, that is, 
publications of other (radical) left-wing movements and journals that were otherwise 
sympathetic to the New Left. Besides the general tone and scope of reporting and opinions 
expressed about the campaign, I have used the media reports to track down the public face 
of the counterterrorist efforts: the kinds of statements the authorities gave to the press and 
what kind of information was published about the measures taken or planned. For practical 
reasons, I have concentrated mainly on the print media.  
I have invested rather heavily in this media analysis for many reasons: Getting media 
attention  is  elementary  for  all  terrorist  campaigns,  because  they  seek  to  exert  influence  
psychologically and therefore the acts have little effect if they are not reported in the 
media. Even stronger, especially in the case of a very small group, the media is the 
primary  arena  in  which  they  exist  for  a  larger  audience.  The  media  also  serves  as  an  
important communication function between those involved in the campaign, their potential 
supporters, the larger audience and authorities. 
In  order  to  discover  more  about  what  the  authorities  did  and  thought,  efforts  were  
made to procure official documents concerning the campaign. While a number of 
documents were obtained, a considerable part of them are still considered confidential and 
have therefore not been released. Information from these sources was complemented by 
the published memoirs of the former officials who were actively involved in the decisions 
or measures with regard to the campaign as well as by the interviews with these people. I 
have also made use of previous studies on counterterrorist policies. While I have also gone 
to certain lengths to obtain source material on this front, it has not been among my highest 
priorities. 
1.4 Case studies 
As case studies for this research, I have chosen the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the 
Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States. I started to look for case studies among 
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the organizations that were part of the New Left wave50 and that were active in Europe or 
in the United States. The vast majority of them fill the first necessary criteria that the 
campaign has definitely ended. Secondly, as I want to construct as thorough a description 
of the campaigns as possible, it is important that the source material that makes this 
possible. 
The  choice  of  such  marginal  campaigns  may seem odd at  first.  The  Rode  Jeugd had  
barely even started up its terrorist campaign and never went underground. The deeds of 
the  Symbionese  Liberation  Army  do  not  lack  in  their  radicality,  but  the  style  of  its  
communiqués and the conduct of its members have made people doubt whether it is more 
a heir of Charles Manson than Mao and Che Guevara.  
While neither of the two organizations selected represents the image of a typical 
terrorist campaign in the way that, for example, the Weather Underground, the Brigate 
Rosse or the Rote Armee Fraktion do, they may actually be just as common-place cases. 
According to the statistics that Audrey Kurth Cronin has compiled from the MIPT 
database, it has been fairly common for the campaigns to die away quickly. From the total 
number of 873 groups, only 457 filled the criteria of having targeted civilians (and not 
only property or military targets without civilian casualties) and having displayed 
sustained organizational capabilities.51
My  interest  was  also  drawn  towards  these  groups  by  some  initial  observations  with  
regard to the possible explanations for the end of their campaigns. The Rode Jeugd is 
interesting, for instance, owing to some comments that its former members have given 
about its decline (including the liberal climate and the situation in West Germany).  
As to the SLA, most attention has been directed to the case of Patricia Hearst. What is 
interesting beyond Hearst is that despite its very limited resources, the SLA managed to 
attract enormous media attention and to escape the authorities for a relatively long time. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to look at why the adherents decided to continue their actions 
and new people joined them even though most of the potential supporters quickly 
distanced themselves from them. With the recent arrests of former members, it has 
become possible to interview former adherents that have been living under new identities 
for decades. Another fact that spoke for these campaigns was that very little academic 
research has been conducted on these groupings, even though a substantial amount of 
primary source material is available, which means that there were also genuine 
opportunities to produce new historical information.  
The primary source material I have used for the case study on the Rode Jeugd includes 
an extensive number of publications by the group and its successors, including pamphlets 
and papers published by the group and its successors, its internal discussion paper, 
Voorwaarts,  and  several  unpublished  discussion  papers.  I  also  refer  to  articles  based  on  
the interviews that the former members have granted to journalists in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Furthermore, I have conducted interviews with nine people who have been involved in the 
campaign. This includes all key members of the Rode Jeugd who are still alive. With 
finding the former members, I received considerable help from a Dutch journalist, Frans 
Dekkers. After obtaining a general idea of where to look for them, most of their contact 
50 With waves of terrorism, I refer to the David Rapoport’s four waves of modern terrorism (Rapoport 2004). 
51 Cronin 2008, 77.  
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information could be found from the telephone book. The interviewees’ reactions to my 
first letter seemed to be shock and amazement, followed by further questions directed to 
me. After answering these questions, an interview was granted almost without exception. 
Some  of  them  agreed  very  quickly,  while  in  other  cases,  it  took  a  few  years  before  the  
curiosity and hesitation of some potential interviewees turned into acceptance. With one 
exception, no-one asked to remain anonymous. 
The  media  analysis  covers  articles  on  the  Rode  Jeugd  and  the  Rode  Hulp  that  were  
published in the most important Dutch newspapers (De Telegraaf, De Volkskrant, NRC 
Handelsblad, Het Algemeen Dagblad, Trouw, Het Parool), the local newspaper of 
Eindhoven (Eindhovens Dagblad) and in several weeklies (De Groene Amsterdammer,
Haagse Post, Vrij Nederland). As to the left-wing oriented publications, I have included 
De Rode Tribune (the publication of the competing Maoist organization), De Rode Vlag
(the publication of the original “mother group” of Rode Jeugd), De Rode Jeugd (ML) (the 
publication of the splinter group of Rode Jeugd), Rode Hulp (the  publication  of  the  
original Rode Hulp; the other publication with the same name, which was published by the 
Rode Jeugd influenced radical splinter group, is also included, but it is treated as primary 
source material) and Vrije Socialist (an anarchist newspaper). 
This study has also benefited from the previous accounts on the Rode Jeugd. The most 
elaborate texts on the Rode Jeugd are ‘n Hollandse stadsguerilla. Terugblik op de Rode 
Jeugd by the journalists Frans Dekkers and Daan Dijksman, which was published in 1988, 
and  the  MA  thesis  of  Eric  van  Staalduinen  under  the  title  Rode Jeugd 1966–1974: Van 
Provo aanhang tot RAF adept, which was completed in 1996. The first of these is an 
account on the Rode Jeugd in retrospect, based on interviews with almost all the former 
key members of the Rode Jeugd, most of whom Frans Dekkers, without ever being part of 
the Rode Jeugd, knows from those times. Considering its focus, this book has obviously 
provided valuable information and ideas for my study. However, as the book is mainly 
constructed around the various persons, it does not even attempt to offer a comprehensive 
view on the kinds of things that the Rode Jeugd did and how its aspirations and actions 
developed over time. This is exactly what Van Staalduinen does in his MA thesis by 
providing a chronological account of the history of the Rode Jeugd by relying on archive 
material  and the aforementioned book. His study is a very ambitious pursuit  to be a MA 
thesis and it has been very helpful for me in finding the material and in coming to grips 
with the development of the group. However, the thesis by Van Staalduinen leaves many 
questions crucial to this study either open or not addressed.52 Another MA thesis by 
Wouter Beekers, Mao in de polder: Een historisch-sociologische benadering van het 
Nederlandse maoïsme 1964–197853,  which  deals  with  the  history  of  the  Maoist  
movements in the Netherlands includes a few pages on the Rode Jeugd.. In addition, the 
documentary film Rode jaren about the Rode Jeugd directed by Leo de Boer was helpful.  
On the workings of the Dutch Security Service (BVD) in the case of the Rode Jeugd, a 
couple of books have been helpful. The first one is In dienst van de BVD, which is the 
memoir  of  Frits  Hoekstra,  who  worked  for  the  BVD  in  the  1970s.54 Hoekstra’s 
52 Moreover, in his study, there is some confusion regarding the timing of some incidents and developments 
which stem from the incorrect dating of pamphlets.  
53 Beekers 2005. 
54 Hoekstra 2004. 
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recollections  provide  a  glimpse  into  the  methods  that  were  employed  in  the  case  of  the  
Rode  Jeugd and  into  the  kind  of  results  they  obtained.  The  workings  of  the  BVD in  the  
case of the Rode Jeugd and the activities of the Rode Jeugd members afterwards are 
discussed in Giliam de Valk’s dissertation, as well as in Dick Engelen’s book on the 
BVD.55 Besides this, my analysis has benefited from cooperation with Beatrice de Graaf, 
who at the time was writing her book on the counterterrorism in the 1970s.56 I have also 
had access to a number of police and intelligence documents concerning the Rode Jeugd 
and its successors. 
In  terms  of  understanding  the  political  and  cultural  context,  the  studies  by  James  
Kennedy57 and Ruud Koopmans58 have been particularly useful. I have also used Antoine 
Verbij’s account on the left-wing radicalism in the 1970s59, as well as Jacco Pekelder’s 
study on the Rote Armee Fraktion in the Netherlands60.
In the case of the SLA, the primary source material I have used includes all publicized 
written  communiqués  and  transcripts  of  the  SLA’s  tape  recordings,  as  well  as  the  open  
letters sent by Russ Little and Joe Remiro during their imprisonment. Many of these 
communiqués and tapes are compiled in the book edited by Robert Brainard Pearsall61 and 
many more are reprinted, for example, in Berkeley Barb. I have also obtained a number of 
documents found from SLA safe houses under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act 
(FOIPA). Particularly important are also the two articles compiled by Susan Lyne and 
Robert Scheer in early 1976.62 They  include  the  Harrises’  account  of  the  events  without  
editorial comments, as well as several comments by Russell Little and Joe Remiro. A 
shorter version of these articles has also been published by The Bay Area Research 
Collective under the name of The Last SLA Statement.
Besides the written sources, I have used a number of interviews I have conducted with 
the former associates of the SLA during the period of 2005–2008. Getting the former 
members to grant interviews was both complicated and facilitated by the fact that several 
of them were at that time in prison. Although they were easy to find, arranging interviews 
was difficult. I approached all six imprisoned former associates with a letter. In one case, 
my letter was delivered to the person via an attorney. Through those imprisoned 
associates, opportunities arose to approach other people who had been involved in the 
campaign.  
In the end, I had the opportunity to conduct interviews with four associates of the SLA 
after the LA shootout. The interviews took place both in and outside prison. I have also 
had access to an unpublished memoir of one of these people. One of the respondents 
55 De Valk 2005; Engelen 2007. 
56 De Graaf 2010. We also wrote together an article on the early demise of the left-wing terrorism in the 
Netherlands, which will be published in Terrorism and Political Violence (De Graaf and Malkki, 
forcoming). 
57 Kennedy 1995/1999. 
58 Koopmans 1992. 
59 Verbij 2005. 
60 Pekelder 2007. 
61 Pearsall (ed.) 1974. 
62 Lyne, Susan & Robert Scheer: “Twenty months with Patty-Tania. By Bill & Emily Harris”, New Times
March 5, 1976; Harris, Bill and Emily, Russell Little and Joseph Remiro, as told to Susan Lyne and Robert 
Scheer: “The story of the SLA”, New Times April 16, 1976. 
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initially asked to remain anonymous, but withdrew that request after having read the 
manuscript and being released from prison. I have used only three of the interviews in this 
study. Namely, one of the respondents, Sara Olson, while she was curious to meet me and 
clearly liked me, was still very reluctant to talk openly about her activities in the 1970s 
and her time as fugitive. Therefore, the interview was of little help for this study.  
Conducting an interview in prison posed considerable methodological problems. It was 
not  possible  to  get  a  visitor  permit  as  a  researcher  or  journalist,  so  I  had  to  enter  as  a  
regular visitor. Under that status, I was not allowed to bring a pen, paper or any recording 
device with me. I was also worried whether there would be sufficient privacy to allow an 
openhearted discussion. The meetings took place in the visitor cantina, face-to-face with 
the interviewee. In all cases, it was possible to talk without anyone in the room 
overhearing us. In some cases, it was possible to take a walk in the yard for yet more 
privacy. The interviewees did not seem to be overly concerned about whether the prison 
authorities listened to our conversation. The guards were reportedly mostly interested in 
tracking any drug traffic-related conversations or smuggling attempts and were not the 
least bit concerned about such old political matters we were discussing.  
One  of  the  luxuries  in  the  prison  interviewing  was  time.  With  each  of  those  I  met,  I  
had at least two days of five hours completely dedicated to our discussion. After leaving 
the visitor center, I immediately recorded my memory of the interview on a digital 
recorder.  Right  after  that,  I  processed  the  recording  into  the  form  of  written  notes.  The  
interviews were supplemented by written correspondence that helped to verify my own 
recollections, especially with regard to factual information. Despite the limitations of the 
prison as a location for an interview, it was definitely worth all the effort and I feel that I 
have managed to account for the methodological challenges as well as it was possible 
under these circumstances. In terms of winning the trust and building rapport, meeting 
face-to-face was absolutely elementary. I believe that only by correspondence, I would 
never have been given the information and insights that I got this way. Having said that, 
the interviews differed much in terms of respondent’s openness for discussing their 
involvement  in  the  campaign  of  the  SLA,  much  more  so  that  was  the  case  of  the  Rode  
Jeugd.
Last, but definitely not least, there is the memoir of Patricia Hearst.63 This book 
provides  a  very  detailed  and  intimate  description  of  the  time Hearst  spent  with  the  SLA 
and a very rare glimpse into the life inside an active terrorist group. The first edition of the 
memoir  was  published  seven  years  after  the  events.  It  clearly  derives  heavily  from  
Hearst’s confessions and testimonies during her arrest and trial. Several questions can be 
posed about the validity of her account of the events, already based on her status as a 
kidnap victim and her mental state after first being held in a closet for several weeks. 
Several people who feature in the Hearst’s account have, however, have confirmed to me 
that the facts and interpretations that she presents are largely accurate. Her description of 
Bill and Emily Harris may be somewhat colored owing to her own position with regard to 
them and it is visible in the text that she was not familiar with the extraparliamentary 
politics of the day. These issues notwithstanding, things went by and large as she 
describes. To my knowledge, no-one involved in the SLA has publicly disputed her story 
63 Hearst & Moscow 1982. 
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apart from the way she describes her own involvement and attitude towards the SLA. 
Therefore, I have made extensive use of her account, but have always tried to find other 
sources to support and contrast the view that she has presented. 
Biographies have also been written about Joe Remiro, William Wolfe and Kathleen 
Soliah (later known as Sara Jane Olson). The biography of Joe Remiro64 is  written  by  a  
sympathetic journalist, John Bryan, and his own position towards Remiro clearly 
influences his account. This book has been useful in terms of understanding the milieu the 
SLA emerged from. Moreover, it provides insights into the milieu that surrounded the 
SLA. The biography of William Wolfe65 written by Jean Kinney concentrates 
predominantly on Wolfe’s life story. The book draws heavily from interviews with 
Wolfe’s family and friends. The biography of Kathleen Soliah, aka Sara Jane Olson66, has 
been written by Sharon Darby Hendry and published in 2002. This work was written 
without any cooperation from Olson and contains little original material. 
The media analysis of the SLA includes a local Californian newspaper, San Francisco 
Chronicle, a national newspaper, The New York Times, weekly magazines, Time and 
Newsweek, and a more limited selection of articles published in San Francisco Examiner
and Los Angeles Times. From the left-wing oriented movement press, I have gone through 
Berkeley Barb, The Black Panther, Guardian, Ramparts, New Times, Rolling Stone and 
Dragon. I have also used some KPFA radio broadcasts preserved by the Freedom 
Archives in San Francisco.  
An overwhelming majority of the books about the Symbionese Liberation Army have 
been written in the 1970s by journalists who were reporting on it or by people who had a 
personal link to either Patricia Hearst or the SLA members. The previous academic studies 
on  the  SLA are  limited  to  a  couple  of  Master’s  theses  submitted  around the  same time,  
although I am aware of another researcher who is currently studying the SLA as a part of a 
larger research project. The best book about the SLA by far is Voices of Guns by Vin 
McLellan and Paul Avery67. Another well-known book, The Life and Death of the SLA by 
Les Payne and Tim Findley68, is less detailed and less balanced although Tim Findley was 
among  the  stars  of  the  investigative  journalists  who  were  reporting  on  the  SLA  at  that  
time. However, credibility of their account suffers from providing overtly detailed and 
dramatized accounts of events for which there were no living witnesses who could have 
provided them with that kind of information. Furthermore, there are several articles on the 
developments inside the SLA campaign published in the 1970s that rely on interviews 
with those involved and provide accounts.69
The rest of the books are more about the writers themselves or Patricia Hearst. To 
mention a few, another frontline reporter on the SLA case, Marilyn Baker, describes her 
64 Bryan 1976. 
65 Kinney 1979. 
66 Hendry 2002. 
67 McLellan & Avery 1977. 
68 Payne & Findley 1976. 
69 Most importantly, two articles based on interviews with Emily and Bill Harris, Joe Remiro and Russ Little 
that were written by Susan Lyne and Robert Scheer and published in New Times (March 5 and April 16, 
1976). Also, there are two Rolling Stone articles written by Howard Kohn and David Weir (October 23, 
1975, November 20, 1975, April 22, 1976) which rely on information from Jack Scott and Steve Soliah. On 
these articles, see McLellan & Avery 1977, 384–385. 
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experiences in tracking down the SLA in her book entitled Exclusive!70. Patricia Hearst’s 
fiancé, Steven Weed, has also written his side of the story in My Search for Patty Hearst.71
William Graebner’s book Patty’s Got a Gun focuses  on  the  case  of  Patricia  Hearst  and  
particularly its reading72.
In the following two chapters, I will first present the history of both campaigns in a 
narrative form. After that, I go through the development of the campaigns focusing 
separately on strategy, organization, ideology and political objectives and external factors 
and examine what kind of similarities and differences can be found in the campaigns. In 
the concluding chapter, I will provide my analysis of how and why the campaigns 
declined and bring up the most important insights that can been drawn from them in terms 
of how and why terrorism ends and how to analyze processes that lead to it. 
70 Baker 1974. 
71 Weed 1976. 
72 Graebner 2008. 
34
35
2 The campaign of the Rode Jeugd 
The Netherlands of the 20th century is hardly known for its rich tradition of political 
violence. However, the first steps towards starting up an armed struggle were also made 
there at the same time as, for example, the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) began to operate in 
West Germany and the Weathermen conducted bomb attacks around the United States. 
These efforts were made by the radicals involved into a loose organization called the Rode
Jeugd (Red Youth). Like other New Left organizations involved in armed struggle, the 
adherents of the Rode Jeugd were also radicalized by the Vietnam War and believed that 
the  world  was  on  the  brink  of  revolution.  They  thought  their  struggle  was  part  of  a  
worldwide struggle against imperialism and capitalism and looked to China as the leader 
of the struggle. However, the activities of the Rode Jeugd or its successors never 
developed on the same scale as those of the RAF or the Brigate Rosse in Italy. 
2.1 The protest phase 
A historical account of the Rode Jeugd, which was published in its internal paper in 1973, 
divides the history of the group into two periods: the protest phase of the years 1966–1970 
and the period of resistance with the initiatives for armed struggle in 1970–1973.73 After 
the organization was disbanded in 1974, many of its former members continued their 
involvement in armed struggle in the context of the Rode Hulp (Red Help) and in other 
networks.  
The Rode Jeugd has roots in two directions – in the protest movement of the mid-
1960s and in a small Maoist organization called the Rode Vlag (Red  Flag),  which  was  
established by former members of the Communist Party of the Netherlands who were 
dispelled from the party following a dispute between those supporting the line of China 
and those supporting the line of the Soviet Union.74
In the mid-60s, the protest movement and mood was quickly building up in 
Amsterdam. The main phenomenon of these years was the Provo, which was established 
in 1965. This loosely organized movement was influenced by anarchist ideas and was best 
known for its style of protest. It aimed at provoking people by parodying the values and 
the way of living of the bourgeois. Provo was hugely appealing to protesting youths, and 
its gatherings drew together hundreds of people.75
The development of youth protests were closely watched by members the Rode Vlag. 
In their eyes, the spring of 1966 marked an important turn. In March, thousands of youths 
gathered in Amsterdam to demonstrate during the wedding of Princess Beatrix who, even 
though the Nazi Germany had occupied the country a couple of decades ago, married a 
73 “Bijdrage LLL: Rode Jeugd 1966/1970 – 1970/1973,” Voorwaarts, November 15, 1973. 
74 See e.g. Rode Jeugd Stadsgeurilla Cahier no. 1, 15. On the Rode Vlag and Maoism in the Netherlands in 
general, see Beekers 2005. 
75 On protesting in Amsterdam around the mid-1960s, see e.g. Bosscher 1992; Kennedy 1995/1999. On the 
political background of the Rode Jeugd, see also Van Staalduinen 1996, 15–52. On Provo’s history see e.g. 
Mamadouh 1992, 54–85; Pas 2003. 
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German prince. While the protests so far had been mostly cultural in character, this time 
there seemed to be clear political overtones. The Rode Vlag members were excited to see 
the youths taking to the streets to protest against the prevailing system, but they felt these 
youths lacked understanding on what they should do and on who they should target. To 
help the protestors with this, the young members of the Rode Vlag established a youth 
paper, which became called the Rode Jeugd (Red Youth), and they started to distribute it 
among the protestors and thereby educated those on Marxism-Leninism.76 Two central 
figures behind this paper were Willem Oskam and Joost van Steenis, both in their twenties 
and prominent activists of the left-wing scene.  
Besides the youth, workers also seemed to be becoming more active. In June of 1966, 
construction workers marched in the streets of Amsterdam to protest against unfair holiday 
bonuses. The demonstrations turned into riots when a man was found dead among the 
crowd. The demonstrators widely believed that he was killed by the police. When the 
morning edition of the populist-conservative newspaper De Telegraaf (correctly) reported 
that the man died of heart failure, the demonstrators, reinforced by many more people, 
stormed into its building.77
In the aftermath of these riots, the Rode Jeugd got its first moment of fame. A few 
days before they began, the Rode Jeugd had been handing out its third pamphlet in the city 
centre of Amsterdam. This pamphlet listed a number of American banks and other 
locations with their addresses and a following text: 
Above is a short and very incomplete list of American companies and institutions where 
the following things could be done: breaking windows, chalking anti-American slogans on 
the walls, setting fires and so forth. But as several of our “left-wing” newspapers and 
weeklies [...] have already stated vehemently, and we fervently agree, something like that 
would be scandalous! That is certainly hooliganism. Creatures who do such things are 
dubious people, beggars of the worst kind.78
The pamphlet landed in the hands of the widely respected novelist Godfried Bomans, who 
then accused the Rode Jeugd in his op-ed of being the culprits behind the recent riots.79
The op-ed drew considerable attention and led to the arrest of four Rode Jeugd members 
who were sentenced to four weeks in prison and a 1000 guilder fine. Bomans, however, 
received so much criticism for his writing and the consequences it caused, that he was 
forced to apologize. As a token of his regret, he donated 100 guilders to the Rode Jeugd’s 
fundraising campaign to cover the fines and legal costs.80
76 “Communique,” Rode Vlag 3, no. 6 (June 1966); Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad 1, 
no. 1 (June 1966); “Rode Jeugd bulletin nr. 1” (Rode Jeugd’s pamphlet, May 26, 1966). 
77 See e.g. Bosscher 1992; Kennedy 1995/1999, 155–158. 
78 “Rode Jeugd bulletin nr. III”, dated June 10, 1966. 
79 Bomans, Godfried; “De raddraaiers,” de Volkskrant June 18, 1966.  
80 Rode Jeugd managed to collect at least 1300 guilders by the campaign. The sum donated by Bomans was 
given to the National Liberation Front of Vietnam in Prague in the form of medicine and plastic. Eggen, Fr.: 
“Zilverlingen van Bomans”, Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-leninistisch jongerenblad no. 3 (1966); “De in ons 
land bekend staande humorist “Godvruchtige Godfried”...”, Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-leninistisch 
jongerenblad no. 4 (1966); “Voorlopige verantwoording steunlijsten Rode Jeugd,” Rode Jeugd – 
Marxistisch-leninistisch jongerenblad no. 5 (1966). 
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While the Rode Vlag leaders were pleased with the initial success of the youths their 
relations soon disintegrated. In the leaders’ view, instead of introducing the protesting 
youths to Marxism-Leninism, their own youths had become badly infected by the playful 
anarchist style of the Provo movement, which was the main phenomenon of the protests. 
When Willem Oskam praised the Provo and slandered the working class on the pages of 
the Rode Jeugd, Rode Vlag had had enough.81 The youths went on to establish the Rode 
Jeugd as an independent organization in October, 1967. Its first meeting, which was 
advertized during the Provo activities, was attended by about 60 youths, many of whom 
joined the organization.82
The first years of the Rode Jeugd were characterized by spontaneity and by their loose 
organization. Around the core leaders and key members, there were perhaps a few 
hundred youths, mostly workers. Activists who aligned with the Rode Jeugd took part in 
demonstrations, published their own paper, chalked slogans on walls and distributed 
pamphlets. In other words, the Rode Jeugd did not have any concise and strictly defined 
political program. Rather, its agenda and ideology was a mixture of Marxism-Leninism 
and the concerns of the protest movement. The Rode Jeugd was involved in protests 
against the US and for the liberation movements and took part in almost any leftist 
demonstration that was organized in Amsterdam. On the other hand, it brought to the fore 
the more traditional working class issues such as the poor position of young workers in the 
labor markets, the working conditions and wages in particular companies, and the 
development of communist movements elsewhere in the world.83
The Rode Jeugd became soon known for its hard approach. This means that they did 
not believe that peaceful protesting would lead anywhere and they therefore advocated 
more confrontational methods. When the Rode Jeugd adherents were confronted by the 
police, they did not withdraw but struck back. In the demonstrations, the Rode Jeugd 
people carried flags and placards bound on stout poles that were used as a cudgel and 
many youths also brought chains with them. It was exactly this militant attitude that made 
the Rode Jeugd attractive for those who got involved.84 This extreme approach became an 
important part of its self-image and its trademark that distinguished it from other Marxist-
Leninist organizations: 
De “Rode Jeugd”, the only consistent revolutionary organization in the Netherlands, WILL
realize its action program, step-by-step and despite the intimidation or reactions that it gets. 
As Marxist-Leninists, we consider it our responsibility to respond with ALL means to the 
insults and challenges posed by imperialist capitalism.85
81 For the dispute see Oskam, Willem: “Rode Jeugd intervieuwt Provo Rob Stolk,” Rode Jeugd – 
Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad 1, no. 5/6 (December 1966); Oskam, Willem: “De beweging en de 
stilstand,” Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad 1, no. 6 (January 1967); Oskam, Willem: 
“Leve de lange haren en de witte spijkersbroeken!!!!!!!!,” Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch 
Jongerenblad 1, no. 7 (April 1967); Bischot, C: “Proletariaat of Provotariaat?” and “Inhoud van Rode Jeugd 
valt niet onder verantwoording van redaktie Rode Vlag,” De Rode Vlag 4, no. 5 (May/June 1967). 
82 “Organisatie!!!!! Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad, no. 10 (October 1967).  
83 See Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad, no. 1–13 (1966–1968).  
84 E.g.  interview with  Aat  van  Wijk  on  March 24,  2003;  Interview with  Henk Wubben on April  3,  2003;  
Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.  
85 Publikatie Aktiegroep Rode Jeugd Eindhoven no. 1 (1968). 
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The same extreme approach, however, strained its relations with other Marxist-Leninist 
movements and to a degree, with the protest movement of the day.86 By 1968, it had come 
so far that the Rode Jeugd was often not invited to demonstrations. For the Rode Jeugd, 
though, not being invited seemed like the strongest invitation of all. An obviously 
frustrated Rode Vlag leader wrote about a Vietnam demonstration organized in October, 
1968:
Because  the  [...]  organizations  had  not  dared  to  ask  the  Rode  Jeugd  to  participate  
(apparently because of the prior experiences!), they [Rode Jeugd] found it necessary to 
suddenly show up with slogans that had nothing to do with defending the Vietnamese 
people. The police got a reason to intervene when other demonstrators, who wanted to 
remove these slogans, got into a fight with the Rode Jeugd.87
In the late 1960s, new Rode Jeugd branches were established in the various towns in the 
late 1960s. These were established by people who had come to Amsterdam for 
demonstrations, had met the Rode Jeugd people and had put together their own 
organization back in their home town. New Rode Jeugd branches were established in 
Eindhoven, IJmuiden, Kampen, The Hague and in several other cities (of which little was 
heard afterwards).88 The activities of the different branches took varying forms as a result 
of the differences in the local protest scene, the reactions from the authorities and the 
aspirations of the local Rode Jeugd leaders. In most places, their actions did not really go 
much further than chalking, distributing pamphlets in the streets and inside companies, 
and participating in the demonstrations.  
The most important of the new branches was that of Eindhoven. Towards the end of 
the 1960s, Eindhoven became a major locus of the Rode Jeugd’s radical actions. The Rode 
Jeugd in Eindhoven also emerged as a very open club of mostly working youths who were 
eager for action. The character of this branch, however, was strongly shaped by the local 
conditions together with the determination of its local leader, Henk Wubben. After 
returning from a thought-provoking eight years of sailing with the mercantile marine, 
Wubben joined the Rode Jeugd and established its Eindhoven branch.89
When it came to local conditions, Eindhoven was a much more conservative city than 
Amsterdam. Eindhoven was largely run by one party (Katholieke Volkspartij, Catholic 
People’s Party), one company (Philips) and one publication (Eindhovens Dagblad, the 
Eindhoven Daily). The Rode Jeugd in Amsterdam was one among many protesting 
groups, but in Eindhoven, it was practically the first youth group which outspokenly 
challenged the policies and values of the major power holders. The reaction of the 
authorities was harsh, reflecting a determination to prevent youth movements gaining 
86 See e.g. “De Vietnam-demonstratie van Piet Nak”, Rode Jeugd. Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad
no. 8 (1967); “Rode Jeugd. Ontstaan en ontwikkeling,” Rode Jeugd. Stadsgeurilla Cahier, no. 1 [1972]; 
“Bijdrage LLL: Rode Jeugd 1966/1970 – 1970/1973,” Voorwaarts, November 15, 1973; Interview with Aat 
van Wijk on April 17, 2007. 
87 Bischot, C: “Provotariaat of Proletariaat,” Rode Vlag 5, no. 1 (November 1968). 
88 See e.g. Publikatie Aktiegroep Rode Jeugd Eindhoven, no. 1 (1968); “Rode Jeugd aktief in het land,” Rode 
Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad, no. 13 (November 1968). About the activities of different 
branches, see Rode Jeugd – in dienst van het volk, no. 3 (1970), no. 1–4 (1971). 
89 Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 26–27. 
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ground in the city.  The first  arrests were made during the first  public action of the Rode 
Jeugd, which involved pasting wall posters about the situation in Indonesia. Besides 
taking photographs and finger prints and keeping the youths overnight in the cell, the 
police had, according to Wubben, informed their employers, “as if we had committed a 
murder.”90
Provocative confrontations with the authorities and especially with the police became a 
prevalent aspect of the Rode Jeugd’s actions in Eindhoven. They took the form of more or 
less spontaneous taunting of the policemen by shouting things, of damaging police cars, or 
of doing something to which the police would react but by making sure the Rode Jeugd 
people remained just out of reach. That seems to have been mostly an enterprise of certain 
younger members of the Rode Jeugd, while Henk Wubben was rarely seen taking part in 
these actions. 
Besides the authorities, the Rode Jeugd’s adherents frequently ended up in a 
confrontation with American soldiers who were based in West Germany and who 
regularly visited Eindhoven on their furloughs. These “beer patrols”, as the Rode Jeugd 
called  them,  came  several  times  to  the  Rode  Jeugd  stand  at  the  market  place  to  pick  a  
quarrel and to destroy the propaganda material. According to eye witnesses’ and the Rode 
Jeugd’s own account, the police were not eager to interfere with the fighting, which was 
interpreted as a sign of discrimination against the left-wing and progressive youths.91 The 
third front of these confrontations was at the factory gates. The Rode Jeugd youths came 
often into conflict with the security guards when they were delivering pamphlets to the 
workers who were entering the factory grounds.92
From the Rode Jeugd youths’ perspective, it looked like whatever they did, they were 
confronted by countermeasures. To defend its right of existence, the Rode Jeugd decided 
to respond to every action taken against them with an even harder reaction. This soon led 
to a process of escalation:  
In the morning, confrontation group of the Rode Jeugd goes to the [factory] gate to deliver 
pamphlets to the arriving workers with calls such as do not take this, protest, go to 
resistance,  etc.  Then the factory guards come and say,  you must  go away,  you are in  the 
territory of the factory [….]. A couple of days later, you go back [...]. Away from the sight 
is what was called a strike force. Again the security guards came out to beat us. The strike 
force stormed immediately to the fore and beat the security guards with cudgels.  
The next step was that you came back again with the confrontation group and the strike 
force to the gates and invite the security guards to come out. [...] If that did not help, then 
we came to the next phase […]. You located the house of the company’s director, chalked 
it, broke the windows and turned his car around.  
90 “Hoofdinspecteur de Jager contra Rode Jeugd” (Rode Jeugd Eindhoven pamphlet [July 1968]); Interview 
with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003. Reactions by the local police of Eindhoven to the first actions of the 
Rode Jeugd are also characterized as strong by the BVD (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, National Security 
Service) in its reports (”Rode Jeugd,” BVD report, February 2, 1973). 
91 “rj 7: Amerikanen in Eindhoven” (Rode Jeugd Eindhoven pamphlet [October 1968]); “Politie solidair met 
Amerikanen,” Publikatie Aktiegroep Rode Jeugd Eindhoven, no. 1 (1968); Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 29; 
“Politie zou niet hebben ingegrepen”, Eindhovens Dagblad October 7, 1968. 
92 E.g. interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003. 
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These are naturally hard and extreme methods, but other methods did not work in 
Eindhoven. We had to act this way, not only to continue existing as political movement, 
but also to enforce our authority. That was thus a culture of violence, an institutionalized 
culture of violence that was used against us in the first instance and which we resisted. 
That way you came to a process where one step provoked another.93 
 
The  most  famous  confrontation  of  the  Rode  Jeugd  with  the  authorities  took  place  in  
February, 1969. The Rode Jeugd organized a demonstration against Philips together with 
the Studenten Vakbeweging (SVB, Students’ Trade Union Movement)94 under the name of 
Aktiegroep Eindhoven Griekenland (Action  group  Eindhoven  Greece).  A  couple  of  
months earlier, Philips had opened a new factory in Greece which in the demonstrators’ 
opinion, indicated that Philips was supporting the US-backed military junta that had come 
to power two years earlier.95 Overall, Philips was a manifestation of those powers that the 
Rode Jeugd was opposing: imperialism and the local establishment of Eindhoven. 
The demonstration reached its climax when the demonstrators, led by Henk Wubben 
and Evert van den Berg (another prominent Rode Jeugd member of Eindhoven in the years 
to  come),  approached  the  statue  of  Anton  Philips  to  lay  a  wreath  made  of  barbed  wired  
and decorated with a swastika.96 The police had called the demonstrators to stay away 
from the statue,  and when that order was not obeyed, the police dogs were released and 
allegedly several plainclothes Philips security guards attacked the demonstrators. A couple 
of days later, the police commissioner, Odekerken, defended his decision in the local 
newspaper:  
The boundaries must be set somewhere and for me personally it was in front of the statue 
of Dr. A.F. Philips. Dr. Anton Philips has meant a lot to Eindhoven; to prevent this statue, 
his memory being damaged, I consider that I acted sensibly when I gave leave to release 
the dogs.97 
 
This demonstration was followed by a wave of reactions that brought the Rode Jeugd into 
the national awareness.98 For Henk Wubben, it cost his job, as it turned out that the 
company he was working for was linked to Philips.99  
The escalation process between the Rode Jeugd and the authorities in Eindhoven 
undoubtedly played a central role in Rode Jeugd’s radicalization. Faced with the ever-
escalating conflict, its members expected that a similar kind of polarized situation would 
                                               
93 Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003. 
94 SVB was a student union established in 1963 to advocate the interests of students with the French Union 
nationale des étudiants as its model. For more about the SVB, see e.g. Regtien 1969; Kijne 1978, 37–68. 
95 “Demonstratie zaterdagmiddag 22 februari […]” (Aktiegroep Eindhoven Griekenland pamphlet [February 
1969]). 
96 Eindhovens Dagblad February 24, 1969; Linden, Frénk van der: “’Ik zit gevangen in mijn eigen 
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97 “Politie gebruikte honden tegen demonstranten,” Eindhovens Dagblad February 24, 1969.  
98 E.g. Trouw February 26, 1969.  
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eventually develop in the Netherlands as already had occurred in West Germany and 
France. That suggested that a change of tactics was necessary: 
The tactics of extraparliamentary actions that the Rode Jeugd uses in Eindhoven will 
change significantly and fundamentally. The traditional forms of passive resistance such as 
demonstrations [...] have proven to be insensible and can be reconsidered. It has been naive 
and unrealistic to think in the first place that monopoly capitalism of the establishment 
would be moved by a pamphlet where the disastrous consequences of the capitalist system 
are underlined. [...] We must move from peaceful, sterile protests to progressive resistance. 
[...]  It  is  clear  that  our  tactic  [...]  has  to  be  to  wage  aggressive  urban  guerrilla  war.  The  
possibilities for such guerrilla struggle in the population centers of the west must be 
studied. [...] The use of progressive violence against the reactionary violence will thus lead 
to the total reorientation of the Rode Jeugd’s purpose, methods and ideology.100
It was announced that the Rode Jeugd in Eindhoven had adopted a new approach called 
Revolutionaire Buitenparlementaire Oppositie (REBO, Revolutionary Extraparliamentary 
Opposition), modeled after the German and French extraparliamentary oppositions. The 
use of violent tactics was justified by drawing a parallel between the Rode Jeugd and the 
guerrilla movements in the Third World. They all found themselves in similar kinds of 
situations and were acting as vanguards for the suppressed masses.101
After the Philips demonstration, the conflict continued to escalate in Eindhoven. This 
time, the Major of Eindhoven, Herman Witte, became their target. The Rode Jeugd 
accused him of unsavory behavior during the Second World War. In September of 1969, 
his car was hit by an incendiary device when he was returning from the opening ceremony 
of the new city hall. In response, the police arrested thirteen youths and seven of them 
were forced to sign a written commitment that they would not take part in political 
activities for the next six months.102 In June of 1970, the home of a police sergeant, Piet 
Snijders,  stationed  together  with  two  other  sergeants  in  the  inner  city  of  Eindhoven,  
seemed to have been the target of a fire bomb attack, although the bomb actually hit the 
neighboring house. A few months afterwards, three local Rode Jeugd members, including 
Henk Wubben, were arrested and held in custody until they were acquitted from the 
original charges, most of them being related to the aforementioned firebomb attack. 
Wubben himself ended up serving six months for another charge.103
100 “REBO”, Publikatie aktiegroep Rode Jeugd, no. 3 (1969). 
101 “REBO,” Publikatie aktiegroep Rode Jeugd, no. 3 (1969). 
102 Van de Pol, Dick: “’Iemand om zeep helpen is in onze ideologie volkomen vanzelfsprekend,’” Vrij
Nederland August 7, 1971; Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 30–33; “Oproep--oproep--oproep...” (Rode Jeugd 
pamphlet); In April 1969, a firebomb was thrown into Witte’s house, but the Rode Jeugd has always claimed 
that it was not responsible for that act (Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 30). 
103 Wubben was arrested as a suspect in a firebomb attack against a house close to where Piet Snijders lived. 
The police assumed that the perpetrators had mistakenly hit the wrong house. Wubben was found not guilty 
in the end (as was Luciën van Hoesel, who was also charged with the same deed), but he received a sentence 
of two months for another charge pressed against him in the same trial (destroying the carpet at the town 
hall), which was quite likely included in order to guarantee a conviction. The arrests trials are described 
from the Rode Jeugd’s point of view in Rode Jeugd vogelvrij? 1. Het Proces 2. Dubbelspion. Uitgave Rode 
Jeugd [1971]. The third member arrested as a suspect in the firebomb attack was Geert Paulussen, who was 
released without being tried after three months and soon afterwards was recruited as a police informant and 
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2.2 Split of the moderate wing 
While the Rode Jeugd kept radicalizing, the protest movement around it was also 
changing. This had a profound impact on the Rode Jeugd: 
The year 1970 was important for RJ, and it found its expression in 1971. After 4 years of 
disturbances, during which the Rode Jeugd kept going well, the movement began to ebb 
away. This happened in 1969 and 1970. With this, also the potential of RJ became slowly 
washed away. What was left were the motivated adherents, a few key members and the 
leaders. Whereas during the period 1966–1970, violence was used only in the form of 
stones, smoke bombs, cudgels and a few Molotov cocktails, in 1970, the discussion of 
more serious violence began, the development of the “urban guerrilla,” about which little 
was known at that time.104 
 
The protest movement, which was largely based on spontaneity, was losing momentum. 
Instead,  many  of  those  who  had  been  active  in  that  context  started  to  orient  themselves  
towards the established politics. Most typically, they joined small parties that had close 
bonds with the movement or the increasing number of single-issue (peace, environmental, 
etc.) organizations established within it.105 This was made possible by the attitudes of the 
Dutch elite towards the new political movements. Towards the mid-1960s, a rather 
common perception among the elite was that the world was changing quickly and it made 
no sense to fight against it.106 
For a small minority, which included the core of the Rode Jeugd, this co-optation and 
institutionalization was no way to go.107 With the ebb of the protest movement, however, 
the Rode Jeugd lost the majority of its adherents. What was left were the leaders and the 
most committed members.108 
The new situation intensified the discussion among the core members about the 
group’s future. While spontaneity had had its advantages in the earlier years when a large 
number of youths were easily mobilized into action, the new circumstances, according to 
the activists, called for stricter organization and for a more serious approach. This was 
demanded especially by Henk Wubben, who had never been a big fan of spontaneity. The 
Rode Jeugd put considerable faith in the working class youths to show themselves to be 
more revolutionary and committed than the students.109 
Besides good organization and discipline, a good revolutionary movement also needed 
a  clear  political  program.  This  turned  out  to  be  a  particularly  tricky  question.  In  the  
previous years, the ideas and activities of the Rode Jeugd in the different cities had 
developed in different directions and along several political lines. While the development 
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of the Eindhoven branch was generally met with interest and excitement by the Rode 
Jeugd youths in other cities, there were also critics.  
Efforts for a coherent program and a more structured organization were made already 
in  1969  when  the  first  congress  of  the  Rode  Jeugd  was  held.  On  that  occasion,  Willem  
Oskam was appointed as Rode Jeugd’s chairman and both Henk Wubben and Joost van 
Steenis were selected as the other members of the leading troika. Moreover, a document 
outlining its principles was drafted, but not everyone was happy with it.110
During 1970 and 1971, a fierce dispute developed among the Rode Jeugd. The battle 
about the appropriate course of action was waged with the writings of Marxist-Leninist 
classics as a weapon in the Rode Jeugd’s internal discussion paper, Voorwaarts
(Forwards). Opposed to each other were the moderates in Amsterdam and Kampen, led by 
Ton Meurs on the one side and the radicals, including the whole branch of Eindhoven and 
most of the Rode Jeugd’s leaders, on the other side. The key issue was very typical for the 
radical left-wing movements of its time: violence111 now or only later. That violence was 
necessary to further revolution was self-evident to all of them. 
For the moderates, the best actions of the Rode Jeugd were committed around the 
period of 1969–1970 in Amsterdam where the group had become active in organizing the 
youths working for the Albert Heijn supermarket chain. In those efforts, the Rode Jeugd 
was working along real communist lines and not caught in such sidetracks as insensible 
fighting with the authorities.112
In Eindhoven, community work never really took hold. The activities there were more 
characterized by direct action and by an ever-escalating confrontation with the authorities. 
The local Rode Jeugd members and most of the organization’s national leaders supported 
what  was  called  the  radical  or  Leninist  line.  Besides  the  classics  of  Marxism-Leninism,  
their ideas derived just as much from Carlos Marighella, whose manual for an urban 
guerrilla struggle had just been released and was being published in the Rode Jeugd paper 
in several parts, starting in August, 1970. The radical line was consolidated into a single 
document for the first time by Henk Wubben, but several other people also had a role in its 
development.  
Unlike the moderates, the radicals thought it was virtually impossible to bring the 
masses into power in fully industrialized societies by means of traditional workers’ 
organizations. This was because, the radicals reasoned, the workers had so hopelessly lost 
their class-consciousness that they no longer realized they were being exploited. So the 
best  way  for  the  Rode  Jeugd  to  bring  the  revolution  closer  was  to  act  as  a  vanguard  
organization. Through its actions, this vanguard should support the struggle in the Third 
World by attacking the capitalist institutions in the Netherlands and in that way, to 
escalate the destruction of capitalism along the lines of the encirclement theory of Lin 
Piao113. Based on that theory, they predicted that revolution would first succeed in the 
110 Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 33; Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; “Rode Jeugd wil aktie: 
beginselverklaring”, Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad, no. 1 (1970).  
111 The concept of violence included in this debate also acts against property, such as sabotage and firebomb 
attacks.  
112 “Diskussiegrondslag voor het congres van Rode Jeugd (ml) Amsterdam November 27, 1971”.  
113 The  encirclement  theory  of  Lin  Piao  had  a  strong  impact  on  the  Rode  Jeugd’s  worldview.  The  first  
reference to it is in the Rode Jeugd paper published in October, 1967 (Oskam, Willem: “De volksoorlog of 
de parlementaire weg,” Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad; no. 10 [October 1967]). 
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Third-World countries and then spread to the heartlands of capitalism. By driving 
capitalism into chaos at home, they could best help the progression of the revolutionary 
struggle and at the same time, they could demonstrate to the Dutch workers how the 
capitalist system could be effectively attacked. Furthermore, the vanguard would benefit 
from the mobilization of the masses in the Netherlands by developing tactics and by 
spreading information so that when the time comes to challenge the system, the masses 
would know what to do.114
The text also established the legitimization of violence: 
With this economic oppression, the owner practices violence against the working class in 
all  forms  from  physical  to  mental  violence.  Breaking  free  from  these  circumstances  
requires the take-over of means of production by the proletariat which returns them to 
society. To achieve this, it is necessary to respond to the violence of the ruling class with 
violence. [...] Because violence stems from economical relations and does not depend on 
any kind of ethical conceptions about freedom or humanity, we must consider violence as a 
technical question, as a political tool for destroying the adversary. From this perspective, 
the relationship between the objectives and means also becomes a technical question. The 
use of intimidation and terror is necessary in the fight against the private interests of the 
oppressors.  [..]  Here  [in  the  Netherlands],  we  are  facing  the  destructive  phase  [of  the  
struggle] and the situation requires from us that we use all possible means without 
reservations to achieve our objective, which at this phase is to drive capitalism into chaos. 
Fraud, intimidation, sabotage, destruction of lives, stratagems and so forth are necessary 
for this purpose. At this phase of the revolution, we must free ourselves from all values and 
norms of the ruling class because these rules restrict us and they are directed at preserving 
the status quo.115
Soon after Wubben’s paper was published, several key leaders of the Rode Jeugd were 
leaving for China. Theirs would be a three months’ visit on the invitation of the Embassy 
of China. Ton Meurs demanded that they should not travel. When they decided to leave 
anyway, the parties agreed on a ceasefire: the radicals would refrain from any further 
action and the moderates would not attack the radicals publicly.116
Meanwhile, the moderates drafted their response to Wubben’s paper. They claimed 
that its interpretation of the revolutionary struggle was outright dangerous for the struggle 
of the working class in the Netherlands. The moderates argued that the working class had 
not lost its class-consciousness. This was because monotonous work on the assembly lines 
increased class-consciousness and did not destroy it, as Wubben has claimed. So the 
moderates felt that the first priority at that moment was to organize the workers in 
companies and labor unions. In other words, inciting use of violence without the masses 
would only lead to the destruction of the vanguard. The moderates also accused Wubben 
of misreading Lin Piao’s encirclement theory.117
114 Voorwaarts 1, no. 4 (1971). The same text is published again in Voorwaarts 1, no. 5 (September 1971) 
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Very little came out of the agreed cease-fire. Before the leaders left, it was also agreed 
among the Eindhoven branch that, should there be one more attack against them by the 
police, they would attack the police commissioner himself. Sometime after the leaders 
were gone, another police operation took place and consequently, a firebomb exploded 
under the car of the police commissioner of Eindhoven. The Rode Jeugd claimed the 
attack.118
During the next few weeks, the secret headquarters of the Rode Jeugd in Eindhoven 
were visited by an army of reporters. In several interviews, anonymous Rode Jeugd 
members stated that things had gone so far that there could be deaths and they announced 
the group’s responsibility for several other deeds.119 A  weekly  paper,  Vrij Nederland,
published a full-page interview with a young man who was “22 years old and has a long 
hair” where he stated that no legal or moral norms restricted them in their struggle to bring 
down the system.120 In another weekly, a member of the Rode Jeugd stated that 
professional revolutionaries need money and therefore there was a expropriation program 
of a Dutch bank waiting for execution.121
The attack and the press campaign effectively sealed the split among members of the 
organization. The moderates responded by publishing a pamphlet where they proclaimed 
the  words  and  deeds  of  the  Eindhoven  section  as  being  misinterpretations  of  Marxist-
Leninist theory.122 The news about the bomb attack reached the Rode Jeugd delegation 
which, on their way back to the Netherlands in early October, 1971, stepped out of the 
plane in Brussels and travelled the rest of the way by train, fearing that the police would 
be waiting for them at the airport. While the leaders had argued that time was ripe for the 
use of violence, they were not totally pleased with what had happened. They did not have 
any complaints about the burning of the police commissioner’s car, but the younger 
members were severely criticized for the press campaign, which the leaders found 
unnecessary and counterproductive.123
The split of the Rode Jeugd was sealed in November, 1971. The moderates had 
summoned the Rode Jeugd members to a congress to sort out the differences. Only two 
activists supporting the radical line showed up, only to announce that all the moderates 
had been expelled from the organization. The moderates consequently established a short-
lived organization called the Rode Jeugd (ML).124
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Leninisten (BvNML or BNML, Bond of Dutch Marxist-Leninists), which was an organization established by 
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2.3 The resistance phase 
After a period of meetings and discussions, the first modest steps towards illegal work 
were taken in 1971. In 1972, these were extended, diverse contacts were established and 
experiences  were  gathered  in  this  terrain  that  was  new  for  all  groups.  It  brought  certain  
danger with it, because there was not a lot [of experiences] to draw from yet.125 
 
In  the  next  couple  of  years,  the  remaining  members  of  the  Rode  Jeugd  adopted  more  
serious  and  radical  ways  of  action.  The  term  urban  guerrilla  appeared  first  in  the  Rode  
Jeugd paper as early as in 1967. Then it was concluded that it was naturally not possible to 
start a guerrilla struggle in the Netherlands, but that the working class had to show its class 
solidarity with those people who were standing face-to-face with imperialism or are 
directly opposing it.126 Now, they were of differing opinions. At the same time, the more 
radical the group became, the more people left its ranks. 
Besides the withering of the protest movement at home, the strategy and worldview of 
the Rode Jeugd were challenged by some developments abroad. The Rode Jeugd had 
perceived itself as part of the worldwide revolutionary movement that was led by China. 
However, China’s commitment to the world revolution came seriously under question in 
the latter part of 1971, when China started to normalize its relations with the United States 
and announced that President Richard Nixon would come on a state visit. Around the 
same time, Lin Piao, the figurehead of the encirclement theory, died in a suspicious plane 
crash. The revolutionary community was there no more (if it ever existed in such form as 
they had envisioned), so the Rode Jeugd could not count on any such alliances.127 
In the coming months, new lines for the struggle were drafted.128 The  plan  was  
basically  to  start  building  up  an  urban  guerrilla  organization  in  the  Netherlands  with  the  
resources they had in hand.  
They did not expect the struggle to be easy: 
We  are  still  a  small  group  and  we  have  to  map  out  our  tactic  cautiously  to  avoid  us  
becoming destroyed before we have achieved our objectives. The first steps will be 
difficult. There will be strong attacks from the right but also from many who call 
themselves leftists. We have to convince these leftists by conducting the correct and clear 
politics. From the struggle conducted by Tupamaros, the RAF in Germany or the NRP in 
France, it has come out that many leftists are against the line of violence. But our politics 
are correct and by following our line consistently, after so-called “leftists” actions fail 
again and again, the majority of the leftists will start to support the line of violence and 
agree that we have to start the violent revolutionary struggle now. [...] At first, it will 
                                                                                                                                             
the Rode Vlag group in 1969 (see e.g. De Rode Vlag 9, no. 4 /  Rode Jeugd ml 2, no. 7 (June/July 1972); 
“Van de Rode Jeugd tot de nieuwe kommunistische jeugdorganisatie,” De Rode Vlag 11, no. 5 (June 1974). 
125 “Bijdrage LLL: Rode Jeugd 1966/1970 – 1970/1973,”Voorwaarts November 15, 1973. 
126 Rode Jeugd. Marxistisch-leninistisch jongerenblad no. 10 (1967), 14. 
127 Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005; 
Ottens, Luuk, Piet Hein Scheltens & Rob Siebelink: “’Muziek maken is een uitlaatklep, dat weet ik wel. 
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appear that we become isolated, but in the longer term, our force and support will start to 
grow quickly.129
In the internal discussion paper, three goals were identified for the urban guerrilla 
organization to accomplish. Firstly, it would prepare for revolutionary struggle in the 
Netherlands. This struggle was not expected to actualize in the near future. In the 
meanwhile, it would support the struggle of the people in the Third World by attacking the 
economic power of the imperialists in the Netherlands. Thirdly, contacts would be 
established with other guerrilla organizations in other West European countries. The 
purpose of those contacts was to provide help and to learn from those who had more 
experience with urban guerrilla struggle. 
The plan included creating an organization with legal and illegal branches. The illegal 
branch was to consist of largely autonomous cells that would train themselves through 
learning-by-doing and would school themselves further in Marxist-Leninist theories. 
Besides training and recruiting, the cells and the national command also needed to be 
involved in putting together the necessary material resources for the actions, such as cars 
and other transportation vehicles and weapons. At first, the cells should commit small acts 
such as graffiti chalking, setting cars on fire or breaking windows. Later, they could use all 
kinds of explosives to attack the economic and political power holders. It was emphasized 
that at all times, it should be made sure that they did not endanger the public.  
While  this  structure  was  to  be  created  for  committing  illegal  acts,  it  was  considered  
very important that, to avoid isolation and recruit new members, these professional 
revolutionaries would maintain their normal contacts within society and would be 
involved in legal activities. The illegal organization should be supported by a legal arm, in 
other words, a network of sympathizers could provide intelligence information, hiding 
places and other things that the illegal cells need.  
Some experiments with illegal actions were conducted as early as in 1971. Besides the 
attack against the car of the police commissioner in Eindhoven, Aat van Wijk recalls that 
there were a few unsuccessful bomb attacks, including an attempt bomb attack during the 
state visit of the Japanese Emperor Hirohito. A bomb was placed in the hotel he was 
staying at, but it failed to explode properly.130
In early 1972, the urban guerrilla campaign began. The first bomb attack took place in 
February, 1972, when a small explosion hit Evoluon, the exhibition center established by 
Philips in Eindhoven. The next morning, a letter signed by Philips Griekenland 
Aktiegroep (Philips Greece Actiongroup) arrived at the press office of Philips. In this 
letter, it was stated that Philips had one month to deliver one million guilders to the Greek 
resistance movement, otherwise the group would start its sabotage program and, if 
necessary, hold the directors of Philips personally responsible for their deeds.131
In the media, there was immediately speculation about a link between this action group 
and the Rode Jeugd. The Rode Jeugd had after all picked Philips as a symbol of 
imperialism and oppression of the working class, had held demonstrations against it and 
129 Voorwaarts 2, no. 2 (May 1972). 
130 Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003 & June 30, 2003. 
131 Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 55; “Rode Jeugd,” BVD report, February 2, 1973. 
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had distributed pamphlets among its workers. Furthermore, members of the Rode Jeugd 
had played a significant role in an action group that had earlier voiced a similar request to 
Philips.132 However, the spokesperson of the Rode Jeugd denied that the group was 
responsible for that action, but emphasized that the Rode Jeugd did not distance itself from 
such deeds.133
During the spring, there were many more small-scale bomb attacks (both successful 
and failed attempts) in Philips facilities, which went unclaimed. On April 24, bombs 
exploded in the Philips facilities in Rotterdam, Baarn and Hilversum.134 A month later, 
there was a bomb attack in the Philips facilities in Arnhem and an attempted attack in 
Amsterdam. Moreover, in early June, an attempt at a bomb attack was made in the Philips 
facility in Eindhoven, but that bomb failed to explode.135 These attacks were not reported 
in the media at that time.  
On  May  8,  a  previously  unknown  group  called  the  Revolutionair Volksverzet 
Nederland (RVN, the Revolutionary People’s Resistance of the Netherlands) claimed an 
arson attempt on the office of the Turkish Airlines in Amsterdam. It was announced that 
this attack was a protest against the execution of three left-wing extremists in Turkey.136
On June 18, another arson attack was made in the name of the RVN. This time, the target 
was the American Library in Amsterdam and this attack caused significant damage.137
Both the Philips Griekenland Aktiegroep and the Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland 
were action names of the Rode Jeugd that were used for illegal actions. In this way, the 
Rode Jeugd could remain a legal organization, only covertly supporting illegal actions 
taken by the ad-hoc commandos who operated under different names.138 Both the Philips 
132 “Sabotage?” (pamphlet of Aktiegroep Eindhoven Griekenland [May 1970]). 
133 See e.g. “Rode Jeugd: Wij pleegden aanslag op Evoluon”, NRC Handelsblad February 25, 1972; “Philips 
zwijgt nog over brief Evoluon”, NRC Handelsblad February 26, 1972; ““Philips moet politieke steun aan 
Griekeland staken”, Algemeen Dagblad February 26, 1972; “Vage brief actiegroep na bomaanslag op 
Evoluon”, Eindhovens Dagblad February 26, 1972; Geffen, Wim van: “Politie ontdekt hermost 
bomontstekingen”, De Telegraaf February 26, 1972; “Actiegroep zou dader van bomaanslag zijn”, Trouw
February 26, 1972. 
134 “Bomaanslagen bij Philips”, Het Parool April 24, 1972; “Bommen bij Philips nog raadselachtig”, De 
Volkskrant April 25, 1972; “Bomaanslagen op Philipsgebouwen”, NRC Handelsblad April 24, 1972; 
“Aanslagen op Philips werk van amateurs”, De Telegraaf April 25, 1972; “Actiegroep houdt woord”, 
Algemeen Dagblad April 25, 1972; “Bomaanslagen bij Philips”, Trouw April 25, 1972; “Rode Jeugd,” BVD 
report, February 2, 1973. 
135 “Loos bomalarm op Eurostrand”, Eindhovens Dagblad June 9, 1972; Geffen, Wim van: “Politieberaad 
over nationale terreuraanpak”, De Telegraaf October 18, 1972, “Philips-topmensen bedreigd”, Eindhovens 
Dagblad October 21, 1972; “Rode Jeugd,” BVD report, February 2, 1973. According to the article published 
in Eindhovens Dagblad, the bomb attacks in Arnhem and Amsterdam would have taken place in late April. 
136 “Misdaad werpt schaduw over weekeinde”, De Telegraaf May 8, 1972. 
137 E.g. “Brand in bibliotheek gesticht uit protest”, Het Parool June 19, 1972;”’Verzetsgroep’ claimt brand 
bibliotheek”, De Volkskrant June 19, 1972. 
138 Interview  with  Aat  van  Wijk  on  March  24,  2003.  However,  some  other  former  members  of  the  Rode  
Jeugd  have  made  reservations  for  this  interpretation.  Henk  Wubben  maintained  in  the  interview  that  the  
Rode Jeugd was not directly responsible, even though it did take political responsibility for the acts. He also 
said that it is not like the Rode Jeugd had nothing to do with the acts (Interview with Henk Wubben on April 
3, 2003). Therefore, it seems that his stand derives back to the view that the Rode Jeugd was the legal part of 
the campaign and the acts were not committed in its name and thus not acts of the Rode Jeugd. Evert van 
den Berg, on his part, recalls only that there were articles about these organizations in the Rode Jeugd 
publications. However, he was aware that there were some illegal operations taking place at that time, but he 
was not part of the cell structure involved in them (Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005 & 
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Griekenland Aktiegroep and the Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland were featured in a 
Rode Jeugd booklet that was published in August, 1972. The Philips Griekenland 
Actiegroep was portrayed as group acting independently of, but according to, the 
ideological lines set by the Rode Jeugd. As for the Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland, 
it was said that it had recently been established by a group of people from Marxist-
Leninist movements with the intention of building up an organization capable of 
committing illegal acts and to prepare for armed struggle.139  
In  October,  the  name  of  the  Revolutionair  Volksverzet  Nederland  appeared  in  the  
headlines again in the context of a series of attacks that caused considerable alarm. The 
first attack took place at the Holiday Inn in Utrecht on October 4. Two weeks later, there 
were several attempted or successful bomb attacks within days of each other. The targets 
of these attacks were the Bank of America in Rotterdam, Zwolsche Algemeene (which 
was owned by the major American company ITT) and one of the former top executives of 
Philips in Eindhoven.140 Those bombs were largely similar to each other and much more 
professional than the ones that were used in bomb attacks against Philips in the spring. 
These bombs bore resemblance to some bombs used by the RAF in West Germany.141 
These attempted bomb attacks caused great hysteria. In the latter part of October, there 
was a flood of false bomb alarms around the country.142 
The police concluded almost immediately that the attacks had to be the work of a 
domestic organization.143 Again, there was speculation about Rode Jeugd’s 
responsibility.144 More focus on the attacks came on October 21, when several newspapers 
reported that a letter was received by the media from the Revolutionair Volksverzet 
Nederland: 
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143 “Terreur houdt aan: in Utrecht bom gevonden”, NRC Handelsblad October 18, 1972; “Veel raadsels na 
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The Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland is responsible for the attacks on the Holiday-Inn 
Utrecht, the Bank of America R’dam and on the Z.A. [Zwolsche Algemeen] Utrecht. The 
attacks are directed against the U.S. imperialism in Vietnam and in Chile in particular. One 
should not expect us to distribute pamphlets any more. The struggle will be fought with 
weapons. Down with all American companies in the Netherlands. Long live the armed 
uprising. Venceremos.145
Another letter signed by the RVN was received by the top executives of Philips:  
Despite several exhortations, the executive board has not found it necessary to accept our 
request. Therefore, the tribunal has decided to go into the next phase of the action program. 
The last warning has been given. From now on, we will proceed to direct personal attacks. 
The tribunal has valued you personally at 48,000 guilders. Should you not pay, then the 
action group will apply the last phase to you or your surroundings. If you accept our 
suggestions, we expect you to place the attached advertisement on 26/10 or 27/10 or 28/10. 
Then, the action group knows that you want to accept the suggestions and will contact you 
in due time to arrange the transaction with you. In return, the tribunal will call off personal 
acts against you and your surroundings.146
One day later, yet another letter signed by the RVN reached the newspapers. In that letter, 
the RVN denied its responsibility and announced that it had not sent the earlier letter. 
Instead, it was claimed that the whole campaign was a stunt of the right-wing elements in 
the Netherlands and were aimed at turning people against the left-wing groups on the eve 
of the elections.147 In reality, this letter was written by those involved in the RVN to 
confuse the police and judiciary.148
Until now, other left-wing organizations had felt little need to discuss the doings of 
Rode Jeugd in their publications. After the bomb attacks in October, however, the 
competing Marxist-Leninist organization, KEN (ml), published an article on the bomb 
attacks in its newspaper, The Rode Tribune.  Here  the  Rode  Jeugd  was  accused  of  false  
revolutionary politics and called anarchist-terrorists who endangered the real revolutionary 
struggle by resorting to childish activities. Furthermore, the authorities were blamed for 
using the Rode Jeugd to discredit the entire revolutionary movement and to legitimize the 
development of stricter counterterrorist measures.149 In Vrije Socialist, a publication of an 
anarchist group, the Federatie van Vrije Socialisten, it was suspected that the attacks were 
145 “Politiek groep legde bommen”, De Volkskrant October 21, 1972. See also “Twee brieven van linkse 
extremisten”, Algemeen Dagblad October 21, 1972; “Philips-topmensen bedreigd”, Eindhovens Dagblad
October 21, 1972. 
146 Quoted in “Chantage op topmensen van Philips”, NRC Handelsblad October 21,1972. 
147 “Werkgroep op spoor daders bomaanslagen”, NRC Handelsblad October 23, 1972; “Volksverzet wijst 
bomaanslagen af”, De Volkskrant October 23, 1972. 
148 Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003. Evert van den Berg, however, did not recall the second 
letter (Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005). 
149 “Voor de revolutionaire massastrijd – tegen de individuele terreur”, Rode Tribune no. 13 (December 
1972). Before this, the Rode Jeugd’s deeds had been commented only on the publication of its mother 
organization, the Rode Vlag, at any length. In the dispute between the moderates and radicals in the Rode 
Jeugd, the Rode Vlag supported the moderates (see e.g. De Rode Vlag 8, no. 7 [1971]). 
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the  work  of  the  right-wing  forces.  How  else  could  one  explain  that  all  bombs  were  so  
visibly placed, that few of them went off and that no organization claimed and explained 
the attacks?150
The authorities seemed to be sure that the attacks were committed by the Rode Jeugd 
members but there was no conclusive evidence against any particular person.151 Since the 
question of responsibility for the attacks remained unanswered, there was room for 
speculations  in  the  lines  of  the  last  letter  signed  by  the  RVN.152 The Rode Jeugd, on its 
part, announced that it was not responsible for any of the bombs and did not know whether 
the RVN was responsible, but that this kind of acts got their sympathies.153 Later in 
December of 1972, Willem Oskam admitted in an interview that there were people from 
the Rode Jeugd in the ranks of the Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland.154
Even though the Rode Jeugd was behind the RVN and the PGAG (and most probably 
also behind most of the unclaimed bomb attacks against Philips), not everyone active in 
the Rode Jeugd were up-to-date with at least the practical side of the illegal activities. The 
organization was divided into legal and illegal parts, even though some of the people 
involved in the illegal acts also took part in schoolings and in other legal actions. Those 
involved in the illegal activities included at least Henk Wubben, Aat van Wijk and Luciën 
van Hoesel, and to some degree Joost van Steenis and Willem Oskam (who was 
sometimes left in the dark for the fear of him not being able to keep things secret). In 
addition, Theo Engelen and Theo Engelen, both central figures of the Eindhoven branch, 
were sometimes involved.155 Besides them, there was at least Jan Mölling, a Rode Jeugd 
member from Amsterdam, who helped by making the jackets for the bombs.156
During 1972, preparations were under way for the urban guerrilla struggle. This meant 
that weapons were bought and plans were made for renting safe houses and obtaining 
money through bank robberies. There were also renewed efforts for political schooling.157
However, just as the urban guerrilla struggle started to get off the ground a bit, some 
worrying developments took place. In West Germany, most of what later became known 
as the first generation of the RAF had been arrested and some of its members were killed 
by the police. If an organization such as the RAF, which was much larger and more 
150 “Terreur geweld”, De Vrije Socialist November 1972. 
151 See e.g. “Rode Jeugd,” BVD report, February 2, 1973; “Politie op spoor bomterroristen”, De Telegraaf
October 23, 1972. 
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October 18, 1972; “Chantage op topmensen van Philips”, NRC Handelsblad October 21, 1972; “Voor de 
revolutionaire massastrijd – tegen de individuele terreur,” Rode Tribune, no. 13 (December 1972); Rode 
Tribune Bulletin: Extra uitgave [October 1973]; Heyden, Jan van der: “Eindhovens Rode Jeugd-lid 
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Eindhovens Dagblad September 8, 1973; Chorus, Boudewijn: “Gesprek met Luciën van Hoesel: 
Bomaanslagen, de BVD, de Hoge Raad, en de Scheveningse gijzeling,” Haagse Post November 30, 1974. 
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154 Ubbink, John & Hans Polak: “Rode-Jeugd-secretaris Willem Oskam: ’Niet alleen zaak van bommen’,” 
Het Parool December 14, 1972. 
155 Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003; “Rode Jeugd,” BVD report, February 2,1973. 
According to the BVD report, Joost van Steenis would have been the leader of the illegal arm, but this was 
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sophisticated, could not survive, what would be the chances of the Rode Jeugd? In other 
words, if one knows that the organization would not be able to hold up for more than a 
very short time, would it make any sense to start with it at all? These were questions that 
many of the Rode Jeugd key members pondered. 
2.4 Decline of the Rode Jeugd 
After the bomb attacks, the authorities feared there were more attacks in the making and 
felt a need to take action against the Rode Jeugd.158 In December 1972, the police raided 
the houses of three Rode Jeugd activists. Two of them were released quickly, but for the 
third one, Luciën van Hoesel, the situation was more complicated. Under his bed, the 
authorities found boxes of bomb supplies similar to those used in the recent bomb attacks. 
Everything suggested that the authorities must have had an information source inside the 
group.  
The members fervently tried to hunt down the traitors among their ranks and organized 
support for Luciën van Hoesel’s upcoming trial. For this latter purpose, they took part in 
establishing an organization called the Rode Hulp (in English, Red Help). The task of this 
organization was to support so-called political prisoners, especially Luciën van Hoesel, 
but also the imprisoned RAF members and Palestinians. At the same time, they continued 
their activities as before and planned new bomb attacks. In March of 1973, when Van 
Hoesel’s trial started, the Rode Jeugd threatened public prosecutor J. Peijnenburg with 
revenge if Van Hoesel was sentenced. In addition, Philips was warned.159
Then in June of 1973, Ger Flokstra, a less prominent Rode Jeugd member, was 
arrested with a suitcase full of bomb supplies. That particular bomb was meant to be used 
in an attack against an American target similar to those attacks that had been committed in 
October. Again, it was obvious that there was an informant involved. According to a 
police document, the Rode Jeugd had come up with a plan to commit several bomb attacks 
to strengthen the position of Van Hoesel. But the police had followed Flokstra when he 
brought the bomb materials in a suitcase from Amsterdam to Eindhoven and stored them 
in  a  locker  at  the  train  station.  When  he  came  back  to  collect  the  suitcase,  he  was  
arrested.160
While the Rode Jeugd people recovered rather quickly from the initial shock caused by 
the arrest of Luciën van Hoesel, the arrest of Ger Flokstra paralyzed the group. By now, it 
was a well-known fact that there were informants inside the group. These arrests still 
158 “Rode Jeugd,” BVD report, February 2, 1973. According to a BVD report (”Informatie politiek 
terrorisme,” BVD report March 29, 1973), the arrests in December, 1972, mentioned below in the text were 
made because the authorities learned about the existence of two bombs. Due to circumstances, the operation 
had to be accelerated and therefore only Luciën van Hoesel was caught with bomb material. The Rode Jeugd 
has always claimed that the boxes in the possession of Van Hoesel were destined for the Greek resistance 
movement, LEA (Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 58–59; Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; 
Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003).  
159 Rode Hulp Informatie-bulletin, no. 2 (1973); “Rode Jeugd bedreigt officier van justitie,” NRC
Handelsblad  March 27, 1973. 
160 “Rode Jeugd”, found from the collections of Streekarchief Eindhoven (nowadays called Regionaal 
Historisch Centrum Eindhoven). 
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managed to plant a considerable degree of suspicion and almost paranoia among those in 
the organization. As a consequence, questions about trust and what to do with people they 
suspected of being informants consumed all their energy.161
The  Rode  Jeugd activists  of  course  knew that  they  were  under  close  scrutiny  by  the  
security service and they had indeed spotted informants among their ranks as early as in 
the late 1960s. It was also clear that if they wanted to commit to urban guerrilla struggle, 
they had to be disciplined enough to keep their plans secret. The organization, however, 
still remained very open, and the outer rings of the group were easily infiltrated by the 
security agencies. This was because each cell operated rather autonomously, and it was 
difficult to keep everything under control. This was not too threatening, as long as all 
confidential information stayed within the core group. The real problem was that while 
most core members developed high security awareness, there were some who had trouble 
resisting the temptation to share confidential information over a glass of beer.162
The Rode Jeugd, and especially Henk Wubben, put considerable effort into developing 
counterintelligence measures. Some of the informers, for example, were exposed or outed 
themselves, and were instructed to feed the BVD false information in return.163 The BVD 
“runners” were deceived by providing them with the same false piece of information 
through several informants, thereby increasing its credibility. In other cases, the Rode 
Jeugd publicly exposed the informers, thereby embarrassing the BVD.164
The issues of infiltration also gained a prominent role in the trial of Luciën van Hoesel. 
He initially got a sentence of three years for the possession of explosives, which was an 
exceptionally long term for such crime. Van Hoesel did not accept this verdict and 
appealed to a higher court. At this stage, his attorney, Pieter Herman Bakker Schut, and 
the Rode Jeugd members, made an attempt to cast doubt over the evidence that formed the 
basis for Van Hoesel’s sentence. They did this by exposing the details about one case 
where the BVD had used an informant in an attempt to incriminate another Rode Jeugd 
member. Danny Mulders, one of the less prominent young members of the Rode Jeugd, 
had come clean about his contacts with the BVD after his runner had allegedly provided 
him with money to buy a pistol and to return it with Evert van den Berg’s fingerprints on 
it. An official BVD history claims that Van den Berg himself instigated it and that 
Mulders surprised his runner with the gun.165 Be as it may, the issue was deeply 
embarrassing for the BVD. This evidence did not overturn the sentence of Van Hoesel, 
however, but he received a reduced sentence of two years in November, 1973. 
161 “Arrestatie week geheim gehouden. Politie Eindhoven pakt man met bomonderdelen,” Eindhovens 
Dagblad June 24, 1973; “Politie pakt man met materiaal voor bomproduktie,” Trouw, June 22,1973; 
interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003; Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; Interview 
with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.  
162 Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003, Hoekstra 2004, 75, Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-
leninistisch jongerenblad, no. 1 [1970]. 
163 Cf. Rode Jeugd leaflets: Rode Jeugd vogelvrij? 1. Het Proces 2. Dubbelspion. Uitgave Rode Jeugd
[1971]; Rode Jeugd vogelvrij. Het BVD spel [1973]; Rode Hulp Special, devoted to the Van Hoesel case 
[May 1974]; Rode Hulp, no. 7 (July 1974). 
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During the fall of 1973, it was becoming increasingly evident to the members of the 
Rode Jeugd that it was time for some drastic changes. It was at this point that the history 
of the Rode Jeugd, quoted several times above, was written. That history ended in the 
following way: 
It is clear that we all have still a lot to learn. There is no room for carelessness that can lead 
to blunders and bring the comrades and organization in danger.166
The members kept on analyzing the international situation and the learnings from other 
revolutionary movements to decide what they should do. There was no question that the 
revolution would come, but they clearly felt that the strategy of an urban guerrilla struggle 
needed to be defined better. The symbolic bombings against imperialist targets were still 
found to be productive and all in all, they remained steadfast in their belief that revolution 
was not possible without violence. In other words, any revolutionary organization that 
wanted to be successful and to be able to defend itself, needed not only a strong legal arm, 
but also an illegal arm. In fact, the recent example of Chile had proven that very point 
once again and there were no grounds to think that it would be otherwise in Europe. In 
West Germany, the whole Left was under pressure and a couple of hundred people had 
been arrested; in Belgium, newspapers and books were banned, the workers on strike were 
intimidated and fired. Moreover, in France, a number of left-wing organizations had been 
banned and in Italy, the police and fascist gangs were cooperating. The same trend had 
likewise taken place in the Netherlands, the establishment of “terrorist brigades” being one 
example of them. Therefore, it was necessary to build the illegal side of the revolutionary 
struggle also in the Netherlands.167
Concerning the legal arm of the struggle, it was concluded that they could not develop 
the type of political organization from the Rode Jeugd that could take up this task: 
The Rode Jeugd is organizationally not up to a long-lasting struggle in the metropolises, 
not well adjusted to the reality of waging armed anti-imperialist struggle and class 
struggle. It is therefore unavoidable that we have to remodel our organization. The image 
of the Rode Jeugd that is formed through several years’ practice does not go together with 
the level in which we need to start working. It can even be that this image hinders the 
building of a resistance organization in the Netherlands.168
 As a consequence, the organization was formerly disbanded on March 14, 1974, on the 
anniversary of the death of Karl Marx: 
The national command of the Rode Jeugd has decided to disband the Rode Jeugd as a legal 
political organization. The formation of sharpshooter brigades whose task is to kill, the 
establishment of the National Criminal Investigation Service for so-called ideological 
criminality, and increasingly stronger calls of the police corps in the big cities to broaden 
166 “Bijdrage LLL: Rode Jeugd 1966/1970 – 1970/1973,”Voorwaarts, November 15, 1973. 
167 Voorwaarts, November 15, 1973, especially “Bijdrage IV: De illegale organisatie”. 
168 “Bijdrage V: Enige opmerkingen over de legale organisatie,” Voorwaarts November 15, 1973. 
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their repressive apparatus, all these are seriously threatening the Rode Jeugd’s normal way 
of functioning. […] As the Rode Jeugd refuses to be voluntarily experimented on, or to 
serve as a target for the rising fascism any longer, the national command has decided to 
disband its legal status.169
In this press release, the need to disband the Rode Jeugd is largely explained by the severe 
counter-measures encountered by the organization. In the texts written by the Rode Jeugd 
members170 for more restricted consumption, the miserable state of urban guerilla 
movement in the Netherlands was blamed on the stagnation of theory forming. As a result, 
same old mistakes had been made over and over again. The problem with most Marxist-
Leninists was, from the Rode Jeugd activists’ point of view, that they stubbornly and 
uncritically held to the mass line and strived for building up a mass organization. In short, 
the Rode Jeugd did not have an understanding of the structure and development of 
imperialism at the global level and requirements that it established for the struggle. While 
focusing on the legal organization, they ignored the importance of building an illegal 
organization by its side to help it prevail the countermeasures by the capitalist and 
imperialist forces. In this situation, the Rode Jeugd, more than any other organization, had 
wiped away the dust from the old classics and dared to bring up the question of violence. 
To put it simply, the Rode Jeugd lacked supporters. Its relations with other Marxist-
Leninist organizations had always been troublesome. The movements such as the Bond 
van Nederlandse Marxisten-Leninisten171 and  the  KEN  ml  did  show  support  when  
someone from the Rode Jeugd was arrested and criticized the authorities for the way they 
attacked the Left172, but that was the extent of their solidarity.  
The second problem, specific to the Rode Jeugd, concerned their organization. The 
problem was that when it was decided to move from protest to resistance, the organization 
had not changed accordingly. The purpose had been to build up a resistance organization 
with well-schooled revolutionaries capable of consistent and disciplined action. 
Nevertheless, many of its adherents were young workers who acted spontaneously out of 
their dissatisfaction with the societal situation and they did not care for ideological 
schooling. Furthermore, the more experienced and motivated members had problems 
adapting to the new situation. The result was an organization with initiatives for 
resistance, but which continued to be characterized by spontaneity and openness.173
The lack of schooling was also seen as an obstacle in the further development of the 
Rode Jeugd’s own organization because it made it difficult to recruit new supporters or 
169 Cited in “Actiegroep Rode Jeugd opgeheven,” Eindhovens Dagblad March 15, 1974. 
170 “Bijdrage IV: De illegale organisatie,” Voorwaarts November 15, 1973; “Bijdrage V: Enige opmerkingen 
over de legale organisatie,” Voorwaarts November 15, 1973; “Voorwoord” and “Inleiding,” Over
gewapende strijd. Aanzetten tot de stadsguerilla in Nederland. 1966–1974 Rode Jeugd (Marxisties 
Scholings Kollektief 1975).  
171 The bond of the Dutch Marxist-Leninists, the successor of the Rode Vlag group. 
172 E.g. “Onmiddellijke vrijlating van Lucien v. Hoesel”, Rode Tribune no. 14 (January 1973); 
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allies, especially among the intellectuals. It was mentioned that the low theoretical level 
was one reason why some people, especially intellectuals, did not want to work with the 
Rode Jeugd.174 This showed a shift in the Rode Jeugd members’ thinking. The Rode Jeugd 
had been distinctively a working class movement. Its members had been suspicious at best 
about the leftist students who went to the factories to learn about the life of workers while 
the young workers, like they themselves, made every effort to get out of there.  
Even if things had gone awry with the revolutionary struggle, it was no reason to quit. 
There were, however, only a handful of core members who continued the struggle while 
the rest quietly left the scene. 
2.5 New attempts for revolutionary armed struggle 
In reality, the disbandment of the Rode Jeugd did not bring any big change to many of its 
key members’ activities. In the resistance phase of the Rode Jeugd, key members had 
already functioned in many ways rather autonomously and few had a concise overview of 
everything  that  was  going  on.  After  the  disbandment,  many  of  them  simply  went  on  as  
before with their own network of people and activities. The relations between the key 
members had become strained to the degree that it was felt that it would be best for 
everybody if they went their own ways. Some stayed in contact, but distanced themselves 
from the other members.  
The following years (1974–1976 in particular) were characterized by a search for ways 
to contribute to the world-wide revolutionary struggle. Preparing for an urban guerrilla 
struggle in the Netherlands was still on the agenda, but due to the increasingly 
unpromising perspectives, many former Rode Jeugd activists leaned more and more 
towards supporting other groups that already started the armed struggle. Generally, there 
was the feeling that while their motivation was still there, there were few opportunities for 
action. They were all so well- known to the BVD by then that it was hard to do anything 
without the agency being aware of it almost immediately. 
Support for other movements had been an important part of their activities almost from 
the beginning. From the late 1960s, together with other people in the Netherlands, they 
had provided logistic support for the Greek and Portuguese resistance movements and 
helped, with German activists, those American soldiers who did not want to go to Vietnam 
to escape from the army bases in West Germany to Scandinavia. When the preparations 
for urban guerrilla started in the early 1970s, the contacts with the German activists 
intensified. The key members of the Rode Jeugd have claimed that they provided many 
kinds of support for the RAF and other German activists later in the 1970s, but the extent 
of their activities is not clear.175 The Rode Hulp members sent all kinds of supplies to the 
imprisoned activists and helped them with legal issues by contacting lawyers. Some of the 
former Rode Jeugd activists have claimed that they assisted the German activists by 
obtaining explosives and guns, and by providing safe houses in the Netherlands. Indeed, 
174 “Bijdrage V: Enige opmerkingen over de legale organisatie,” Voorwaarts, November 15, 1973. 
175 Interview with Aat van Wijk on June 30, 2003; Interview with Henk Wubben on July 15, 2003; Interview 
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there is evidence that at least a dozen fugitive members of the RAF stayed in the 
Netherlands. The Rode Jeugd/Rode Hulp members therefore might have been involved in 
providing support.176
Besides that, there is some evidence of their attempts in the mid-1970s to help the IRA 
with obtaining weapons.177 Some people, like Luciën van Hoesel, as well as Mirjam 
Lucassen and Annie Westebring, who became active in the “Rode Jeugd” corner of the 
radical Left around this time, played with the idea of taking it one step further and leaving 
for Nicaragua or for some other place that offered better perspectives for revolutionary 
struggle.178
2.5.1. The Rode Hulp 
Several  people  from  the  old  cadre  of  the  Rode  Jeugd  joined  an  organization  called  the  
Rode Hulp (Red Help). As it was previously mentioned, this organization was established 
in January of 1973 to organize solidarity with progressive activists in trouble.179 Instead of 
merely joining, the former Rode Jeugd members rather kidnapped the Rode Hulp to use it 
as a legal cover to continue their efforts towards starting an urban guerrilla movement. 
This  displeased  many  of  the  original  members  of  the  Rode  Hulp,  who  soon  established  
their own short-lived organization, the Rood Solidariteitsfront (Red Solidarity Front).180
The former Rode Jeugd members who joined the Rode Hulp included Evert van den 
Berg and Luciën van Hoesel (after he was released from prison in late 1974 and had 
moved  to  Amsterdam)  who  became  the  central  figures  of  the  radical  Rode  Hulp.  They  
were joined by new people, most importantly, by Annie Westebring181, who became the 
secretary of the Rode Hulp. From the former members of the Rode Jeugd, Aat van Wijk 
and Willem Oskam were also active in the Rode Hulp, although Oskam remained more 
and more on the sidelines. For a long time, he worked in a progressive bookstore. In the 
years to come, the disappointment with the ever-gloomier perspectives for revolution 
seemed to hit this die-had leftist very hard.182 Joost van Steenis was also participating in 
the activities of the Rode Hulp for some time, but became expelled.  
Under the banner of the Rode Hulp, the participants had many discussions about the 
future of the revolutionary struggle and the role of the Dutch activists in it. However, 
when it came to concrete radical action in the form of bomb attacks and the like, not much 
happened. In May of 1976, the RAF leader Ulrike Meinhof died. Several people from the 
Netherlands traveled to Meinhof’s funeral and some of them gave a speech over her 
grave.183 After her death, there was a strong urge to do something. As a consequence, a 
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bomb was placed in the office of the main dealer of Volkswagen in the Netherlands, 
Autopon. A bomb threat call was subsequently made to the police in Amsterdam and the 
bomb was found before it exploded. There appears to have also been another attempted 
bomb attack that targeted the German company Hoechst.184
In the summer of 1976, a new opportunity presented itself for the radicals around the 
Rode Hulp. There was a chance to participate in a month-long training at the training 
camp of the Palestinian resistance organization, the PFLP185,  in  South  Yemen.  This  
opportunity was arranged by Ciska and Adrie Eeken. The couple felt sympathy for the 
Palestinian cause and they were involved in various kinds of support activities.186
The group that eventually left for South Yemen was organized by Evert van den Berg, 
Luciën van Hoesel and Annie Westebring. The offer to accept fifteen people for the 
training was incredibly royal considering the small number of people in the Netherlands 
who were interested in such an opportunity. Most of those few who were interested were 
monitored so closely by the security service that it  was difficult  for them to do anything 
without it being noticed. After a great deal of hesitation, it was decided to accept the offer 
and try to fill all the places, because such an opportunity did not present itself too often.187
The  list  of  people  who left  included  Evert  van  den  Berg,  Luciën  van  Hoesel  and  his  
girlfriend, Mirjam Lucassen. Adrie and Ciska Eeken also enrolled in the training, as did 
Annie Westebring and her boyfriend, Roel Koopmans. In addition, other participants were 
Lidwien Janssen and Rinus Nieuwburg from the network of Evert van den Berg in Breda, 
two other couples active in the radical leftist milieu, a Moluccan called Sam Pormes, 
recruited through Annie Westebring and an Irishman Flinton Vallery from the People’s 
Democracy invited by Evert van den Berg.188
The fifteen people who left for South Yemen did not form a homogeneous group. Each 
of them had their own agendas and came from different backgrounds. In an attempt to 
bring more cohesion into the group, a lengthy document189 was produced, with Evert van 
den Berg and Luciën van Hoesel probably as the primary authors, and it was signed by all 
travelers. This document was largely a summary of the Rode Jeugd ideology. The basic 
idea was to build up the logistics and organization in order to conduct a revolutionary 
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struggle in the Netherlands and to support the struggles elsewhere in the world. This was, 
however, only one of the agendas that the participants had in mind. Luciën van Hoesel and 
Annie Westebring at least had talked about the possibility of leaving for Lebanon and of 
fighting for the Palestinians, while others were more interested in helping the RAF.190
The training turned out to be a typical guerrilla training, including long days of 
gymnastic exercises, combat training, shooting and explosives training.191 That camp also 
had  a  group  of  Germans  who  seemed  to  have  been  there  for  a  longer  time  and  they  at  
times acted as co-instructors. This group was led by Siegfried Haag. In addition to Haag, 
Günther Sonnenberg, Verena Becker, Rolf Clemens Wagner, Rolf Heissler, Willy Peter 
Stoll and Elisabeth van Dyck were also reportedly there. While the Dutch did not know all 
of the real identity of all Germans during the training, Luciën van Hoesel recognized 
Elisabeth van Dyck as someone he had met in Amsterdam when she was hiding there. 
When Van Hoesel brought that up, he was confronted by the whole German delegation for 
this security blunder, which to them seemed like another addition to the list of amateurish 
deeds by their Dutch comrades.192
Even though the Dutch activists felt sympathy for their German comrades and had 
provided help for them, some ambivalence had remained concerning the methods used by 
the German urban guerrillas. The experiences with the Germans in the camp fed into that 
ambivalence. The RAF people irritated the Dutch because they seemed to think they knew 
it all better than the Dutch and showed how the revolution should be done. The relations 
were further colored by the historical hatred that the Dutch felt for the Germans.193
Instead of a new beginning, the South Yemen episode thus marked the beginning of 
the end. In retrospect, Evert van den Berg has concluded that all ingredients for 
disbandment were there before the trip, but it took a while to realize it.194
The whole trip to South Yemen was full of security blunders. To begin with, making 
such a journey clandestinely while being so closely watched by the security service was 
quite a challenge. The participants were aware of that, but their eagerness to leave 
overcame their concerns for their security.195 Furthermore, the participants made the 
situation even worse by their own actions. For instance, for their travel arrangements, they 
used regular travel agencies, which noticed a sudden increase in queries for alternative 
travel routes to South Yemen. Evert van den Berg’s retrospective statement that he made 
in 2005 that “we could have just as well rented a tourist bus”196 is hardly an exaggeration. 
Moreover, it did not help that prior to the trip, Ciska Eeken had travelled with a collection 
of  passport  photos  of  all  the  participants  to  the  Middle  East  and  that  these  photos  were  
found and copied by security guards at the Schiphol airport in Amsterdam.197
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The trip was further compromized by the way the participants were selected. This 
compromise was largely based on “whoever wants to come can come” principle. The 
biggest mistake was, according to the participants, that people were allowed to take their 
boyfriends and girlfriends with them. Besides bringing a sufficient degree of social drama 
with it, the selection process produced a very heterogeneous group of people.198
When accepting such an offer as the training was, it was evident that the time might 
come to return the favor. This came shortly afterwards. Ciska Eeken received a request 
from Wadi Haddad of the PFLP to inspect the arrangements on board in an Air France 
flight to Tel Aviv. Originally, Luciën van Hoesel and Mirjam Lucassen were supposed to 
go, but cancelled, because they were afraid they were too well-known to go through the 
passport control without being recognized. In the end, it came down to Rinus Nieuwburg 
and Lidwien Janssen to carry out the assignment. They boarded the flight in Paris on 
September 24, 1976. Rinus Nieuwburg travelled to the end destination, New Delhi, 
whereas Lidwien Janssen left the plane in Tel Aviv where it made an intermediate 
landing.199
When Janssen arrived in Tel Aviv, she was told that the authorities had been informed 
that there was a bomb in her suitcase. After the inspection, she was directed to the airport 
police office where a representative of Mossad came to question her.200 It soon became 
clear that Mossad was well informed about her past activities. According to Lidwien 
Janssen,  it  seemed  that  it  was  mostly  the  PFLP  and  not  really  the  Rode  Hulp  that  
interested the authorities, even though they seemed to be very well informed about the 
latter, too.201 Her case was handled in the court in early 1977. In March, she was sentenced 
to six years for indictment, espionage and for helping a hostile organization. She was 
released three years after her arrest.202
After Janssen had left the plane, Rinus Nieuwburg flew the whole way to New Delhi 
as planned and continued his travel unhindered to Bombay. Later, he went to the airport to 
meet Janssen, as was agreed in advance, and got arrested. That arrest put him in a difficult 
situation. This was because there was no extradition treaty between India and Israel, and 
hardly any evidence to press charges against him. Returning to the Netherlands was 
difficult, because he did not have enough money and the airline companies were not 
particularly keen to have someone suspected of planning a plane hijacking as their 
passenger.  With  the  help  of  the  other  Rode  Hulp  activists,  a  deal  was  negotiated  with  a  
Dutch journalist that in return for arranging Nieuwburg’s travel to the Netherlands, 
Nieuwburg would grant an interview.203
Before the interview with Nieuwburg was published in November, 1976, the arrest of 
Lidwien Janssen, as well as the training in South Yemen, had already received extensive 
coverage in the Dutch media. Immediately after the arrest of Nieuwburg, a small story 
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appeared in a newspaper about a Dutchman who was arrested in Bombay. For the Rode 
Hulp  activists,  that  was  the  first  sign  that  the  operation  did  not  go  as  planned.  
Confirmation for this came early the following morning when the police showed up on the 
door of the Rode Hulp activists and conducted house searches.204
In this situation, there seemed to be only one thing to do. On December 31, 1976, the 
disbandment  of  the  Rode  Hulp  was  announced.  Just  like  when  the  Rode  Jeugd  was  
disbanded, the actions by the authorities were mentioned as a cause for their decision. It 
was claimed that the criminalization politics of the Dutch government and the “bourgeois” 
media had greatly impeded the Rode Hulp’s work as a relief agency. It was also pointed 
that these instances were influenced by the Israeli secret service and propaganda 
machination, which tried to label the Rode Hulp as a terrorist organization.205
Another wave of operations against the Dutch activists took place in January of 1977, 
most evidently prompted by the confessions of Lidwien Janssen in Israel.206 This 
operation was so extravagant that it must have been organized to also work as a deterrent. 
It does not seem to be out of the question that pressure from Israel to act firmly against the 
people suspected of cooperating with its adversaries played a role as well.207 To those 
arrested, the situation seemed almost comical: 
They came to arrest us [Annie Westebring and Roel Koopmans] in the morning. There 
were  a  lot  of  red  lights  and  policemen  everywhere.  We  were  first  brought  to  the  police  
bureau in Groningen and later that day, we were transported to Amsterdam, separately, 
because we were so dangerous [she laughs]. One of us was transported via Amersfoort and 
the other one via the Closure Dike. I still remember that I could not help laughing in the 
car when then told me this.208
The tour-de-force was largely unnecessary, because most of the trainees and their 
accomplices had already drawn their conclusions. With the ever-increasing attention by 
the security services and the experiences with the training, the contemplations about the 
possibilities and expediency of an urban guerrilla struggle had reached a culmination 
point. Luciën van Hoesel had told the reporters, even before the Rode Hulp was 
disbanded, that it was high time for him to distance himself from the armed struggle.209
For some, one reason for this was the experiences in South Yemen. The training put 
them face-to-face with the reality of armed struggle much more concretely than they had 
been before, which made some of them feel uncomfortable. Lidwien Janssen has said that 
it was only there she realized how much the weapons were the last option, and how 
weapons give a false feeling of power. She spoke about this with the Germans in the camp 
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206 Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 152–153; also interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007. 
207 The  impact  of  Israel  on  the  measures  taken  by  the  Dutch  authorities  in  the  case  of  Rode  Hulp  was  
speculated e.g. in Sauer, Derk & Remmers, Henri: “Rode Hulp: ’Dood en verderf is niet onze stijl’,” Nieuwe 
Revu November 19, 1976. 
208 Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007. 
209 E.g.  Sauer,  Derk  &  Remmers,  Henri:  “Rode  Hulp:  ’Dood  en  verderf  is  niet  onze  stijl’,”  Nieuwe Revu
November 19, 1976.  
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who stated that once you use weapons, you realize that you won’t reach thirty.210
According to Mirjam Lucassen, when she and Luciën were training with the weapons in 
the camp, they did not really think that they would use those skills against other people. 
Only after the training, the consequences of a full-fledged involvement in the armed 
struggle started to sink in. To continue with the armed struggle would mean that they 
should put their acquired skills into practice. This was too much for them.211
The explanations that those who were active in the radical Rode Hulp have given for 
their detachment from armed struggle have most often included two elements: continuing 
the armed struggle became impossible because the security service was too well informed 
and up-to-date of their activities and the liberal climate destroyed their motivation. With 
their withdrawal, the contacts between the former comrades also quietly faded away. 
In  the  case  of  Luciën  van  Hoesel  and  Mirjam  Lucassen,  the  long  process  of  
disengagement crystallized in a particular moment. During a nightly bus ride home during 
the fall of 1976, Luciën and she sat on the last bench and agreed that they should stop 
altogether with what they had been doing in the past years. They decided to try out 
something completely different for a while, and maybe try again the armed struggle after 
few years. 212
Shortly after that bus ride, Van Hoesel and Lucassen got married, moved to Groningen 
in the north of the Netherlands, and started a family. As for their political activities, trying 
something “completely different” became joining a political party, the Pacifistisch 
Socialistische Partij (PSP, Pacifist Socialist Party). That decision has been later explained 
by Mirjam Lucassen followingly: 
We had always been in the same lines with the PSP with regard to how the economy 
should be organized, how the society should be organized, you name it. Only the armed 
struggle was somewhat  contradictory,  because the PSP was pacifist  and we were just  the 
opposite. But if you come to the point that you decide to end armed struggle, then that last 
difference is [...] gone. That was then the only party that came into question. [...] I think 
what has also played a role is that we thought that if we joined a political party, then we 
would be safer, then you were part of something. You can of course start up something 
yourself, but nobody will believe you and you continue to be placed in that same corner.213
For the PSP, letting the former urban guerrilla fighters join was apparently no problem. In 
the local elections of 1978, Luciën van Hoesel was the leading candidate of the PSP and 
got elected.214 In his own opinion, his past has only helped him in his career as social 
worker. As Lucassen has later noted, Van Hoesel’s past made it easier for him to win the 
trust of those youths he worked with. Ironically enough, his job brought him face-to-face 
210 Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 120–121. 
211 Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006. On the other hand, Rinus Nieuwburg told in an 
interview in late 1976 that the experience with the training in South Yemen strengthened his motivation to 
fight against capitalism. However, in the same interview he told that he would not participate in the armed 
struggle in the future (Remmers, Henri & Sauer, Derk: “Marius Nieuwburg: Een mislukte terrorist,” Nieuwe 
Revu November 12, 1976).  
212 Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006. 
213 Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006. 
214 E.g. “Ex-leider Rode Jeugd kandidaat gemeenteraad”, NRC Handelsblad November 17, 1978. 
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again with the same prosecutor who was involved in the lawsuit that brought Van Hoesel 
his prison sentence.215
Evert van den Berg also joined the PSP around the same time, and he has continued to 
be active in the parliamentary context ever since. “A political animal does not stop”, as he 
put it. It has cost him time and energy to make his way and to eventually win the respect 
of  everyone,  but  the  fact  that  it  has  succeeded,  has  been  a  proof  to  him that  a  return  to  
society was still possible.216 Together with another former Rode Jeugd activist, Theo 
Engelen, he was a representative in the agglomeration council in Eindhoven in the early 
1980s. While both of them had at that point left their revolutionary past behind, the 
security service was not convinced about this and recruited people to monitor them. This 
became public when the recruited informants told about the operation to Evert van den 
Berg.217 In 1986, Van den Berg was elected to the city council of Eindhoven and in 1994–
1998, he worked as a policy maker for the parliamentary faction of parties propagating the 
interest of elderly people. Today, he assists the representatives of the local council in 
Eindhoven in policy-making. From time to time, his past has been brought up. “If you are 
35 years active in the politics, you naturally make some enemies”.218
Like Van Hoesel, Evert van den Berg has felt that his involvement in the Rode Jeugd 
has helped him in his life. It was an important emancipating experience for him. On the 
other hand, the fact that he has been able to make a political career afterwards has changed 
his attitude towards the prevailing system: 
At one moment, I decided to take another direction […]. I remained politically active. I 
had to fight my way in, but in the end, I have gained the respect of all parties, including 
even my former enemies. That shows that the liberal climate was there. I think that has 
certainly contributed to my deradicalization. And that I have got rid of some of that anger I 
had when I was young.219
Like Luciën van Hoesel and Mirjam Lucassen, Annie Westebring also left Amsterdam and 
moved to Groningen. She found a new political home in the anarchist movement, which 
was much more rewarding and comfortable than the militant radical Left had ever been. 
Unlike the Marxist-Leninist movements, the anarchist movement, in her opinion, 
acknowledged the diversity of human beings and the richness that it brings to life. 
Westebring became active in many kinds of grass-root activities and ran an anarchist 
bookstore for some time. Over the years, she has worked as a teacher and a chef and 
nowadays, she is involved in the education of challenged children through giving them 
lessons in cooking.220
Even though leaving the armed struggle behind appears to have been rather easy and 
smooth in practice, it did not happen in the blink of an eye. None of those involved were 
sought  by  the  police  or  had  any  other  of  the  sorts  of  practical  issues  complicating  their  
215 Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006; Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 58. 
216 Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005. 
217 E.g. de Valk 1996, 80–81. 
218 Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005. 
219 Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005. 
220 Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007. 
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detachment. For Evert van den Berg, “stopping was one thing, dissolving another issue”. 
He told me that it took him a long time to look after people in his network and to make 
sure they would not get involved in the same kind of action again.221 It also seems that for 
many, it took a long time to process the meaning of their experiences and their choice to 
abandon the idea of armed struggle. 
Not everyone, however, stopped their involvement in the armed struggle in 1976. One 
of  those  who  continued  was  Aat  van  Wijk.  After  the  Rode  Jeugd,  he  was  active  in  the  
context of the Rode Hulp, mostly in the form of helping imprisoned German activists by 
sending them goods and by speaking to lawyers on their behalf. He did not leave for South 
Yemen, but was asked by Evert van den Berg and Luciën van Hoesel to provide logistical 
support for their group after they had returned home.222
When Rode Hulp was disbanded, he continued for a while in the Rood Verzetsfront
(RVF, Red Resistance Front), an organization that was established shortly afterwards 
(more about the organization in the below). In 1979, Van Wijk left that organization as it 
became clear to him that the activities of the RVF were developing along the same lines as 
those that the Rode Jeugd and the Rode Hulp had adopted earlier. In a discussion paper he 
wrote around this time, Van Wijk fiercely criticized his potential comrades in arms 
concerning their impatience and inability to learn from past mistakes, and especially for 
not recognizing the importance of building up the necessary logistic infrastructure before 
starting up with the armed struggle.223 He argued that this impatience and inability took 
the Dutch urban guerrilla time and again back to the square one. After voicing this 
criticism, he and his associates from The Hague were kicked out the organization.224
Worth noting in this context is that in this paper, he did not call into question the concept 
of urban guerrilla as such, but was rather frustrated by his comrades’ amateurism.  
While leaving the RVF behind was an easy choice to make, abandoning the whole 
concept of armed struggle was a much more emotional and difficult issue for Van Wijk: 
You have ideals, you have ideas, regardless of whether those are good ideals or good ideas. 
We thought for a long time that we, together with other groups in Europe, could bring on 
the revolution. You had lost your sense of reality a bit, okay, but that was your vision, that 
was your point of view. If you discover that it is not true, it is like cutting your umbilical 
cord or so, a painful feeling.225
After leaving the RVF, Aat van Wijk has had contacts with people in the extra-
parliamentary left-wing scene, but has not been politically active himself. For the next 
fifteen years, he was so tired of everything to do with the politics that he did not even vote 
in elections. Later, he regained his interest in the politics, but he has made a conscious 
decision not to take part in any party or movement in order to prevent whatever he joined 
from being discredited by revelations that there is an “ex-terrorist” among their ranks.226
221 Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005. 
222 Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003 & April 14, 2003. 
223 Aat van Wijk: “Paralel tussen Rode Jeugd, Rode Hulp, Rood Verzetsfront”, August 1979. 
224 Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003 & April 14, 2003. 
225 Interview with Aat van Wijk on April 14, 2003. 
226 Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003, April 14, 2003 & April, 17 2007. 
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For  a  long  time,  he  worked  as  graphic  artist  and  later  he  has  run  a  cultural  centre  and  a  
restaurant in Zoetermeer. 
2.5.2. The Rood Verzetsfront  
When the Rode Hulp was pronounced dead, a new organization called Rood Verzetsfront 
(RVF) was established. The driving forces behind this latter organization were Ciska and 
Adrie Eeken and a few of their acquaintances from the Palestine Committee. Those who 
got involved were predominantly people who had had ties with the Rode Hulp but who 
were not active in it. From the former core Rode Jeugd/Rode Hulp members, only Aat van 
Wijk and more discreetly, Henk Wubben (more about him will follow in the next section), 
continued their activities in its context. They were joined by a new generation of activists, 
at least some of them had been radicalized by the kidnapping of Hanns-Martin Schleyer by 
the RAF in September and October of 1977. 227
The purpose of the Rood Verzetsfront was to support those who opposed the fascist 
system. This was to be done mostly in two ways: by publicizing about the resistance 
against the system and by helping activists who were in trouble. For the purpose of 
publicity, a paper named after the organization was established and printed on the Eekens’ 
own printing press. The Rood Verzetsfront was also actively involved in organizing 
information evenings and demonstrations in support of the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist 
movements.228 In practice, its activities concentrated heavily on the conflict between the 
state and urban guerrilla groupings in West Germany. Attention for the German situation 
was also sought by using methods of direct action. An example of this occurred in March, 
1979, when the RVF occupied the office of Swiss Air in Amsterdam as a protest against 
the treatment of two members of the German Bewegung 2. Juni (the  2nd of June 
Movement), who were imprisoned in Switzerland.229
In analogy with the Rode Jeugd and Rode Hulp earlier, there seems to also have been 
initiatives for armed struggle behind the façade of Rood Verzetsfront. However, little 
concrete information is available about these initiatives. Paul Moussault, a former core 
member of RVF tells in his controversial book about the group that in the spring of 1979, 
a grouping called the B-group was established within the RVF. The purpose of this group 
would have been to begin preparation for an armed struggle in the Netherlands by 
obtaining the necessary resources (such as money, cars, weapons and explosives). 
According to Moussault’s account, which is evidently mostly based on his own 
recollections but is also at times supported by his interviews with other former members, 
the group drafted several plans for stealing money and cars, some of which were aborted 
only  at  the  last  minute.  The  group also  hit  twice  on  the  city  hall  of  Groningen  with  the  
227 Moussault 2009, 37–38; Ottens, Luuk; Scheltens, Piet Hein & Siebelink, Rob: “’ Muziek maken is een 
uitlaatklep, dat weet ik wel. Maar het is nog altijd beter dan surfen’,” De Groene Amsterdammer February 
13, 1985; “De toepassing van “klein geweld” in Nederland,” BVD Report March 21, 1977. 
228 “Het ROOD VERZETSFRONT gaat ervan uit...,” Rood Verzetsfront 1, no. 3 (May 1977). 
229 “Verklaring bij appel gevangenhouding” (statement by two RVF members [May 2, 1979]).
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intention of obtaining identification papers.230 After the first such action in June 1979, two 
RVF members were arrested. This action led to a controversy among the RVF members 
about whether the RVF should be involved in such activities in the first place. As 
consequence, several people left the group.231
In these attempts, the RVF seems to have confronted the same challenges that the Rode 
Jeugd, the Rode Hulp and many other groupings aspired to conduct armed struggle had 
confronted earlier: how to combine legal and illegal actions.232 Many thought that, in order 
to be successful, the branch committing illegal actions should be clearly separated from 
the legal branch. These organizations had too little patience and too few resources to 
create such an illegal branch. Besides, many people involved were already well-known so 
the possibilities of clandestine action were not very good. At the same time, the craving 
for action was so great that it was very difficult not to act against one’s best judgment. 
This dilemma was not properly solved within the organization.233
For the remaining members, the treatment of the imprisoned RVF member, Joop Bolt, 
became a focus of their attention. Activities around his case culminated in a bomb attack 
against the house of J. M. Schampers, a judge involved in Bolt’s case, in late February 
1980. The attack was claimed under the name of the Rood Volksverzet and it was the first 
bomb attack that the alleged B-group committed.234
The existence of B-group remained shortlived. By late 1980, the group members’ 
disagreements had developed to such an extent that it made it impossible to continue their 
cooperation. The same can be said about the Rood Verzetsfront in general. In other words, 
the cooperation between its branches in various cities declined and its members 
concentrated their efforts mostly on working within the context of the militant squatter 
movement, anti-militarism and on the actions against nuclear power.235 After that, the 
Rood Verzetsfront continued its existence in the form of a publishing enterprise until the 
late 1980s.  
As mentioned earlier, one objective of the RVF was to help people involved in armed 
struggle more concretely than by merely seeking publicity for their cause and conditions. 
In this context, the name of another Rode Jeugd veteran, Henk Wubben, has been 
mentioned. 
230 Moussault 2009, 207–216. 
231 Moussault 2009, 134–135. 
232 The similarity of the challenges is reflected by the fact that the former RVF member Paul Moussault uses 
almost direct quotations from the Rode Jeugd/Rode Hulp texts in describing these aspects of the history of 
the RVF (e.g. Moussault 2009, 140, 207–208. The fact that he does it without referring to the documents, is 
problematic in terms of the credibility of his account. 
233 Onderzoeksburo Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten 1998, 59, 67, 71–82; Verbij 2005, 143; Pekelder 
2007, 153–154. 
234 Moussault 2009, 141–144, 217. The attack is discussed also in Onderzoeksburo Inlichtingen- en 
Veiligheidsdiensten 1998. 
235 Moussault 2009, 141, 165-166, 222; Onderzoeksburo Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten 1998, 59. 
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2.5.3 Henk Wubben, the RVF and the RAF236
One of the questions that have intrigued the students of the left-wing movements in the 
1970s is what Henk Wubben actually did after 1974. Soon after the disbandment of the 
Rode Jeugd, he moved to Amsterdam and started to study cultural anthropology at the 
university. He was still seen in the radical left-wing circles, but did not seem to play a 
particularly prominent role in the Rode Hulp or any other grouping. As zealous as he felt 
about the idea of revolution, he seemed to be very doubtful about the prospects for 
revolutionary struggle in the Netherlands and, perhaps even more, about the capabilities of 
his potential partners in it. 
During the last years of the Rode Jeugd, Henk Wubben had been calling for a more 
professional attitude and methods. Moreover, after the disbandment of the Rode Jeugd, he 
remained highly critical of the activities of other former Rode Jeugd people. This became 
especially clear in the letters he wrote to some of them in June, 1975 where he expressed 
his disappointment that people seemed not to have taken warning of their past mistakes 
and that they were not doing enough to find out what exactly had happened in the case of 
Luciën van Hoesel. In that correspondence, he broke off all contact with them.237
Henk Wubben had his eyes more on what was going on in West Germany and he 
oriented his activities towards supporting the groups who waged the revolutionary struggle 
there. He was active in several organizations supporting the RAF. Already during the 
Rode Jeugd time, he had established many contacts with German comrades, for example 
with people involved in what were called the Knastgruppen (prison groups) that supported 
the imprisoned German activists. Through these contacts, he met many people who later 
joined the RAF and went underground. Even though Wubben himself never became part 
of an illegal structure, he instead played a role in das Umfeld, in other words, the support 
networks  of  RAF.  Wubben  emphasized  that  this  help  did  not  include  renting  cars  or  
houses, because a professional organization such as the RAF does not make itself 
vulnerable by assigning such tasks to outsiders. He gave the impression that he has been 
one of those who the RAF had more trust in, but avoids being specific about his activities.  
Some clues about the degree of Wubben’s involvement can be determined from what 
is known about his activities. For example, it can be derived that he has considered 
himself as being capable of hiding explosives and of taking care of a German comrade 
escaping from prison.238 Considering the length and palpable strength of his commitment 
236 Information about Henk Wubben’s activities in this sub-chapter is based on the interview with Henk 
Wubben on July 15, 2003, unless mentioned otherwise. 
237 “Aan: Willem Oskam, Joost van Steenis, Evert v.d. Berg, Aat van Wyk en Lucien van Hoesel” (letter 
written by Henk Wubben, June 26, 1975).  
238 In 1980, Wubben was arrested when he visited a garage where there were ingredients for explosives. 
According to his account, the materials were destined for the IRA and he had helped to hide them after the 
first attempt for delivery to the receiver had failed. The supplies were, according to Wubben, obtained by a 
BVD infiltrator (interview with Henk Wubben on July 15, 2003). Paul Moussault, however, has claimed that 
this was a story that was fabricated for defense purposes and that the chemicals were obtained to be used in 
their own bomb attacks (Moussault 2009, 216–218). By hiding comrades on the run I refer to what is 
referred  to  as  the  Celler  Loch  Affaire.  As  part  of  efforts  to  infiltrate  the  RAF,  Henk  Wubben  was  asked  
whether he could take care of his friend Sigurd Debus, who was allegedly at that time in bad health, after he 
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to the RAF, it would be surprising if he had kept himself in the margins for the whole 
time. Fully in line with his thinking and way of action is to not betray his comrades by 
offering a too detailed rambling about his past activities. 
It has been claimed that Wubben acted as an important contact person between the 
RVF and the RAF239, and there is no reason to doubt that. His contacts with the RVF date 
back to the beginnings of that organization. According to Wubben, the Eekens were in the 
process of directing their activities from supporting the Palestinian cause more into 
supporting the RAF and they were looking for people who were already involved in such 
activities. In the context of Rood Verzetsfront, Wubben was involved in developing the 
political line of the grouping and in helping with the printing press. He also participated in 
some actions that were organized in support of the RAF.  
Wubben’s role in the initiatives for armed struggle is not clear. In any case, he did not 
then and does not currently reject the idea of committing, for example, small-scale bomb 
attacks or occupations. Through these kinds of militant actions, people could train and 
explore “whether they were fit for the hard work”. According to Moussault, Wubben 
would have been part of the B-group and involved in various plans for robberies and 
bombings.240  
In the 1980s, Wubben withdrew slowly from his involvement in the armed struggle. A 
crucial turning point in this regard took place in June, 1980 when the house where he lived 
with Ciska Eeken was almost completely destroyed by an explosion. A few days 
afterwards, Wubben was arrested for hiding explosives. While Wubben maintains that the 
explosion was work of the German intelligence agencies as a consequence of the 
unsuccessful attempts to infiltration through him, many people are convinced that 
explosion was most probably caused by his own mishandling of explosives.241 
After  the  campaign  of  the  Rood  Verzetsfront  sputtered  out,  no  other  similar  kind  of  
opportunity for a revolutionary struggle in the Netherlands has arisen that Wubben would 
have found worthwhile. He still maintains that the struggles that the RAF and other groups 
were engaged in as honorable and just ones. 
Today, Henk Wubben lives with Ciska Brakenhoff (formerly Eeken) in Almere, on a 
street named after one of the heroes of the Dutch resistance movement during the Second 
World War. In 1997, his book on North Korea was published and he occasionally lectures 
and gives interviews on that theme. As for Ciska Brakenhoff, she remains steadfast in her 
refusal to grant interviews.  
                                                                                                                                             
was helped to escape from prison. Initially, Wubben agreed to help in this, but later became suspicious and 
withdrew from the plan. 
239 E.g. Verbij 2005, 144. 
240 E.g. Moussault 2009, 210–211, 214–215, 220–221. 
241 Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 46–47; “’Nederland wist van bomaanslag’”, Het Parool June 14, 1986. Van 
Staalduinen claims that it had later come out that the German authorities knew about the explosion (Van 
Staalduinen 1996, 200). However, this information seems to be based on misreading the above-mentioned 
article in Het Parool (which deals with the role of the German authorities in the explosion at the wall of the 
prison that Debus was in). 
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2.5.4 Joost van Steenis and the concept of small violence 
Of the former Rode Jeugd people, Joost van Steenis is one of those who have stayed 
involved in the radical politics the longest. After the Rode Jeugd, he too took part in the 
Rode Hulp for a time. Others, however, had serious reservations about his concept of the 
anti-imperialist struggle. According to Van Steenis, the concept of the urban guerrilla did 
not suit well the prevailing circumstances in the developed countries. Instead, the best way 
for  action  was  the  use  of  “small  violence”  (klein geweld),  that  is,  all  kinds  of  acts  that  
required little logistics. Most typically these acts would be directed against the power 
holders of imperialist and capitalist system in person, such as harassment, intimidation and 
other deeds that would disturb their lives.242 Most of the others did not support this idea 
and expelled Van Steenis from the Rode Hulp.243
From the late 1970s on, Van Steenis has been active in various movements. In 1977, 
he  was  a  parliamentary  candidate  for  a  small  party  called  the  Verbond tegen Ambtelijke 
Willekeur (Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule). One year later, he established, 
together  with  his  friend  Tom de  Booij  (who had  also  been  active  in  the  Rode  Hulp),  an  
organization called Schoon van Lichaam, Helder van Geest (Clean Body, Lucid Mind) 
which purportedly supported the doctrine of small violence, as well as the Stichting Macht 
& Elite (Foundation Power and Elite), which had as its task the research on the balance of 
power in the Western countries. In the early 1980s, Van Steenis was actively involved in 
the squatters’ movement as well as the movement against nuclear power.244 He currently 
maintains a website entitled Foundation Power and Elite where he publishes his letters, 
articles and books.  
Part of Van Steenis’ ideology is the propagation of the autonomy of individuals and 
autonomous action. His opposition of all elites also includes reservations against the strict 
organization of resistance against the ruling elite, because “centralization will always lead 
to the rise of a new elite”.245 As  this  shows,  Van  Steenis  has  largely  abandoned  the  
Marxist-Leninist ideology in its most typical form and he had done so already in the late 
1970s.246
242 Discussion paper for the meeting in Amersfoort December 13, 1975 (”Vergadering zaterdag 13 december 
12.00 precies Restaurant Amershof....”); a letter from Joost van Steenis to Aat van Wijk, August 10, 1979; 
“De toepassing van “klein geweld” in Nederland,” BVD report March 21, 1977. 
243 Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 79. 
244 “Who is Joost van Steenis?” http://members.chello.nl/jsteenis/whoisjoostvansteenis.htm (retrieved 
February 12, 2008); Quarterly survey of BVD 4, 1981, reprinted in English in de Valk 2005). About his role 
in the movement against nuclear power, see especially de Valk 1996, 191–204.  
245 “Who is Joost van Steenis?” http://members.chello.nl/jsteenis/whoisjoostvansteenis.htm (retrieved 
February 12, 2008). 
246 Letter from Joost van Steenis to Aat van Wijk, January 16, 1980. See also the webpages of his foundation 
at http://members.chello.nl/jsteenis/index.htm (retrieved February 12, 2008). 
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3 The campaign of the Symbionese Liberation Army 
The radical  Left  in  the  United  States  and  the  Netherlands  followed closely  many of  the  
same international developments – the Vietnam War, Latin American struggles and the 
inequalities in the socioeconomic position at home. In contrast to the Dutch, however, the 
American radical Left was strongly influenced by the race question. To many activists, the 
people of color were an internal colony of the United States. Like the independence 
movements around the world, the movements of the people of color in the United States, 
and those of African-Americans in particular, were seen as the frontline fighters and the 
natural leaders in the fight against imperialism. From this perspective, the task and moral 
obligation of the white activists was to support these struggles. 
Another distinctive feature of the American New Left was its interest in prisoner 
issues. By the late 1960s, the treatment and the rights of prisoners had captured the 
activists’ attention in the San Francisco Bay area and elsewhere. In the previous two 
decades, dissatisfaction and protests against the prison conditions and policies had grown 
among the convicts. This took many forms, one of them being an overt politicization and 
organization of prisoners. 
Interaction developed between the politicized inmates and the New Left activists.247
This exchange of ideas happened through books written by these inmate activists – such as 
Eldridge Cleaver’s book, Soul on Ice (1968), and George Jackson’s, Soledad Brother
(1970) and Blood In My Eye (1972). More direct contacts were also made possible by the 
model of prisoner treatment that had been adopted as the organizing principle in the 
Californian  prisons.  What  this  treatment  involved  was  that  from  the  early  1960s  on,  
outside experts, such as psychologists, university students and community groups, were 
brought into prisons in increasing numbers to participate in the convict reform programs 
that aimed at curing the inmates of their criminal tendencies. These people were often very 
sympathetic to the prisoners’ position and brought a flow of ideas (including Marxist-
Leninist thinking) from the outside with them. 
Through  this  interaction,  the  radical  Left  activists  started  to  regard  prisons  as  the  
ultimate manifestation of what was wrong in the society and as an important front in their 
struggle against the capitalist and imperialist system. They also saw prisoners as being 
members of the underclass who were forced to commit crimes to stay alive. Since they had 
ended up in prison essentially due to the faults in the political system, they were 
considered political prisoners. Following the analysis of Cleaver, the radical Left saw 
prisoners as a source of massive revolutionary potential and expected the underclass to be 
the instigators of the people’s revolution in the United States.248
247 The following description is based mainly on Cummins 1994, which is the most detailed study on the 
radical prison movement in California. This book is strongly influenced by the writer’s disillusionment and 
condemnation  of  the  way  the  New  Left  dealt  with  the  prisoner  issues.  Cummins  blames  the  New  Left  at  
destroying the emerging attempts for serious prison organizing by feeding the prisoners revolutionary 
fantasies and by hijacking the prisoner cause away from the prisoners themselves. Nevertheless, in this 
author’s opinion, Cummins manages to capture very well the essentials of the evolution of the narratives of 
resistance and revolution among the prisoners and leftists. See also e.g. Gottschalk 2006, 165–196; Van 
Deburg 1992, 97–111. 
248 Cummins 1994, 93–186. 
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This activism around prison issues peaked in the early 1970s in the Bay Area. The 
prisons were a topic of various demonstrations and teach-ins. Besides that, the California 
Department of Corrections offices became targets of bomb attacks. Towards 1974, 
however, the interest in prisoner issues was decreasing in the Bay Area, as was the interest 
in Marxism-Leninism on the university campuses. At the same time, many of those who 
remained active, radicalized further.249
3.1 Formation of the Symbionese Liberation Army 
The Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) is one of those radicalized groups that were 
heavily influenced by the ideas and utopias that developed from the interaction between 
the New Left and the political prisoner movement. The SLA was formed and its program 
developed in the summer of 1973 by a black escaped convict, Donald DeFreeze, and by a 
handful of white activists from the Berkeley area in California. DeFreeze, 30 years old at 
that time, had been in and out of prison for years for petty crimes and robberies. In the 
early 1970s, he became politicized in prison and started to plan for committing himself to 
armed revolutionary struggle. In March, 1973, he was assigned to a light-security job 
which left him unguarded at times. On his first day, DeFreeze seized the opportunity and 
escaped.250
Once outside, he looked for people whom he had met in prison to help him – ex-
convicts, escapees, and political activists. Finally, he ended up at the doorstep of the so-
called Peking House in Oakland, California, the residence of William Wolfe and Russell 
Little. Wolfe and Little had participated as tutors in the inmate study groups and had 
become friends with DeFreeze.251 At  that  point,  both  Wolfe  and  Little  were  politically  
radicalized and associated with the Venceremos organization. Venceremos was known as 
the most radical and militant of the radical Left movements at that time in California. This 
organization was active in various issues, ranging from defending and educating prisoners, 
operating a people’s medical center and staging violent anti-war demonstrations, to 
organizing self-defense classes and allegedly planning military actions.252
Wolfe and Little arranged DeFreeze to stay with someone who was beyond the 
suspicion of authorities, Mizmoon Soltysik. Soltysik was their friend-of-a-friend who was 
politically active in the women’s movement but not involved in the prisoner issues.253
With  her,  DeFreeze  began  to  write  down  the  plans  and  program  for  the  SLA.  Soon  
249 Cummins 1994, 222–224, 228–229.  
250 E.g. McLellan & Avery 1977, 87–88, 308–321; Payne & Findley 1976, 1–52; also “Criminal records of 
the two prison fugitives”, San Francisco Chronicle February 16, 1974. 
251 E.g. McLellan & Avery 1977, 56–63. 
252 To  my  knowledge,  there  is  no  academic  study  on  the  Venceremos  organization.  For  information  
presented here, see McLellan & Avery 1977, 58–59, 53–64; America’s Maoists: Report by the Committee of 
Internal Security (1972), 109–112; Bryan 1976, 103–107; Elbaum 2002, 100; Payne & Findley 1976, 121. 
According to McLellan & Avery (1977, 94), Wolfe, Little and Nancy Ling Perry, who comes up in the 
following paragraph, had been involved in another army called the Partisans’ Vanguard Party, which was a 
group of black inmates and ex-convicts. Their efforts had failed by the summer of 1973. 
253 Payne & Findley 1976, 7–8, 95; McLellan & Avery 1977, 87–90, 92–93.  
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afterwards, they were joined by William Wolfe, Russell Little and another friend of theirs, 
Nancy Ling Perry.254
The mission of the Symbionese Liberation Army was presented as follows in its 
declaration of revolutionary war dated on August 21, 1973: 255
The Symbionese Federation and the Symbionese Liberation Army is a united and federated 
grouping of members of different races and people and socialist political parties of the 
oppressed people of the Fascist United States of America, who have under black and 
minority leadership formed and joined The Symbionese Federated Republic and have 
agreed  to  struggle  together  [...]  in  the  gaining  of  FREEDOM  and  SELF  
DETERMINATION and INDEPENDANCE [sic] for all their people and races.256
The purpose of the SLA was thus to unite all oppressed people in their struggle against the 
common enemy. The world “symbionese” in its name referred to this purpose. The SLA 
explained that this word is derived from “symbiosis” and it defined its meaning as “a body 
of dissimilar bodies and organisms living in deep and loving harmony and partnership in 
the best interest of all within the body”.257 As the logo for the army, the SLA adopted the 
seven-headed cobra. This logo also symbolized the alliance: the cobra had seven heads, 
but  they  were  all  united  in  one  body,  just  as  the  people  of  the  SLA  came  from  diverse  
backgrounds but have united themselves in the struggle.258 The movement would operate 
under black and minority leadership. In this, the SLA followed the idea that blacks and 
other “third world people" (rather than middle-class whites) should lead the revolutionary 
struggle because they experienced the oppression first-hand. 
Moreover, in terms of ideology and goals, the SLA was a blend of ideas and 
influences, representing the grievances and desires of all those oppressed people it wanted 
to represent. It was most strongly influenced by the issues of race, feminism and 
254 There are somewhat contradictory accounts about who became involved at which stage (cf. Payne & 
Findley 1976, 88–144; Hearst & Moscow 1982, 138–139, McLellan & Avery 1977, 75–122, 174–187; The 
last SLA statement). Furthermore, Little’s girlfriend, Robyn Steiner, and possibly also other friends of those 
mentioned, were at least partially involved (Payne & Findley 1976, 101; “Former S.L.A. member tells of the 
group’s early days”, The New York Times November 27, 1973). 
255 The SLA communiqués and transcripts of its tapes have been published in various newspapers (e.g. San 
Francisco Chronicle, Berkeley Barb). Many of them are also included in the FBI files that have been 
released under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act. The communications until the end of April 1974, 
are also reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974. I have used here Pearsall (ed.) 1974 because it is the most 
convenient source for citations and also the easiest to obtain for an interested reader.  
256 “The Symbionese Federation & the Symbionese Liberation Army Declaration of of Revolutionary War & 
The Symbionese Program”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 22–23. Interestingly enough, despite the total 
condemnation of the US as it was, the SLA still referred to the Declaration of Independence of the United 
States as legitimization of its own declaration of revolutionary war against “the fascist capitalist class”. 
257 “The Symbionese Federation & the Symbionese Liberation Army Declaration of Revolutionary War & 
The Symbionese Program”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 23.  
258 “The emblem of the Symbionese Liberation Army....” reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 15–17. In the SLA 
documents, several meanings are given to the seven heads of the cobra. Another explanation given in the 
communiqué introducing the emblem describes it in almost esoteric terms as an ancient symbol that people 
have used to signify God and life and that two heads on each side represent the four principles of life and the 
three heads in the middle represent God and the universe.  
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Marxism.259 The influence of black nationalism is also clear in the values of the SLA that 
were presented side-by-side with the seven-headed cobra. The values are almost word-for-
word Nguzo Saba, the seven key values which are part of the black cultural nationalist 
Kawaida theory about cultural and social change which was developed and propagated by 
Maulana Ron Karenga and the US Organization he led.260 These  values  were  unity,  self  
determination, collective work and responsibility, collective production, purpose, 
creativity and faith. 
The objectives and visions about the society the SLA strived for were outlined in its 
document called “The goals of the Symbionese Liberation Army”. Their aim was to 
destroy the capitalist state and its value systems and to replace it with a system that serves 
the interests of all people and is “based on the true affirmation of life, love, trust, and 
honesty, freedom and equality that is truly for all”.261 The values the SLA despised were 
individualism, fascism, racism, sexism, imperialism and capitalism.262 To get to this kind 
of society, the SLA called for political and economical changes that were rather typical for 
Marxist  movements,  such  as  taking  over  the  land  owned  by  the  state  and  the  capitalist  
class, and a more democratic form of government. Furthermore, according to the SLA, 
institutions needed to be established that would help the women grow, the elderly needed 
to be taken care of with respect and the whole prison system had to be destroyed and 
replaced by a system based on comradeship and education.  
These objectives would not be achieved without military action. The SLA was 
established explicitly for the purpose of conducting armed struggle. Its whole program 
was based on the conception that violence was the only means left for the people to fight 
back against their enemy and to achieve their freedom. In fact, to deny this was absolutely 
antirevolutionary. It was emphasized that the SLA’s commitment to revolution was total 
and fully uncompromisable.263
To  organize  the  people  to  join  the  revolutionary  struggle,  the  SLA  developed  an  
alternative model to the party organizing which its members thought had proven to be an 
ineffective way to mobilize people in the struggle. It looked at establishing a “Symbionese 
Federation” that was to administer both the fight for and living in the new kind of 
society.264 The SLA was to be “a federation formed in the style of a revolutionary United 
Nations”.265 This federation would be led by the War Council, where each group that 
chose to participate would be represented. There would be two types of units, combat units 
and support units.266 In fact, the Symbionese organization structure was designed on paper 
in detail.267
259 The SLA members later identified their key sources of inspiration to be Marxism, revolutionary 
nationalism and revolutionary feminism (the last SLA statement, 3). 
260 E.g. Van Deburg 1992, 171–173. 
261 “The goals of the Symbionese Liberation Army”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 26–28. 
262 “The emblem of the Symbionese Liberation Army...” reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 15–17. 
263 The SLA oath, “The United Symbionese War Council Terms of Military/Political Alliance”, “Tactical 
support units”, “A letter to the people from Fahizah”, all reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974. 
264 “The goals of the Symbionese Liberation Army”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 26–28; Harris, Bill and 
Emily, Russell Little and Joseph Remiro, as told to Susan Lyne and Robert Scheer: “The story of the SLA”, 
New Times April 16, 1976, 30. 
265 “A letter to the people from Fahizah”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 43–50.  
266 “Tactical support units”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 33–34. 
267 Reprinted in McLellan & Avery 1977, 106–110.  
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The idea of establishing a federation was an attempt to enable coordination and 
cooperation without interfering with each group’s autonomy and self-reliance. The uniting 
force in the federation would be “a basic belief in the necessity to use armed force to 
destroy U.S. corporate fascism.”268 The  context  of  federation  would  not  place  too  much 
pressure on agreeing on every single issue and thereby facilitate cooperation. The 
federation would also enable the taking of initiative by a smaller group of people even 
when everyone did not fully agree.  With this,  the SLA tried to avoid the common-place 
situation among the Left that organizations fell apart over bitter fighting about the future 
course of action.269
An essential part of the SLA’s program was that change not only had to occur in 
society, but also individuals would need to change. The revolutionary project thus also had 
a personal dimension and violence was its essential component: “[a] revolutionary is not a 
criminal nor is she or he an adventurer, and revolutionary violence is nothing but the most 
profound means of achieving internal as well as external balance.”270 As  a  symbol  of  
transformation and commitment, the SLA members adopted new names, following either 
the tradition of Latin American revolutionaries to use code names or the black nationalist 
movement’s custom to abandon the “slave name” given at birth (or both).271
The army that the SLA members designed was for far more people than they had in 
their ranks at that moment. Thus, a call was issued for all people to join: 
... what is needed now is for you as lovers of the people to select in what area you are able 
and willing to fight in or give support to, either in the combat units or support units of The 
S.L.A., the choice is yours alone: to be and show yourselves as lovers of the people and 
our children and true to your word revolutionaries, or as egotistic opportunists and lovers 
of the group and organization and enemies of the people.272
3.2 Getting started 
From the late summer of 1973, there are reports of DeFreeze contacting several radical 
leaders and proposing an alliance. The SLA members also reportedly searched and tested 
for potential recruits in the Marxist study groups.273 The last SLA document stated that: 
268 The last SLA statement, 4. 
269 “Tactical support units”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 33–34, see also The last SLA statement, 3–4. 
270 “A letter to the people from Fahizah”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 43–50. 
271 Payne & Findley 1976, 111–112, cf. McLellan & Avery 1977, 18–19, Hearst & Moscow 1982, 46. Nancy 
Ling Perry took the name Fahizah, Mizmoon Soltysik became Zoya, William Wolfe started to call himself 
Kahjoh (often written incorrectly as Cujo) and Russell Little became Osceola (or Osi). Emily Harris was 
called  Yolanda  and Bill  Harris  was  Teko.  Joe  Remiro  became Bo and Angela  Atwood adopted  the  name 
Gelina. Soltysik had actually already changed her name from Patricia to a more poetic Mizmoon earlier, 
most evidently in the cultural spirit of the 1960s. Donald DeFreeze had already replaced his slave name with 
the name Cinque (Cin) Mtume. According to McLellan and Avery (1977, 18), Cinque came from an 
enslaved Wendji  chief  who led  a  famous  revolt  on  the  slave  ship  in  1839 and Mtume from the  word  that  
means “apostle” or “disciple” in Swahili. 
272 “Tactical support units”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 34. 
273 McLellan & Avery 1977, 98; Bryan 1976, 110. 
76
The original group, Nancy, Willie, Mizmoon and Cin, decided to draft a program of 
revolutionary ideas and objectives for a multi-national organization. They took the 
program  around  and  showed  it  to  a  lot  of  community  people  and  a  few  Bay  Area  
organizations. They got a really mixed reaction to it – most people didn’t feel it was 
practical to try to form multiracial units.274
According to all accounts, the reactions to the Symbionese program were indeed mixed at 
best.  The  idea  of  multiracial  units  was  only  one  of  the  concerns.  For  many  people,  the  
program sounded so weird that they suspected DeFreeze was either crazy or a provocateur. 
Few seemed to get excited about his ideas.275 Rumors started to spread in Berkeley that 
there was a very violent group in the making that had the weapons and ammunition-
making equipment.276 That, however, was not very spectacular in the Berkeley context 
“where new messiahs, tribes and armies surface regularly”277 and they do not seem to have 
provoked any heightened alarm. 
While the response in general was negative, the SLA found a handful of new members 
among a circle of friends. Through their political activities, Wolfe and Little had met Joe 
Remiro,  Emily  and  Bill  Harris  (a  married  couple)  and  Angela  Atwood.  Like  Wolfe  and  
Little, they were active in the context of the Venceremos organization but none of them 
(except for Remiro) were official members, nor held a key position within that 
organization. In the context of the Venceremos, they took part in Marxist-Leninist study 
groups and self-defense classes where they practiced with weapons. They also worked 
together on prison issues.278 By  January  of  1974,  all  of  them  had  joined  the  SLA.279
Around this core of people who were fully committed to the SLA, there were evidently a 
network of friends and possibly also more members. Some of these people dropped out as 
the SLA became more radical, and others were cut out when the SLA tightened its 
security.280
274 The last SLA statement, 2–3. 
275 McLellan & Avery 1977, 98; Payne & Findley 1976, 140. McLellan and Avery (1977, 104) report that a 
group called Chicano Liberation Front would have joined the federation. 
276 Bryan 1976, 113–114. 
277 McLellan & Avery 1977, 105. 
278 The last SLA statement, 12–14; McLellan & Avery 1977, 99. 
279 McLellan & Avery 1977, 94. It is not clear when exactly the Harrises, Joe Remiro and Angela Atwood 
joined the ranks of the SLA. In the last SLA statement, it is stated that their contact to the SLA was mediated 
by  William  Wolfe  and  that  the  crucial  talks  and  joining  the  SLA  took  place  in  late  1973  (The  last  SLA  
statement, 15). Even though Emily Harris has claimed that she did not get to know Soltysik or Perry well 
before January, 1974, it seems that she had at least met Mizmoon Soltysik by April, 1973. McLellan and 
Avery suspect that the Harrises would have been close friends of Soltysik if not part of her commune already 
at that time. Patricia Hearst has said that Joe Remiro and Angela Atwood would have joined earlier and the 
Harrises only after the murder of Foster because they were initially not trusted enough (Hearst & Moscow 
1982, 138–139). Be it as it may, according to all accounts, all those people mentioned became involved by 
the beginning of 1974. 
280 Bryan 1976, 108; see also Payne & Findley 1976, 127. The SLA had also contacts inside prisons. Besides 
Wolfe and Little, Emily and Bill Harris were also frequently visiting politicized prisoners. They had 
regularly visited, for example, James “Doc” Holliday, an alleged head of the Black Guerrilla Family, who 
they met nine times during 1972–1973 (Cummins 1994, 241; see also Payne & Findley 1976, 118). The 
Black Guerrilla Family was a dreaded revolutionary inmate gang (e.g. Cummins 1994, 223, 236). Also, 
Wolfe and Little had been in contact with various prisoners, including Clifford “Deathrow” Jefferson, who 
also claimed to be a leader of the Black Guerrilla Family and has been sometimes portrayed as the cellblock 
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During the summer and fall of 1973, the SLA core members also started to train and 
stockpile supplies and equipment. According to McLellan and Avery, the SLA members 
also committed several robberies to obtain money and identification papers. At that point, 
plans were made for future attacks. For several attacks, communiqués in the form of 
warrant orders issued by the court of the people were drafted. There was a plan to kidnap 
one  of  the  presidents  of  a  subsidiary  of  the  ITT  Corporation  as  a  protest  against  that  
corporation’s deeds against the people of Chile, Brazil, South Africa, Rhodesia and The 
Philippines and to demand 50,000 dollar ransom in exchange for his life. Other planned 
targets were the Avis Rent a Car, The Kaiser Corporation and the General Tire and Rubber 
Company, which were accused of serving and supporting the fascist governments of 
Israel, Portugal, South Africa, Chile, and Great Britain. These attacks were not conducted, 
perhaps because they were not considered to be good enough targets. There were also 
rumors that one of the priority targets of the SLA would have been Raymond Procunier, 
the director of the California Department of Corrections. McLellan and Avery have stated 
that, according to police intelligence sources, the murder would have been already planned 
but was cancelled because the convict associates of the SLA vetoed the idea in fear of the 
repercussions that it may have caused inside the prison.281  
3.3. The murder of Foster 
The plan that the SLA decided to go ahead with was the assassination of Marcus Foster, 
the black Oakland school superintendent. On the evening of November 6, 1973, three SLA 
members,  Nancy  Ling  Perry,  Mizmoon Soltysik  and  Donald  DeFreeze282, shot him with 
cyanide bullets as he was leaving the school building. His close colleague, Robert 
Blackburn, who accompanied him, was shot several times, but survived.283  
The SLA claimed the attack in a communiqué that was received by the media within a 
few days. The charges that were presented against Foster and Blackburn read as follows: 
Supporting and taking part in forming and implementation of a Political Police Force 
operating within the Schools of the People, Supporting and taking part in the forming and 
implementation of Bio-Dossiers through the Forced Youth Identification Program. 
                                                                                                                                             
leader of the SLA (McLellan & Avery 1977, 99–104). Another early convict contact was Thero Wheeler. 
Wheeler was a well-known black prison militant and reportedly the first convict member of the Venceremos 
organization. He escaped from prison in August, 1973. He has later claimed that he got help through his 
Venceremos connections. It is not clear whether DeFreeze was involved in arranging his escape, but there 
was a role for Wheeler in DeFreeze’s plan for revolution. Although Wheeler has claimed he did not agree 
with DeFreeze’s politics, he stayed in the SLA commune for some time and according to some accounts, 
was actively involved in recruiting new people into the SLA or even competing for the leadership (McLellan 
& Avery 1977, 94–95; Payne & Findley 1976, 122–144). Some have claimed that he would have 
participated in the group’s actions still in the spring of 1974 (see e.g. Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 61–62). 
281 The last SLA statement, 2–3; McLellan & Avery 1977, 105, 110–111, 168–172; Payne & Findley 1976, 
134–136, 147–149; “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Unit 10; Subject: Charles W. Comer”, 
a communiqué dated October 15, 1973, included in the FBI headquarters file 157–30832. 
282 The last SLA statement, 10; Payne & Findley 1976, 168.  
283 “School Official Killed in Ambush by 3 Gunmen”, The New York Times November 7, 1973; “Chief of 
schools slain in Oakland”, San Francisco Chronicle November 7, 1973. 
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Supporting and taking part in the building of composite files for the Internal Warfare 
Identification Computer System.284
The SLA threatened to shoot-on-sight other members and supporters of these programs as 
well. 
The accusations refer to plans that had been proposed in order to improve the security 
situation in the Oakland schools. These plans included the introduction of identification 
cards that students had to carry with them and the placement of police officers in the 
schools. According to the SLA, these measures were part of the efforts of the fascist ruling 
class to subordinate the blacks and other minorities to its servitude and to crush any 
opposition against it. It was no coincidence, the SLA claimed, that such measures were 
introduced in the Oakland-Berkeley area, because “the ruling class must seek to stop the 
revolutionary community here before the ruling class can regain its arm of control around 
the struggling and oppressed people of the world”.285 The  planned  measures  as  well  as  
other means that were used to monitor activists were modeled after the “fascist Amerikan 
tactics of genocide, murder and imprisonment practice by Amerikan financed puppet 
governments in Vietnam, The Philippines, Chile and South Africa”.286
It is not known for certain how and why the SLA ended up choosing Marcus Foster as 
its target. Foster was not among the “usual” enemies of the Left. According to one source, 
the SLA likely chose Foster after they heard about the critique that the Black Panthers had 
raised against him.287 Thero Wheeler, another black escaped convict who took part in the 
SLA for some months, has said that the issue of Foster came up one night. There had been 
a lot of negative feelings about him in the community and “Bobby Seale [a prominent 
Black Panther leader] was raising hell about him and all”. In the middle of this 
conversation, DeFreeze allegedly exclaimed that “We’re gonna waste that nigger!”.288
Even though Foster was considered to be an “Oreo cookie” (black on the outside, 
white on the inside) when he started his job in Oakland, he had largely won trust and 
respect by late 1973. In some circles, the opposition to Foster prevailed for a longer time 
and it may be that the SLA members had been disproportionally influenced by these 
voices. These circles could be found, for example, in prisons. The news about the 
possibility of a student ID card being issued, as well as other plans, were received very 
critically, because it provoked the idea that school children would be placed under a 
similar kind of surveillance as the prisoners themselves were experiencing. The story 
seemed to lose some nuances and details in the process, and by the summer of 1973, 
Foster was reportedly considered to be a “Black Judas in Oakland” by many prisoners, at 
least in Vacaville where DeFreeze had been imprisoned.289
284 “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Youth Unit Communique no. 1”, reprinted in Pearsall 
(ed.) 1974. 
285 “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Youth Unit Communique no. 1”, reprinted in Pearsall 
(ed.) 1974. 
286 “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Youth Unit Communique no. 1”, reprinted in Pearsall 
(ed.) 1974. 
287 Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The inside story: Part two”, Rolling Stone November 20, 1975, 34, 36.  
288 Quoted in McLellan & Avery 1977, 111. 
289 McLellan & Avery 1977, 68–69. See also Payne & Findley (1976, 149–151) who claim that the murder 
was part of DeFreeze’s war against the black bourgeoisie stemming from his childhood experiences. 
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The communiqué published after the Foster murder was the first time that practically 
anyone, including the radical Left, had heard about the Symbionese Liberation Army. The 
authorities did not take the SLA seriously until a few days later when it was found out that 
the assassination was made with cyanide bullets just as the communiqué claimed.290
In reaction to the assassination, people were generally horrified and amazed. Who 
would want to kill a superintendent who was well liked in the community? What kind of a 
revolutionary movement would start its campaign by assassinating a black person? 
Moreover, the radical Left found the deed and the communiqué bizarre. Even though the 
communiqué included references to many common themes of those days – the oppression 
of the ethnic minorities, “criminalizing” dissent to the prevailing system and so on – the 
choice of the target seemed strange and the analysis far-fetched. All this combined with 
the fact that the SLA seemed to come out of nowhere made many people suspect that the 
SLA  might  not  be  a  genuine  left-wing  movement.  The  Black  Panthers  in  particular  felt  
outright threatened by the SLA and feared that the Foster assassination was a cover 
operation which was intended to give a bad name to the Black Panthers and to the black 
community in general. “The revelations of the Watergate investigations have clearly 
established that powerful, fascist elements in this country, in cooperation with high 
officials, do engage in assassinations, murders and violence to achieve their objectives”, 
the Black Panther weekly noted.291 The  reception  among others  whose  support  the  SLA 
wished to gain was hardly any better.292
What made the attack even more controversial was that the SLA had not got its facts 
right. It was true that Foster had initially supported the plan, but he had renounced his 
support before the attack. The SLA members seemed to be unaware of this. In short, the 
SLA seemed to have misjudged the role of Foster.293
A week later, the SLA issued a new communiqué where it withdrew the shoot-on-sight 
order, because the controversial plans had been halted. Besides that, it wanted to set things 
straight and to salvage its image. The SLA accused the “fascist news media” of 
suppressing the truth about Marcus Foster. This time, it attacked Robert Blackburn in 
particular and claimed he was a CIA agent.294 The bottom line of the message was that the 
assassination had produced the desired results and that the SLA was right about Foster and 
Blackburn. The audiences in Oakland, Berkeley, and elsewhere were still not convinced.  
The  murder  of  Foster  was  a  powerful  way  to  introduce  the  SLA  but  this  turned  
seriously against the group. It gave the SLA a reputation as being adventurists who were 
out of touch with both reality and “the people” and cast doubts about the real identity of its 
members. The inmate sympathizers of the SLA were not impressed, either. Some of them 
290 Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 35, The Black Panther November 24, 1973, 3; “Oakland 'Army' Puzzles Police”, The
New York Times November 11, 1973. 
291The Black Panther November 17, 1973, 3. 
292 E.g. Payne & Findley 1976, 174–175. 
293 E.g. Findley, Tim: “Evidence back claim of Foster ‘Assassins’”, San Francisco Chronicle November 10, 
1973; “Hunt for motive in Foster death”, San Francisco Chronicle November 12, 1973; Payne & Findley 
1976, 175; “Bullets That Killed Oakland Educator Contained Cyanide”, The New York Times November 10, 
1973.
294 “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Youth Unit Communique No. 2”, reprinted in Pearsall 
(ed.) 1974. See also Jennings, Duffy: “New letter by Foster’s killers”, San Francisco Chronicle November 
19, 1973. 
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felt they had been misled about the true character of Foster. There are rumors that some 
SLA-connected inmates would have even ordered DeFreeze to be executed. The 
assassination also weakened the SLA’s support networks, as several of its associates and 
helpers were appalled by the deed and consequently distanced themselves from the 
group.295
However,  the  SLA  members  were  not  deterred  by  this.  They  went  on  preparing  for  
new attacks. Towards this end, they gathered information on potential targets for kidnap 
and assassination, practiced bomb-making and studied other skills useful for their armed 
struggle. Later, an unmailed Symbionese Liberation Army communiqué number 3 was 
found in the safe house suggested that the SLA had planned to execute the California 
Department of Corrections prison personnel by cyanide bullets.296
3.4. The arrest of Little and Remiro 
The SLA’s preparations and planning were interrupted by a routine traffic inspection. On 
the night of January 10, 1974, Joe Remiro and Russell Little were stopped by patrolling 
policemen when they were driving in the deserted streets near their safe house. When the 
policemen  asked  the  two  men  to  step  out  of  the  car,  Joe  Remiro  opened  fire  and  fled.  
Russell Little tried to escape by car, but had to stop when a shot flattened a tire and Little 
was then arrested. In the van, the police found a pile of leaflets with the SLA cobra 
emblem on them. Eventually, Remiro was arrested a couple of hours later while walking 
in the neighborhood.297
It seems probable that Remiro had gone to the safe house to warn the others and after 
that, let himself be arrested to take some heat off from the rest of the group. The weapon 
Remiro  carried  at  the  time of  the  arrest  was  the  one  that  was  used  to  kill  Foster.298 Bill 
Harris has later said that Donald DeFreeze and Willie Wolfe felt very guilty for their 
comrades’ fate because Wolfe had borrowed the gun for the Foster murder from Remiro. 
DeFreeze  had  tried  to  modify  the  identifying  characteristics  so  that  it  would  not  be  
recognized before they gave it back to Remiro.299
Later that  day, the SLA members left  the house and set  it  on fire to get rid of all  the 
material in the house they could not take with them.300 However,  the  fire  did  not  burn  
down the house entirely. When the police entered the place, they found a remarkable 
collection of documents and bomb-making material. Due to the documents found in the 
295 McLellan & Avery 1977, 146–148; Payne & Findley 1976, 176–177. 
296 “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Womens and Mens Unit, Communique no. 3; Subject: 
The Department of Corrections & Its Agents Associates Members”, included in the FBI headquarters file 
157–30832. The communiqué provides the same kind of explanation of a military coup in the US around 
1963/64 that was included in “A letter to the people from Fahizah” that was sent to the media in January, 
1974.
297 McLellan & Avery 1977, 159–164; Symbionese Liberation Army: A Study, 3–4. 
298 McLellan & Avery 1977, 165; Payne & Findley 1976, 191–192. 
299 Harris, Bill and Emily, Russell Little and Joseph Remiro, as told to Susan Lyne and Robert Scheer: “The 
story of the SLA”, New Times April 16, 1976, 31. 
300 McLellan & Avery 1977, 166, The last SLA statement, 17. 
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car and in the house, everyone involved in the SLA became a suspect and those who had 
not yet gone underground were forced to do so.301
These arrests were a serious setback for the SLA. Russ Little has later regretfully 
stated that they were just two months away from getting it all together, from having a 
much stronger organization. They had recruited a network of supporters to help them but 
were forced to cut contacts with them for security reasons.302 Soon after the arrests, they 
decided to send another statement to the media in an evident attempt to improve the public 
image of the SLA by giving it a human face and by providing justification for its acts. 
This document was “a letter to the people from Fahizah”, i.e. Nancy Ling Perry.303
The letter responded to several criticisms and claims about the SLA. Perry restated the 
SLA’s position on the Foster murder. She also denied that they had not intended to burn 
down the safe house completely, just enough to melt down any fingerprints they may have 
overlooked.304 She denied that there would have been a vast cache of armaments in the 
house and claimed that such statements were purely lies that were designed to incriminate 
Remiro and Little. In short, the SLA had not made any mistakes. If a mistake was made, 
then it was rather that not everyone was heavily and offensively armed and that they were 
not aware that they were under attack. 
This letter also introduced the SLA’s analysis of the recent history of the United 
States. According to that letter, the country was now a dictatorship run by Richard Nixon. 
This dictatorship was established by a coup that took place when John F. Kennedy was 
assassinated. Furthermore, the government was after everyone who opposes it, all those 
people were in acute danger of being thrown into concentration camps (a word they used 
for  prisons).  Moreover,  “...  the  government  is  now  in  the  rapid  and  steady  process  of  
removing the means of survival from the lower class and giving these benefits to the 
middle class in an effort to rally support from them.” In this situation, it was only natural 
that  those  who were  robbed  by  the  government  would  try  to  take  back  what  was  theirs.  
The only means left for the people to achieve their liberation was violence. It was in the 
nature of people to fight when they were oppressed, but people were terrified by this 
revolutionary violence because they had been conditioned to be afraid of it. 305
This letter did not serve the interests of the SLA any better than the assassination and 
the previous communiqués. It did not convince the communities in Berkeley and Oakland 
that the SLA had been on the right track. Rather, it added to people being perplexed.306 To 
counter the backlash, they decided to step up their actions and try to get their comrades out 
of prison. 
301 The last SLA statement, 18; McLellan & Avery 1977, 167–168; Payne & Findley 1976, 193–194. 
302 The last SLA statement, 18. 
303”A letter to the people from Fahizah”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 43–50.  
304 In the last SLA statement (p. 17), Joe Remiro states that the house was set on fire because they were 
worried that the house would be linked to the car before they had time to move everything out. The fire, 
however, ignited because of bad ventilation. The biggest mistake, in his view, was that they had all that 
material lying around in the first place. 
305 “A letter to the people from Fahizah”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 43–50.  
306 See e.g. Pepper, Sgt: “SLA’s Fahizah Just Naive”, Berkeley Barb February 1–7, 1974, 2. 
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3.5 The kidnapping of Patricia Hearst 
The SLA’s next target was Patricia Hearst,  the heiress of the well-known media dynasty 
and the grand-daughter of the legendary William Randolph Hearst. Her name had 
appeared on an apparent hit list that the police found in the safe house, but that had not led 
to any action by the authorities. On the evening of February 4, 1974, a group of SLA 
members307 entered  Hearst’s  apartment  in  Berkeley  and  took  her  with  them.  Three  days  
later, the SLA sent out a similar kind of arrest warrant for Patricia Hearst that it had sent 
earlier for Foster. The communiqué ended with the promise that further communication 
would follow.308 Patricia  Hearst  was  taken  to  a  safe  house  in  Daly  City  where  all  seven  
active SLA members lived at that time.309
The kidnapping was instantly310 a major news story which attracted world-wide 
attention.  It  was  the  first  political  kidnapping  of  its  kind  in  the  United  States.  Some  
interpreted the incident as an (already predicted) arrival of a Latin American-style political 
terrorism to the country and expected to see many more of this type of acts.311
Right after the kidnapping and the communiqué, there was intense speculation about 
why Hearst was kidnapped. The FBI, which immediately got involved in the 
investigation312, assumed that the SLA would demand the release of Joe Remiro and Russ 
Little. This was a widely held assumption.313 Randolph Hearst said he would do 
everything in his power to meet the kidnappers’ demands. At the same time, he expressed 
publicly his concern that the SLA would demand something that was not in the control of 
his family, meaning specifically the demand to release prisoners.314 From the comments of 
the  director  of  FBI’s  San  Francisco  office,  one  got  the  idea  that  the  release  of  prisoners  
would not happen, if not for any other reason then for the fear that their release would lead 
others to try the same thing.315
The release of Remiro and Little was indeed what the SLA strived for.316 It seems that 
the SLA waited for a few days to see what the reaction to the kidnapping would be, and 
then they sent out their demands. A week after the kidnapping, they sent out their 
307 McLellan & Avery (1977, 197) state that Hearst would later testify that these people were Donald 
DeFreeze, Bill Harris and Angela Atwood. 
308 “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Adult Unit, Communiqué No. 3”, reprinted in Pearsall 
(ed.) 1974; McLellan & Avery 1977, 200. 
309 McLellan & Avery 1977, 213.  
310 To be precise, “instantly” is not entirely correct term. While the news about the kidnapping spread fast 
through grapevine, a news embargo was declared on Randolph Hearst’s (Patricia’s father) demand at first. It 
did not last more than a few hours. After that, there was no holding back and probably also little to be gained 
with the news embargo (e.g. Raudebaugh, Charles: “Hearst daughter abducted by 3 armed commandos”, San
Francisco Chronicle February 6, 1974; “Granddaughter of Hearst Abducted by 3”, The New York Times
February 6, 1974). 
311 Carroll, Jerry: “New Latin-style terrorism feared”, San Francisco Chronicle February 9,1974. 
312 Raudebaugh, Charles: “No message from Hearst kidnapers”, San Francisco Chronicle February 7, 1974. 
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communication kit to a radio station. This included a tape-recorded message and a pile of 
SLA documents that the SLA demanded to be published in full.317
In the taped message, the SLA explained in DeFreeze’s voice that they had kidnapped 
Patricia Hearst for the crimes that her parents had committed against the American people 
and  against  all  oppressed  people  around  the  world.  Her  father  was  the  editor  of  the  
newspaper San Francisco Examiner, and to use the SLA’s wording, the “corporate 
chairman of the fascist media empire of the ultra-right Hearst Corporation, which is one of 
the largest propaganda institutions of this oppressive military dictatorship of the militarily 
armed corporate state that we now live under in this nation”.318 Patricia Hearst's mother 
was a member of the University of California Board of Regents which had been attacked 
by the Berkeley left on several issues. 
The SLA had obviously concluded that their demand for the release of Remiro and 
Little  may not  be  met.  Instead,  they  demanded that  the  Hearst  family  deliver  a  token  of  
good faith. Once that token had been performed, the SLA would then start negotiating for 
the release of Patricia Hearst. The good faith gesture that the SLA demanded was to 
distribute 70 dollars worth food to “all people with welfare cards, Social Security pension 
cards, parole or probation papers, and jail or bail release slips”.319
The SLA did hint, however, that it was the release of Remiro and Little what they were 
after. It was explained in Patricia Hearst’s voice that she was treated according to the 
Geneva Convention but that her conditions would at all times correspond to those of 
Remiro and Little,320 thus implying that when Remiro and Little were free, she would be, 
too.321 One purpose of the food delivery demand was clearly to test whether it would be 
feasible to demand the release of their comrades. According to the retrospective statement 
of the SLA members, their aim was also to get as many people involved in a guerrilla 
action as possible and to make the people think of revolutionaries as a valid part of their 
everyday lives.322
The  documents  that  were  sent  with  the  tape  described  elaborately  the  objectives  and  
design of the SLA. They were widely published.323 The food delivery demand, however, 
was more difficult to come by: it was quickly calculated that the costs of such food 
delivery would add up to over 400 million dollars. Hearst replied that the demand was 
impossible to meet, but he would soon come up with a suggestion along the lines of the 
SLA’s demands based on what he would be able to do.324 The SLA members obviously 
understood now that their demand was not reasonable. They made a new tape in which 
they replied using Patricia Hearst’s voice that they did not intend to be unreasonable and 
317 The documents to be published included all the central documents of the SLA that were written in the 
latter part of 1973, that is the cobra emblem and its meaning, The Symbionese Federation & the Symbionese 
Liberation Army declaration of revolutionary war & the Symbionese Program, the goals of the Symbionese 
Liberation Army, The United Symbionese war council terms of military&political alliance, and tactical 
support units. 
318 Transcript reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 55. 
319 Transcript and communique printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 53–58, 63–64.  
320 Transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 58–61. 
321 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 44. 
322 The last SLA statement, 18. 
323 McLellan & Avery 1977, 208; e.g. San Francisco Chronicle February 13, 1974.  
324 Statement printed in San Francisco Chronicle February 14, 1974. McLellan & Avery 1977, 208–209. 
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“whatever you come up with is basically okay. And just do it as fast as you can and 
everything will be fine”.325 Hearst responded by introducing a two million dollar program, 
called People in Need, which would feed approximately 100,000 persons during the next 
year.326
The SLA dismissed the Hearsts’ offer as “throwing a few crumbs to the people”.327
Instead, the SLA demanded four million dollars more and gave a list of new instructions 
as to how to organize the distribution. Randolph Hearst replied that the demand was 
beyond his capabilities, but the Hearst Corporation stepped up and offered the extra four 
million dollars in two parts, one part when Patricia Hearst was released unharmed and the 
second in January, 1975. The offer was valid until May 3.328 For the SLA members, this 
was no offer at all because they were convinced that once Patricia Hearst was released, the 
corporation would not live up to any of its promises.329
When  days  went  by  without  a  word  from  the  SLA,  Randolph  Hearst  demanded  that  
Patricia Hearst should be allowed to write him a letter. He legitimized his demand with 
reference to the Geneva convention according to which the SLA had stated it was treating 
Patricia Hearst. Soon afterwards, the SLA responded that the demand would be met if 
Russell Little and Joe Remiro were given the possibility to communicate via a live 
national television broadcast about their health and conditions. Randolph Hearst repeated 
that he would do anything he could to meet the demands. The broadcast, however, was 
eventually refused by the court. 330
During the Hearst kidnapping, the SLA members, the public and authorities all 
communicated through the media. The SLA members were following the media reporting 
on the kidnapping very intensely. Their communications included much more than the 
above-mentioned demands and responses. There were also many messages for different 
audiences. 
Judging by the tone and content of their communication, the SLA members were 
particularly attentive to what the radical Left was saying about them. According to Patricia 
Hearst, the SLA had expected that the publication of the tape and the SLA documents 
would rally most of the radicals in the Bay area for their cause.331 In the tape that the SLA 
had sent out, the purpose of the kidnapping was explained in Hearst’s voice: 
I am basically an example and a symbolic warning, not only to you but to everyone, that 
there are people who are not going to accept your support of other governments and that, 
325 Transcript reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 66. 
326 Hearst put half a million dollars of his own money to the program and the rest of it came from the Hearst 
Corporation. McLellan & Avery 1977, 220–221. 
327 Transcript reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 71. 
328 McLellan & Avery 1977, 247; Raudebaugh, Charles: “Hearst discloses free food plan”, San Francisco 
Chronicle February 20, 1974; “Hearst Captors Offered 4-Million”, The New York Times February 23, 1974; 
“The Hearst nightmare”, Time April 29, 1974. 
329 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 77–78. 
330 E.g. Raudebaugh, Charles: “Hearst wants TV time for SLA ’Soldiers’”, San Francisco Chronicle March 
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faced with suppression and murder of the people. [pause] And this is a warning to 
everybody.  It  is  also to show what  can be done.  When it  is  necessary,  the people can be 
fed, and to show that. It is too bad that it has to happen this way, to make people see that 
there are people who need food. Now maybe something can be done about that, so that 
things like this won’t have to happen again.”332
The hopes of the SLA did not, nonetheless, materialize. The public in general was strongly 
on the Hearsts’ side. Support poured in for the Hearst family in the form of expressions of 
sympathy and money to pay for the food program. In the letters sent to the San Francisco 
Examiner, many people who qualified for the food deliveries announced their refusal to 
accept food.333
The response from the people ideologically closer to the SLA was reserved and 
sometimes outright hostile. The reactions of those organizations that the SLA wanted to 
monitor the food deliveries were illustrative.334 Most of them agreed to participate in the 
end, but only to save Patricia Hearst’s life. In a joint statement, they strongly expressed 
their opposition to terrorism.335
The  SLA  responded  that  they  understood  the  hesitation  of  these  organizations  to  
participate because of the dangers that an affiliation with the SLA could entail. However, 
the SLA also claimed that this hesitation was partly based on a lack of understanding 
about the nature and tactics of the enemy. According to the SLA, the enemy always sought 
to negotiate with those political groups and leaders that were most willing to compromise 
the needs and concerns of the people. Overall, the enemy tried to destroy the revolutionary 
forces by granting sufficient reforms to make the majority of people satisfied and then kill 
those who did not concede. The SLA warned the people not to play into this scheme.336
It is not uncommon for revolutionary leftists to disagree on their tactics. Starting up the 
armed struggle in Western countries at the time was a highly controversial idea and every 
group that attempted was subject to fierce criticism. The SLA, however, seemed to get an 
exceptionally  strong  and  sharp  condemnation  from the  majority  of  the  radical  Left.  It  is  
noteworthy that several movement papers and magazines did not print the SLA documents 
332 Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 66.  
333 E.g. “The hostage: a game of terror”, Newsweek February 25, 1974; “The public reaction to the 
kidnaping”, San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle February 17, 1974. 
334 The list included Nairobi College in East Palo Alto, Glide Memorial Church in San Francisco, and The 
Black Teachers Caucus, the National Welfare Rights Organization, the American Indian Movement, the 
United Prisoner’s Union, the Third World Womens Alliance, the United Farm Workers, and representatives 
from people’s news services such as Getting Together, Kalayan, Triple Jeopardy, the Black Panther Party 
and The Anvil (Transcript reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 63). 
335 Power, Keith: “Go-between offer in the kidnap”, San Francisco Chronicle February 14, 1974. The only 
one  really  expressing  his  support  to  the  SLA was  Revender  A.  Cecil  Williams,  a  pastor  of  Glide  Church,  
who also played a major role in convincing the other organizations to join. Wilbur “Popeye” Jackson, the 
chairman of United Prisoners Union, did not seem an entirely reluctant participant, either (see Johnston, 
David: “Popeye blames PIN for screwing up food program”, Berkeley Barb April 5–11, 1974). The Black 
Panthers, while still  vehemently opposing the SLA, offered to take care of the program, but that offer was 
refused and the Panthers withdrew completely (“Huey P. Newton’s letter to Hearst family”, The Black 
Panther February 23, 1974; McLellan & Avery 1977, 244–245). 
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as the group had requested.337 However,  there  were  also  those  who  supported  the  SLA.  
The Black Liberation Army showed solidarity with its struggle in the following words: 
... we have been waging this protracted War of Liberation virtually alone; Oh but how 
sweet it is to hear the thunder of your weapons resounding on the battlefield. ... From our 
vantage point the most advanced forms of struggle are our clandestine BLA assault squads, 
the weatherunderground, and the SLA combat units. All are working from the promise laid 
down by our fallen Comrade George Jackson.338
The SLA was also warmly, although more reservedly, greeted by the Weather 
Underground. A communiqué signed by Bernardine Dohrn stated that the kidnapping 
dramatized what was wrong with the society and that change was needed.339
The SLA gladly expressed its  love for those who had saluted it.  At the same time, it  
seemed to be bothered by those who condemned its actions: 
There have been many on the left who, without a clear understanding, have condemned the 
actions of the SLA and the people’s forces who have chosen to fight rather than talk. These 
speakers condemn without clearly recognizing that our actions are a direct response to the 
vicious and murderous actions of the enemy corporate state against the people. It has been 
claimed that we are destroying the Left but in truth an unarmed and nonfighting Left is 
doomed – as the people of Chile can sadly testify. 
The analysis of these so-called leaders who presume to speak for the people can be traced 
to one of two qualities: Either they are cowards afraid of revolutionary violence because it 
is a direct threat to their personal security or they are opportunists who have personal gains 
in allowing the enemy to enslave or oppress and tranquilize the people. 
[..] 
The actions of the SLA are based on a clear understanding and analysis of the enemy and 
its actions against the lives and freedom of the people. We call upon the people to judge 
for themselves whether our tactics of waging struggle are correct or incorrect in fighting 
the enemy by any means necessary. 340
In the communiqués sent during the first five weeks of the kidnapping, the SLA operated 
from the assumption that the opposition against its project was based on a lack of 
337 The Berkeley Barb published every document and tape the SLA released. The Black Panthers published 
the set of documents that were demanded to be published in the SLA’s communication of February 12. 
However, publications such as Ramparts and the Guardian did not publish a single communication. For 
more information on the reactions on the SLA, see the next chapter. 
338 “Black Liberation Army welcomes SLA struggle”, Berkeley Barb March 1–7, 1974. 
339 Letter from Bernardine Dohrn/Weather Underground, February 20, 1974. Freedom Archives. For more 
supportive statements about the SLA, see especially Berkeley Barb, e.g. Albert, Stew: “Fear, Loathing and 
paranoia on the left”, Berkeley Barb March 1–7, 1974; “SLA helping revolution struggle to spread”, 
Berkeley Barb March 1–7, 1974; “A Silent Supporter” and “Welcomes Guerrilla Warfare”, Berkeley Barb
19/6,  February  22–28,  1974.  Solidarity  with  the  SLA was  also  called  for  in  some letters  from the  readers  
published in the Guardian on March 20 and 28, 1974. 
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understanding.341 It  seems  as  if  they  expected  that  after  all  this  explaining,  the  people  
would stand up and say that “now I understand” and commit themselves to revolution. The 
SLA clearly still firmly held to the belief that the desire for freedom was strong among the 
people and could be mobilized with the right kind of leadership, something that other 
revolutionary movements in the US had failed to provide. 
Besides the statements of potential supporters, the SLA was naturally actively listening 
to  what  the  authorities  and  to  the  Hearst  family  were  saying.  When  it  came  to  the  
authorities,  the  SLA  literally  expected  the  FBI  to  show  up  and  kill  them  all,  including  
Patricia Hearst.342 It was communicated that the primary concern of both the Hearsts and 
the FBI was the safety of Patricia Hearst and that the inquiry was at that moment 
subordinated to the wishes of the Hearst family. Randolph Hearst’s approach, in turn, had 
been from the beginning to take the SLA as what it claimed it was, a politically-motivated 
group, and to try to negotiate with it accordingly. Having said that, the FBI was, however, 
working intensely on the case. The local office told the press that they had about one 
hundred agents working on it and that they were ready to employ hundreds more if that 
was needed.343
The authorities and journalists were very quickly up-to-date with the identities of most 
SLA members. The fact that Cin, who talked on the tape, was Donald DeFreeze, was 
published on February 15, 1974.344 The press reports presented DeFreeze as a 
megalomaniac ex-convict who drank too much plum wine and depicted the SLA as a 
product of his fantasies that he had developed in the isolation of his prison cell.345 The 
story  about  the  origins  of  the  SLA  was  put  together  largely  within  a  month  from  the  
kidnap, but it was run in the newspapers only in late March.346
It was clear for most from very early on that the SLA was a small group,347 although 
the  U.S.  Attorney  General  William B.  Saxbe,  known for  his  sloppy statements,  claimed 
that there were indications that the SLA might be an organization with a nation-wide 
reach.348 Saxbe’s comments were also otherwise controversial. For example, when the 
SLA announced its demand for food delivery, he stated that the Hearst family should not 
341 Besides the tapes, this is apparent from Hearst’s memoir, see e.g. Hearst & Moscow 1982, 93. 
342 See e.g. the transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 86–87. 
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344 Findley, Tim: “Strange story of ’Cinque’”, San Francisco Chronicle February 15, 1974; “Hearst 
kidnapping linked to two escaped convicts”, The New York Times February 16, 1974. Other, equally 
unflattering articles on his background appeared later: Findley, Tim & Paul Avery: “The troubled past of the 
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April 11, 1974.  
345 “Two fugitives names as possible Hearst suspects”, San Francisco Chronicle February 16, 1974. 
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comply with the demand. Furthermore, he stated that he would consider it a dereliction of 
duty if the police knew where members of the SLA were and did not attempt to get 
Patricia Hearst out.349 The SLA took Saxbe’s comments as being prematurely exposed 
government policy decisions.350
According to Patricia Hearst’s account, the SLA members were disappointed and 
angry with the response to their actions. They did not believe it for a minute that Randolph 
Hearst would have had problems with meeting the demands had he really wanted to. 
Neither did they like how Charles Bates, the local head of the FBI, had called the SLA a 
bunch of hoods or that Saxbe had requested the FBI to kill the SLA and get Patricia Hearst 
out. Moreover, the SLA was angry about all the lies that the media had told about them. 
They were also very annoyed by the fact that practically no-one had praised them for 
arranging food for the poor.351
The confessions and memoir of Patricia Hearst are the only elaborate first-hand 
accounts of what was going on inside the SLA during the kidnapping. The image she 
gives in her memoir is one of a very isolated group that was fully dedicated to preparing 
for the revolutionary struggle. Most of their time was devoted to physical exercise, 
weapons training (without ammunition in their apartment), information gathering and 
ideological discussion. Moreover, they had intensive sessions of criticism-self-criticism in 
an effort to get rid of their bourgeois background and to become better revolutionaries. 
The ideological schooling extended to Patricia Hearst, who was lectured by them about the 
SLA’s position on the American society.352 They all lived in the same apartment and they 
rarely left the house. When they did leave, they donned disguises. At least in the 
beginning stages, they had some help from people who brought them supplies. One of 
them, Camilla Hall,  a friend of Mizmoon Soltysik,  moved in with them a few days after 
the kidnapping.353
In their tape of March 9, where they demanded the television broadcast for Remiro and 
Little in exchange for the opportunity for Patricia Hearst to communicate with her father, 
they also announced a suspension of communication. They had kidnapped Hearst in an 
effort to exchange her for Remiro and Little and the food delivery program was an 
additional idea that they had come up with when it seemed questionable whether the 
original plan would work. Since the food deliveries did not work out too well, it clearly 
made no sense to demand the release of Remiro and Little. Hearst had the impression that 
the SLA did not know what to do next.354
In the meantime, the media attention started to shift to the Hearst food delivery. These 
deliveries began at the end of February. In the next few weeks, People In Need, the 
organization established to take care of the project, organized five sets of food deliveries. 
The project soon got a bad name, because it was organized poorly, food got stolen and the 
349 McLellan & Avery 1977, 235; Raudebaugh, Charles: “Hearst blasts Saxbe’s comments on the kidnap”, 
San Francisco Chronicle February 15, 1974; Turner, Wallace: “Hearst scores Saxbe Kidnapping View”, The 
New York Times February 15, 1974. 
350 See transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 87.  
351 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 59–61, 79. 
352 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 71, 78. 
353 McLellan & Avery 1977, 124. 
354 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 64. 
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deliveries were often chaotic and occasionally deteriorated into rioting.355 Even  so,  the  
media interest in the story remained high. As a consequence, the yard of the Hearst 
mansion in Hillsborough had become a campground for reporters waiting eagerly for the 
next  statement  by  the  family  or  the  SLA.  The  telephone  company  installed  a  battery  of  
press telephones across the street from the Hearst mansion already in mid-February.356
3.6 Patty/Tania spectacle 
What attracted most attention in the aforementioned tape from March 9 was the statement 
by  Patricia  Hearst.  She  said  that  she  was  no  longer  afraid  of  the  SLA  and  that  she  was  
beginning to understand what they were talking about. What she really feared now was the 
FBI. To Patricia Hearst, it seemed that no-one cared for her anymore and her family and 
authorities were more interested in protecting their own interests or in taking advantage of 
her. She said that the SLA had given her a weapon of her own and trained her to use it.357
The tape intensified the already circulating (unfounded) rumors that Patricia Hearst 
might have arranged the kidnapping herself. Many made the remark that the tone of her 
voice seemed more sincere and together than in the earlier tapes, so she actually might 
have meant what she said. Still, for many it was unimaginable that a kidnap victim would 
genuinely change her views so fundamentally within just one month and while virtually 
held at gunpoint. Hearst herself later stated that she was given the script and while she did 
not agree with the text, she just thought it wise to do what they asked her to do – which 
was the general approach that Hearst has told that she adopted during the kidnapping.358
As it was already mentioned, the SLA members had begun quite early in the 
kidnapping to educate Patricia Hearst on their political views and ideology. Hearst has 
said that some time during March, DeFreeze approached her with the question of whether 
she would be interested in joining the SLA. It is not known how exactly the SLA members 
came up with this idea, but Jerry Rubin actually came close to proposing it in his open 
letter in the middle of February. He suggested that the SLA should take everything out of 
their position of power leverage and then release Patricia. In the meantime, they should 
treat her so well that she walks away as an ally to their cause.359
After  the  initial  overtures,  the  question  of  her  joining  was  officially  posed.  She  was  
formally given the alternative to leave, but Hearst said she understood immediately that it 
was not a real option. Hearst, seeing her joining as her best chance for survival, eagerly 
told  them  that  she  wanted  to  join.  After  several  days  of  talks  between  Patricia  and  all  
355 On the PIN program, see e.g. McLellan & Avery 1977, 234–251. See also e.g. “First day of food plan is 
chaotic”, San Francisco Chronicle February 23, 1974; Anspacher, Carolyn: “How Hearst food giveaway is 
shaping up”, San Francisco Chronicle March  8,  1974;  “Hearst  Food  Distribution  Plan  Has  Been  
Completed”, The New York Times March 27, 1974; “Hearst Food Distribution Reported Beset by Theft”, 
The New York Times April 1, 1974. 
356 E.g. “They all await word”, San Francisco Chronicle February 12, 1974. 
357 Transcript reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 88–93. 
358 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 91–92. 
359 “Jerry Rubin’s letter to the U.S. – and the SLA”, San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle February 17, 
1974.
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members of the SLA, where Patricia was to convince the others that she should be allowed 
to become a member, a unanimous decision was reached.360
In late March, the food delivery program was completed and the public waited for the 
next  step  from  the  SLA.  In  the  last  days  of  March,  two  open  letters  to  the  SLA  and  
Patricia Hearst were published in the media. The first one was from the captured Remiro 
and Little, who greeted Patricia warmly and expressed their conviction that she would be 
released unharmed. The second letter, signed by the purported SLA inmate members 
Clifford Jefferson, Al Taylor and Raymond Scott, suggested that the SLA should start 
negotiations to release Patricia Hearst and that they had been guaranteed that four million 
dollars would be indeed used for feeding the poor.361 The  authenticity  of  the  letter  was  
verified with the signatures of Reverend Williams and Randolph Hearst, who had met 
with Jefferson several times.362
After these communications, the SLA decided to play an April fool’s joke. A 
communiqué hinting that Patricia Hearst would be released, was to be sent out. On April 
2, one day later than intended, a delivery including the Communiqué number 7, SLA’s 
Codes of War and half of Patricia Hearst’s driver’s license arrived to John Bryan, an editor 
of the San Francisco Phoenix.363 This communiqué was titled “Negotiations and Release 
of Prisoners”. It said that the details of the release of Patricia Hearst would be made public 
within 72 hours.364 The communiqué was greeted with considerable enthusiasm. 
This excitement turned into amazement when the next communication, this time in the 
form of a tape recording, followed on the next day. In that tape, Patricia Hearst 
announced: 
I  have  been  given  the  choice  of,  one,  being  released  in  a  safe  area,  or,  two,  joining  the  
forces of the Symbionese Liberation Army and fighting for my freedom and the freedom 
of all oppressed people. I have chosen to stay and fight.365
360 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 96–100. The question “What really happened to Patricia Hearst” is probably the 
single most widely discussed issue related to the SLA. It is of secondary importance to the study at hand, so 
I will not deal with this question in detail. Hearst’s own interpretation is that as she adopted the strategy of 
agreeing with everything the SLA said or requested, she slowly started, if not believe, at least to adopt their 
views. A large part in this was played by her increasing desperation. She did not see a way out, feared 
actively for an FBI raid, and felt that no real effort was made to get her out alive. When she was offered the 
chance to join, she welcomed it because it would allow her to survive. Later, after the experience of the bank 
robbery and being branded as a “common criminal”, she felt that a numbed shock set in. For different 
interpretations, see Graebner 2008, also e.g. Anspacher, Carolyn: “SLA and brainwashing”, San Francisco 
Chronicle April  6,  1974;  Albright,  Joseph & Carolyn Anspacher:  “Brainwashing –  what  it  really  is”,  San
Francisco Chronicle May  24,  1974;  “Theory  on  SLA  brainwashing”,  San Francisco Chronicle May 28, 
1974; “’Brain-impressing’ and Patricia Hearst”, San Francisco Chronicle May 29, 1974; “The Hearst 
nightmare”, Time April 29, 1974. 
361 McLellan & Avery 1977, 294–296.  
362 E. g. Belcher, Jerry: “Death Row Jeff’s message to SLA”, San Francisco Chronicle March 31, 1974.  
363 Bryan was chosen because he had written an entirely fabricated story about the SLA (Hearst & Moscow 
1982, 115). He is the same person who wrote the biography of Joe Remiro (Bryan 1976).  
364 Reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 97–98. 
365 Transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 114–118. 
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She announced that she had been given the name Tania, in the spirit of a comrade of Che 
in Bolivia. With that tape, a now famous photo was released of Patricia Hearst dressed in a 
jumpsuit and beret and holding a carbine.366
Patricia’s statement was accompanied by statements by Bill Harris, Nancy Ling Perry 
and Donald DeFreeze. They declared that the operation was over, and that there was no 
need for negotiations, as Patricia Hearst was free to leave whenever she wished to. At the 
same time, the SLA made a final call for people to stand up and struggle for their lives as 
the SLA no longer expected its communications to be published in full.  
While the first communications had contained long segments about the fortunes of the 
Hearst empire by which the SLA members attempted to prove their point, the more 
emotional elements started to increasingly overrule the factual content in the later 
communications. A reoccurring theme then became the issue of leadership. They stated 
that the enemy had murdered prophets and leaders that the people had brought forth, 
including Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr. and George Jackson. Donald DeFreeze was 
proclaimed to be another prophet and leader that the people had brought forth. DeFreeze 
greeted  his  own  children  and  explained  how  he  was  fighting  for  them.  The  tape  closed  
with “the national anthem of the Symbionese Liberation Army”.367
During March, the SLA was running out of money and looked for ways to get more 
funding. They started to plan a bank robbery. Besides money, which the SLA badly 
needed, the operation was also designed to generate publicity. It was decided that Patricia 
Hearst should participate in that robbery. On April 15, 1974, the time was ripe to put their 
plan into action. The SLA members entered a Hibernia Bank location in San Francisco 
and Patricia Hearst identified herself to the surveillance camera.368
According to Hearst, the SLA members were ecstatic about the sensation that the bank 
robbery created and believed once again that it would help turn around the people to 
support them.369 After the robbery, the SLA decided to send another tape. The main 
message of that tape was summarized by Donald DeFreeze’s voice: 
Now people, I warn you again: The only way, I repeat, the only way you will regain your 
life and freedom is to fight. The only way you can keep your guns is to use them. Your 
time is running short. Open your eyes.370
In their eyes, the recent developments had shown that the enemy was terrified by the SLA 
and  was  fighting  against  it  with  all  possible  means.  Hearst  later  told  the  SLA  was  
particularly happy with the tape, calling it the opening salvo of the coming revolution.371
The transformation of Patricia Hearst to an urban guerrilla was a media scoop unlike 
any other. It is still the photo of Tania above anything else that people are likely to 
366 McLellan & Avery 1977, 301; on the name, see also Hearst & Moscow 1982, 113–114. 
367 Transcripts printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 107–114. 
368 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 126–127, 144–149. 
369 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 151. 
370 Transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 122–123. 
371 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 166–167. The transcript of the tape is printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 120–124. 
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remember of the SLA. The posters with this photo became common in the Berkeley area. 
The front page of the Berkeley Barb exulted that Patty was free.372 Other movement press 
barely commented on the Tania issue. The SLA was criticized, though, for gunning down 
two innocent persons during the bank robbery.373 Evidently, shooting bystanders was just 
not what American revolutionaries did. 
The messages that the SLA sent out in April hardly raised the SLA’s stock. In terms of 
winning the larger segments of the radical Left on their side, it was not the best idea to talk 
about DeFreeze as a prophet. As McLellan and Avery write, a revolutionary messiah was 
the last thing that American radicals were looking for.374
At this point, Randolph Hearst lost his temper with the SLA. He and his wife said they 
did  not  believe  a  word  Patricia  said  and  came  to  believe  that  she  was  brainwashed.  He  
claimed the SLA members had not proven to be worthy of their promises but were merely 
cruel people with twisted ideas.375 He seemed particularly offended with the SLA’s April 
fool joke. The statements that were given after the bank robbery indicated that the 
authorities had also changed their approach in dealing with the SLA. The local FBI head, 
Charles Bates, said that the robbery had put the investigation into a new perspective as 
they had now people identified committing a federal crime.376 Instead of the old message 
of how “Patricia’s safety is our primary concern”, the FBI began to repeat that they were 
going to get the SLA.377 The authorities gave conflicting statements on whether they 
considered Hearst as being still a hostage or a criminal, in other words, whether she was a 
willing participant in the bank robbery.378 The  FBI  Director  Clarence  M.  Kelley  
announced that while the FBI did not know at the moment where the SLA was, when such 
information was available, the FBI would enter the location. “We will make every effort 
not to injure and certainly not to kill anybody... It’s going to be well-planned, but we’re 
going in”, he stated.379
After the bank robbery, arrest warrants were immediately issued for Donald DeFreeze, 
Mizmoon  Soltysik,  Nancy  Ling  Perry  and  Camilla  Hall,  who  were  wanted  for  bank  
372 Berkeley Barb April 5–11, 1974. 
373 Flynn, William: “Venceremos founder says SLA subverts radical causes”, San Francisco Sunday 
Examiner & Chronicle April 28, 1974. 
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“Why Mrs. Hearst won’t believe it”, San Francisco Chronicle April  5,  1974;  Revenaugh,  R.  L.:  “Hearst  
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robbery, and Hearst who was wanted as a material witness.380 The police were conducting 
house-to-house searches in the area where the bank robbery took place.381 A couple of 
days later, Emily Harris, Bill Harris, William Wolfe and Angela Atwood were declared 
wanted nominally for committing perjury in obtaining drivers’ licenses under false names, 
but it was naturally their SLA involvement that the police were interested in.382 Now, there 
was an arrest warrant for every active member of the SLA. The police seemed to be 
coming  closer  to  the  SLA.  In  early  May,  the  police  found  the  SLA  safe  house  in  the  
Western Addition (1827 Golden Avenue) that its members had left about a week earlier.383
3.7 Preparing for the inevitable 
The bank robbery became a point of no return, not only for Patricia Hearst, but also for the 
other  SLA  members  who  had  not  had  a  criminal  record  before.  Hearst  said  that  Willie  
Wolfe in particular changed his ways after the robbery and became more disciplined and 
dedicated than before.384
After leaving the old safe house, the SLA had moved into another apartment in the 
Hunter’s Point District of San Francisco.385 Hearst recalls that around this time, “a new 
intensity crept into our lives, a combination of revolutionary zeal and sheer paranoia: we 
were running out of time”.386 DeFreeze kept declaring that the struggle was intensifying 
and that it would be only a matter of months before the revolution would begin. How else 
would it be possible that they could find people to run errands for them by ringing 
doorbells randomly in the neighborhood?387
Even if all the police cars and helicopters they saw were not looking for them, as they 
appeared to think, there was a major hunt for clues about the whereabouts of the SLA. The 
newspapers were filled with stories about the SLA, including the identities and the former 
lives of its members. Several articles published claimed that DeFreeze had formerly been a 
police informer. Furthermore, his letter to a judge where he explained all his troubled past 
was published in its entirety.388
It was no wonder that the SLA members felt encircled and in the middle of a war. The 
realities of their own everyday life supported the analysis of DeFreeze about the state of 
the revolution which had largely taken shape in the isolated and repressive world inside 
the prison walls. The other SLA members had, through their personal histories, a 
somewhat wider perspective on the state of affairs, but the Bay Area was not a particularly 
380 E.g.  Raudebaugh,  Charles:”Two  shot  in  S.F.  bank  raid  –  Patricia  Hearst  in  photos”,  San Francisco 
Chronicle April 16, 1974; Raudebaugh, Charles: “FBI names SLA leader in bank raid”, San Francisco 
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suitable  place  to  draw  conclusions  about  the  conditions  in  the  rest  of  the  country.  
Moreover, because of their belief in third-world leadership, DeFreeze was supposed to be 
the one who had the best understanding of revolution. According to Hearst’s account, 
occasional disputes notwithstanding, the others seemed to rely a great deal on DeFreeze’s 
judgment. The information that they got from their only outside contact, the Black 
Muslims they had recruited to help them, reinforced that image. They said that the SLA 
hunt was enormous, there were wanted posters everywhere and that the photo of Patricia 
Hearst as an urban guerrilla, with the text “We love you, Tania”, had become a popular 
poster in Berkeley and in the East Bay Area.389
With the forthcoming struggle in mind, a decision was made to split into three teams 
which would start operating independently and just have occasional meetings. The idea 
was to decrease the security risk and to expand the SLA’s activities. Each team was 
supposed to recruit new people. After a long dispute, the first team, led by DeFreeze 
himself, consisted of Camilla Hall and Angela Atwood. The second team was led by 
Nancy Ling Perry, the other members being Willy Wolfe and Mizmoon Soltysik. The 
third team, the one of Bill Harris, included Emily Harris and Patricia Hearst. As a result, 
they all started to do everything in teams and planned to move to different locations.390
The  next  combat  operation  in  their  plans  was,  according  to  Hearst,  to  go  out  to  the  
streets, search-and-destroy style, and kill policemen during the night. During the day, they 
would hide in the people’s houses. With this campaign, they (or DeFreeze) envisioned that 
they would force the authorities to intensify countermeasures, which in turn would enrage 
the people and make them join the SLA in its fight.391
Before it came to that, they reached the conclusion that San Francisco was becoming 
too dangerous and it was time to move out. They followed DeFreeze’s idea to move to Los 
Angeles, because he had grown up there. After they arrived in Los Angeles in three teams, 
they found a cheap safe house in an all-black neighborhood and started to look for new 
recruits and helpers. They contacted people in the area they knew and asked for help but 
with little result.392
According to Hearst’s description, the group was becoming even more frantic in their 
combat drills and weapons practices and they were enclosed in their own world. Her 
retrospective analysis is that they were all “suffering from a combination of group 
hypnosis and battle fatigue, our anxieties and fears stretched to the breaking point.”393
Death had become a regular discussion topic, as not only being beautiful, but increasingly 
also as a necessity. They felt that any other end to the SLA would be demoralizing for the 
people.394
As the reader may have already noticed, the above account of the state of mind within 
the SLA was solely based on Patricia Hearst’s account. The way that these discussions are 
described in her memoir is so coherent and paves the way towards the future 
developments so perfectly, that one cannot help wonder what the role of the co-writer 
389 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 186–187. 
390 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 182–183, The last SLA statement, 27. 
391 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 185–186. 
392 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 187–188,193–194, 202–203. 
393 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 199. 
394 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 196–202.  
95
Alvin Moscow has been in constructing the narrative. The overall claim, however, finds 
support in other sources, too. While words such as death, murder and execution had been 
present in the SLA’s communications from the beginning, there were increasing signs of 
desperation and agonized calls for the people to take up arms and to defend themselves or 
otherwise they would be killed. In the tape from early April, in which Patricia Hearst 
announced that she had joined the SLA and the SLA declared that the negotiations were 
terminated, DeFreeze told his own children that “even when I may never see you again, 
know that I love you and will not for any price forsake your freedom and the freedom of 
all oppressed peoples”.395
On  May  16,  Bill  and  Emily  Harris,  together  with  their  third  team  member,  Patricia  
Hearst, went to buy clothes and other supplies that would be needed in combat.396 In  a  
shop called Mel’s Sporting Goods, Bill Harris, on the spur of the moment, stuffed a 
bandana inside his sleeve. The security guards had seen that and stopped him and Emily 
Harris as they were leaving the store. At that point, Patricia Hearst, who had stayed behind 
in the car to wait, grabbed a submachine gun and fired. That enabled Bill and Emily Harris 
to escape and to return to their car.397 The Harrises and Patricia Hearst then left their car 
and escaped by hijacking one car after another. There was no way of going back to their 
safe house, and they tried to establish contact with the others with the use of pre-agreed 
arrangements made for this kind of situation, but without any result. Finally, they drove 
past the house and saw that it was empty. They then decided to check in to a motel near 
Disneyland in Anaheim and to lay low for a few days.398
In the car that the Harrises and Patricia Hearst left behind during their flight, the police 
found a parking ticket that was issued in the neighborhood of the SLA safe house. The 
registration information of the gun that Bill Harris had lost at Mel’s pointed towards the 
SLA. By the next morning, the police had located the SLA’s (by then abandoned) safe 
house.399
After leaving their safe house, the other SLA members drove around looking for a 
place  to  go.  At  long  last,  they  located  a  small  stucco  house  in  Compton,  a  black  
neighborhood where all the lights were on. They went to ask whether they could hide there 
for a couple of hours and were let in. Trusting that black people were on their side, they 
made no secret about who they were. During the next hours, many people went in and out 
of the house as the rumor spread that the SLA was in that house.400
The police too learned soon about the SLA presence in Compton. By the afternoon, the 
police had located the house. The news about the increasing police presence reached the 
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SLA, who began to prepare for a confrontation and reportedly planned to take as many 
cops with them as possible. A little bit before 6 pm, the police called for the people inside 
the house to surrender. After this call had been repeated several times, rockets with CS 
tear gas were fired into the house. The SLA responded with gunfire and the police fired 
back. What followed was several minutes of intense shooting. The police shot more tear 
gas inside the house. After three quarters of an hour, the house caught fire. The police 
called a ceasefire and asked those inside to surrender. Two of them, Nancy Ling Perry and 
Camilla Hall, did come out of the house, but when Hall opened fire, they were killed by 
the bullets that the police fired in return. The rest of them died inside the burning house. 
During  the  shootout,  ten  thousand  bullets  were  fired,  half  of  them  by  the  SLA  and  the  
other half by the police, but amazingly enough, no-one but the SLA members got hurt.401
The entire shootout was broadcasted live on television.  
Immediately after the shootout, it was not known whether Patricia Hearst had been 
inside the house. The police had reportedly tried to find this out in advance from those 
who had visited there during the day, but they received conflicting information.402 Within 
a couple of days, the identities of the deceased were confirmed. With that, it became clear 
that Patricia Hearst was not in the house, but was the one who had fired at Mel’s Sporting 
Goods.  The  FBI  announced  that  it  no  longer  considered  Patricia  Hearst  to  be  a  kidnap  
victim, but instead, she was seen as an armed and dangerous fugitive.403
The media attention was again at its height. The newspapers ran many stories on those 
who died in the shootout and on the remaining members. The national magazines also 
featured these stories with Patricia Hearst appearing on the cover of Newsweek for the 
second time in a month, and on the cover of Time.404 There was also a great deal of 
bewilderment over the shootout. The police defended themselves by saying that their 
actions were in line with the situation and that they were backed up by Attorney General 
Evelle Younger and, although somewhat less wholeheartedly, by the FBI. According to 
their account, the SLA had opened fire, and the police were amazed by their firepower. 
What ensured was a shootout that was allegedly the biggest gunfight ever in Los Angeles. 
While there was little sympathy for the SLA itself, there was a sense of outrage on behalf 
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Francisco Chronicle May 20, 1974; “Miss Hearst Called 'Dangerous Fugitive'; F.B.I Charges Due in 
Machine-Gunning”, The New York Times May 20, 1974. See also Raudebaugh, Charles: “New counts 
against Patricia”, San Francisco Chronicle May 23, 1974. For stories about the deceased SLA leaders, see 
e.g. San Francisco Chronicle May 18, 20 and 22, 1974. 
404 Hearst was in the cover of Newsweek on April 29 and May 27, 1974. Before that, she had made the cover 
once already and would still make it four more times, for the last time on March 29, 1976. As for Time, she 
had three covers in total. That was unique by any measure (see e.g. Nacos 2002, 40, 48–51).  
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of the people who lived in the area. This was in part because the police had not evacuated 
anyone from the neighborhood, not even from the neighboring houses.405
The  campaign  of  the  SLA  was  generally  considered  to  be  over.  The  only  remaining  
identified members, Emily and Bill Harris and Patricia Hearst, were called to surrender by 
several parties, including their friends, relatives, the FBI, Randolph Hearst and Governor 
Ronald Reagan.406 It was generally claimed that the SLA had made a huge mistake by 
moving to Los Angeles, because they did not know the terrain well and did not have any 
helpers.407
Among the Left, the shootout provoked mixed feelings. All were appalled by the 
brutality of the LAPD.408 That outrage, however, did not really translate into support for 
the SLA. The fundamental differences between the SLA remained and the recent events 
had underlined the risks that helping the SLA might include. This hostility towards the 
SLA became evident in the context of DeFreeze’s funeral. His brother had welcomed all 
radicals, but no-one of any distinction showed up.409
Tips  about  the  possible  location  of  the  Harrises  and  Patricia  Hearst  poured  in  during  
the first days after the shootout. Even though there were no signs of progress in the 
investigation, the police seemed to believe that the matter would soon resolve itself. This 
is because they expected it would not take long before the fugitives had exhausted their 
limited resources and could not hide anymore.410
3.8 Regrouping 
Among those who watched the live broadcast shootout had also been Patricia Hearst and 
Emily and Bill Harris. They had just checked into the motel. Watching their comrades 
burn alive in front of their eyes was a devastating experience. This is how Emily Harris 
described the moment in retrospect two years later: 
The first things I remember feeling were a numbness and a feeling of disbelief. I couldn’t 
even cry. [...] There was just nothing we could do. We all felt responsible because of the 
405 E. g. Avery, Paul: “Cinque reported among victims”, San Francisco Chronicle May 18, 1974; “L.A. 
police gunplay angers neighbors” and “Patricia Hearst not among those killed in L. A. shootout”, San
Francisco Examiner & Chronicle May 19, 1974; “Younger lauds L.A. Police”, San Francisco Chronicle
May 23,  1974;  “Los  Angeles  will  Pay for  Damage in  Its  Raid  on  S.L.A.”,  The New York Times May 23, 
1974.
406 Wegars, Don: “Patricia’s parents ask her to give herself up” and Avery, Paul & Charles Raudebaugh: 
“Warrant out for Patricia – Search for SLA widening”, San Francisco Chronicle May 21, 1974; Avery, Paul 
& Charles Raudebaugh: “FBI plea to Harrises and Patricia”, San Francisco Chronicle May 22, 1974; 
Anspacher, Carolyn: “Friends, relatives appeal to fugitives”, San Francisco Chronicle May 23, 1974; 
Reagan urges last SLA to surrender”, San Francisco Chronicle May 24, 1974. 
407 E. g. “Leftists tell how SLA made big mistake in L.A.”, San Francisco Chronicle May 21, 1974. 
408 E. g. “L.A.P.D. search and destroy tactics exposed”, The Black Panther June 15, 1974. 
409 “Services for two SLA members”, San Francisco Chronicle May 23, 1974.  
410 “Border watch tightened in SLA hunt”, San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle May 26, 1974; “FBI thinks 
Patricia is still in L. A.”, San Francisco Chronicle May 27, 1974. 
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Mel’s thing. Now maybe we can see that a lot of things caused it [...] but at that moment it 
seemed so clear that the three of us were to blame.411
And Bill Harris stated: 
... the police agencies didn’t know that the SLA was in the LA area until Mel’s. Knowing 
that makes all the other things seem unimportant and the psychological burden of that has 
been really incredible for me – I mean how can you describe what it’s like to watch the six 
people you love most in the world being killed? [...] It was like there was a record 
continually going over in my head, “if we just hadn’t done this, or if we had just moved 
faster.” My brain was in a turmoil and my heart felt about as big as a trash can. 412
According to Hearst’s description, the death of their comrades provoked a strong 
sentiment  of  obligation  in  Emily  and  Bill  Harris.  They  felt  that  they  owed  it  to  the  
deceased ones to continue the struggle.413
Now that Donald DeFreeze was no longer there, it was Bill Harris as their team leader 
who was in command. One of the first priorities of the remnants of the SLA was to get a 
new tape out and to let people know that the SLA was still alive. The tape was sent out in 
early June.414 This tape included an eloquent description of each fallen comrades’ 
revolutionary prowess. Even though DeFreeze had been an important leader, they 
emphasized that his death had definitely not left them leaderless. On the contrary, they 
claimed that their unit, which they called Malcolm X Combat Unit, had been a leadership 
training cell, so the SLA was all but lacking leadership. Another matter that they needed to 
set  straight  was  that,  contrary  to  what  had  been  claimed  in  the  media,  the  six  SLA  
members that died in the shootout were not suicidal, “just determined and full of love”. 
Cinque most definitely did not commit suicide, as was claimed in the first reports of the 
coroner. Moreover, the idea that he was a police informer was described as ridiculous 
beyond belief. He was a true black leader and like so many black leaders before him, he 
was killed by the “pigs”. They also denied that the SLA had made a mistake by moving to 
Los Angeles. They explained that SLA made that move because it had become 
increasingly difficult to hide in the Bay area and that they left for the LA only after careful 
investigation. That Bill Harris had shoplifted was a cheap lie and much of the blame was 
put on a particular individual who gave the crucial tip that led the police to the right door 
in  Compton.  And  most  of  all,  the  SLA  was  definitely  not  going  to  surrender.  With  the  
voice of Patricia Hearst, they announced: “I died in that fire on Fifty-fourth Street, but out 
of the ashes I was reborn, I know what I have to do.” 
The interpretation of the recent events they offered was basically that the “pigs have 
won a battle, but the war of the flea is not over”. They claimed the shootout just showed 
how scared the authorities were of the SLA. They knew that when the oppressed people 
unite in struggle, like the SLA calls for, the police could not overpower them. According 
411 Quoted in Lyne, Susan & Robert Scheer: “Twenty months with Patty-Tania. By Bill & Emily Harris”, 
New Times March 5, 1976, 30. 
412 Quoted in Lyne, Susan & Robert Scheer: “Twenty months with Patty-Tania. By Bill & Emily Harris”, 
New Times March 5, 1976, 30. 
413 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 222–228. 
414 A transcript of the tape is reprinted in e.g. the Berkeley Barb June 14–20, 1974. 
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to the SLA, the shootout and its live broadcast were part of the authorities’ terrorist tactics 
to deter people from rising up against the “fascist dictatorship”. Those tactics, however, 
were going to backfire, because they only raised people’s consciousness. The struggle that 
the SLA was leading was practically impossible to break: “The pigs boast that they have 
broken the back of the Symbionese Liberation Army. But to do this, the pigs would have 
to break the back of the people.” From now on, Bill Harris announced on the tape, they 
would proudly take up the banner of New World Liberation Front (NWLF), a left-wing 
armed revolutionary group that was operating in California at that time and had called 
anyone sharing its goals and ideology to operate in its name.415
The Harrises and Patricia Hearst were almost penniless and did not have anyone to 
help them. Therefore, finding new supporters and networks was a high priority. They 
decided that they should move back to the San Francisco area, where it would be much 
easier for them to make such connections without endangering their security.416 Once in 
the  Bay  area,  Emily  and  Bill  Harris  started  to  go  through  their  old  friends  who  they  
thought would be ready to help them and who they knew well enough to judge their 
trustworthiness. One after another of their friends turned them down, some of them very 
bluntly. The Harrises felt betrayed and furious. Finally, they decided to turn to Kathleen 
(Kathy) Soliah who had been a close friend of Angela Atwood who they had met before 
going underground. Her address was listed in Emily Harris’ notebook, but they had not 
contacted her because they did not know her too well and they were hesitant as to whether 
she was the kind of person who could be trusted. Lacking better options, the Harrises 
decided to take the chance.417
415 In late May 1974, the May 19th Combat Unit of the NWLF had committed a bomb attack to show 
solidarity to the slain SLA members (Buck 1978, 119; “NWLF Chronology”, Dragon no. 1 (August 1975), 
5. The New World Liberation Front had called everyone sharing its objectives and ideology to operate in its 
name. McLellan & Avery (1977) give the picture that all NWLF bombings would have been committed by 
the SLA remnants and the new team, stating that Hearst had declared that they were the NWLF. I have 
found no support for this claim. Instead, all those I interviewed stated that the only attacks they committed 
were those that took place in August, 1975 and are mentioned later in the text. 
416 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 222–228. There are somewhat conflicting accounts from the events from here 
on. This description here is based largely on Patricia Hearst’s account and my interviews with former SLA 
associates. Two of these associates, James Kilgore and Michael Bortin, who were both deeply involved in 
helping the Harrises and Hearst, have confirmed to me that Hearst’s account is largely accurate. For more 
elaborate discussion on the memoir of Patricia Hearst, see the introduction. McLellan and Avery also 
reached the conclusion that the full confession of Patricia Hearst, which was available at the time they wrote 
their book, was the most reliable one. The events have also been described, although more selectively and 
with more bias, in three Rolling Stone articles, two of them allegedly based on information from Jack and 
Micki Scott (Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The inside story”, Rolling Stone October 23, 1975 and Kohn, 
Howard & David Weir: “The inside story part two”, Rolling Stone November 20, 1975) and one on 
information  from Steve  Soliah  (Kohn,  Howard & David  Weir:  “The lost  year  of  the  SLA”,  Rolling Stone
April 22, 1976). In none of these articles, for example, Michael Bortin, who comes up later in the text,  is 
mentioned by name. Also, references to Jo Soliah and several other friends who helped them are almost non-
existent. There is also no discussion about the (attempted) attacks that the group committed in August-
September 1975.  
417 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 242–243; see also McLellan & Avery 1977, 375–376. In the article by Kohn and 
Weir (Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The inside story”, Rolling Stone October 23, 1975, 41) it is said that 
the  Harrises  and Patricia  Hearst  would  have  attended the  SLA rally  and spotted  Kathy Soliah  there.  This  
information, however, is based on second-hand sources and is contradicted by the accounts of Patricia 
Hearst as well as that of the Harrises (Lyne, Susan & Robert Scheer: “Twenty months with Patty-Tania. By 
Bill & Emily Harris”, New Times March 5, 1976, 32). As for why the Harrises hesitated to contact Kathy 
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Kathy Soliah had been devastated by the death of her friend Atwood and, along with 
her boyfriend James Kilgore, agreed to help them. Soliah also mobilized her sister, 
Josephine (Jo) Soliah, and brother, Steven (Steve) Soliah, to take part in the effort as well 
as Kilgore’s good friend, Michael Bortin.  
Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore and Michael Bortin all had been involved political 
activism before they met the Harrises and Hearst, although they were not very high profile 
activists in the Bay Area. Even though the Harrises berated them as intellectuals who had 
done  nothing,  Soliah,  Kilgore  and  Bortin  were  not  entirely  unfamiliar  with  the  armed  
struggle either. Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore had studied at the University of California 
at Santa Barbara during the Isla Vista riots in 1970. Soliah and Kilgore had participated in 
the protests, and witnessing the National Guard occupation of Isla Vista had had a 
profound and radicalizing impact on them.418  
Via Los Angeles and Monterey, Soliah and Kilgore had moved to the Bay area in 1971 
in search of political action. The initiative to move there came through their contacts with 
Jack Scott, a well-known radical sports writer who called for the better inclusion of 
minorities and the poor, and for less authoritarianism in the sport system.419 Another 
attraction for Kathy Soliah was the good theater acting possibilities. When they arrived in 
the Bay area, the protest movement had already peaked, but it was still incredibly vibrant 
in their eyes. They got involved in all kinds of grass-root activities, such as food 
conspiracies420 and free clinics and attended numerous demonstrations. It was in the food 
conspiracy that Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore met Michael Bortin and Willie Brandt. 
They all lived in the same area in North Oakland. Kilgore and Bortin became good friends 
with Steven Soliah who also had recently moved to the area. Together, they started to earn 
money by painting houses. Bortin and Brandt, as well as Bortin’s girlfriend, Pat Jean 
McCarthy, had also known Jack Scott for some time by then. In addition, Kathy’s sister, 
Jo, also moved to the Bay Area in 1973. 421  
Willie Brandt had his own project called the Revolutionary Army. During the early 
1970s, he made several bomb attacks to protest against the US involvement in the 
Vietnam War. While his army consisted of him and to some extent, his girlfriend Wendy 
Yoshimura, he asked people he knew to help him in individual bombings. Brandt had 
made such a request to Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore, but they declined. Michael 
Bortin, an action-hungry man who did not delve on the possible consequences of his 
action, accepted the request in March, 1972. Brandt, Bortin and Paul Rubenstein, who was 
                                                                                                                                             
Soliah, another explanation that has been often brought up is that she had just spoken in the SLA memorial 
rally in Berkeley and thus might have been under police surveillance. This might not be a good explanation, 
because according to Jo Bortin, the Harrises would have contacted Kathy Soliah already before the rally 
(Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008). 
418 McLellan & Avery 1977, 379; Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008. On the Isla Vista riots, see 
e.g. Whalen & Flacks 1990. 
419 On  Jack  Scott’s  background,  see  Kohn,  Howard  &  David  Weir:  “The  inside  story”,  Rolling Stone 
October 23, 1975; Goldstein, Richard: “Jack Scott, a prominent critic of sport’s excesses, dies at 57”, New 
York Times February 8, 2000. 
420 Food conspiracies were projects where people grouped and bought food products directly from the 
producers. For a retrospective account, see Rosen, Laurel & McGrane, Sally: “The revolution will not be 
catered”, San Francisco Chronicle March 8, 2000. 
421 Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008; McLellan & 
Avery 1977, 379–380, 392. 
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a roommate of Soliah and Brandt, were arrested when they entered the garage that housed 
the Brandt’s bomb factory. Judged by a communiqué found in the car, they had planned to 
commit  an  arson  bombing  at  the  UC  Berkeley  Naval  Architecture  Building.  That  arrest  
also put Yoshimura into danger, because the garage had been rented by her. As a 
consequence, she fled from the Bay Area with help from Jack Scott. Bortin ended up in 
prison for one year and Brandt got a sentence of one to fifteen years. James Kilgore helped 
Michael Bortin in his trial, and visited Bortin and occasionally Brandt in prison.422
By the spring 1974, Kathy Soliah, Kilgore and Bortin had become sympathetic to the 
SLA.423 In their eyes, the Hearst kidnapping was a wonderful soap opera. While they were 
not particularly attracted to SLA’s political program and did not comprehend the Foster 
murder, they thought it was great how the SLA managed to pressure the Hearsts to give 
many millions of dollars to food deliveries and thereby exposed cleverly both the extent of 
the richness of the rich and the poverty of the poor.424
The personal contact between Kathy Soliah and Angela Atwood, however, seems to 
have been the all-important factor that got Soliah and her friends involved. Soliah had met 
Atwood in a theater company in Oakland and became very good friends with her. They 
also worked together in a restaurant and made efforts to organize its employees. Those 
close to Soliah have said that there was a great change in her character and conduct after 
the Los Angeles shootout.425 Soliah and her friends felt a need to do something. They took 
part in organizing a memorial rally for the SLA and established the Bay Area Research 
Collective (BARC) to organize support for the group and the underground in general. 
Later, when Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore got more deeply involved in helping the 
Harrises  and  Patricia  Hearst,  they  withdrew from the  BARC.  From then  on,  BARC was  
mainly run by Kathy Soliah’s roommates.426
While for Kathy Soliah, Kilgore and Bortin, at least, helping the Harrises and Patricia 
Hearst was also a continuum of their involvement in the politics, their friends, including 
Jo  and  Steve  Soliah  and  Bortin’s  girlfriend,  Pat  Jean  McCarthy,  and  a  couple  of  others,  
were helping mainly from their personal loyalty towards Kathy Soliah, Kilgore and 
Bortin.427
422 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 270, 275, 281–282, 296–297; McLellan & Avery 1977, 389–391; Letter from 
James Kilgore on June 15, 2008; Interview with Michael Bortin on May 21, 2005 & June 9, 2008. 
Rubenstein, who had provided information to the authorities, got out after eight months and immediately left 
the area. 
423 McLellan & Avery 1977, 380–381. 
424 Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008; Interview with Michael Bortin on June 9, 2008. 
425 McLellan & Avery 1977, 381–383, 394; Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008; Interview with Jo 
Bortin on June 10, 2008. 
426 McLellan & Avery 1977, 381–383, 394; Brown, Mareva: “Kilgore given six years for his role in SLA 
killing”, The Sacramento Bee May 11, 2004; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008; Interview with 
Michael Bortin on June 9, 2008; Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008. One of these room-mates 
was Andrea Behr who later became a journalist (see Behr, Andrea: “A bourgeois desire for a long life”, San
Francisco Chronicle February 3, 1999). 
427 Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008; Interview with Michael Bortin on June 9, 2008; Letter from 
James Kilgore on January 30, 2009; Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin; Steve Soliah’s portrayal in 
Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The lost year of the SLA”, Rolling Stone April 22, 1976; Hearst & Moscow 
1982, 303–305, 317; McLellan & Avery 1977, 392–393, 434. 
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Kathy Soliah and her friends provided the fugitives with money and arranged them a 
temporary  place  to  hide.  They  also  brought  the  Harrises  in  contact  with  Jack  Scott.  
Besides his activities in the field of sports, he and his wife, Micki Scott, had also a history 
of providing help for activists in trouble. Scott suggested that he would arrange the 
fugitives to be transported to the East coast where they could relax and lay low for a while. 
The Scotts had rented a quiet farmhouse in the country in Pennsylvania where the Harrises 
and Hearst could stay and he would provide them with everything they needed. It was not 
an easy decision for the security-minded Harrises to surrender their destiny into the hands 
of people who they had just met, especially when the Scotts required that all the weapons 
should be left behind in California, but in the end, they accepted the offer.428
What seemed to attract the Harrises to Jack Scott in particular were his reputed 
contacts with the Weather Underground Organization (WUO). They were considering the 
possibility of a merge with the group. Hearst says that the Harrises were impressed by the 
WUO’s reputation and dreamt about convincing them that the tactics of the SLA were 
more efficient.429 In fact, they had good grounds for believing that the WUO would be 
interested in helping them. On May 31, the Weather Underground Organization had made 
a bomb attack on the California attorney general’s Los Angeles office as a salute to the 
fallen  comrades  of  the  SLA.  In  its  communiqué,  the  WUO  had  praised  the  SLA’s  
successes and lashed out at the Left for its failure to back up the SLA. This communiqué 
ended with following words: 
...  many  members  of  the  SLA  are  still  free.  They  must  be  defended,  publically  and  
privately. Anyone who is in a position to help them directly should give them 
encouragement, support, shelter, and love. Empty your pockets. Struggle with them. Learn 
from them. We must protect our fighters.430
Around late June, Emily and Bill Harris, and Patricia Hearst were separately transported to 
the East coast by Jack Scott, his parents and friends.431 The Scotts had arranged for 
Brandt’s fugitive girl friend, Wendy Yoshimura, to stay with them in the Pennsylvanian 
farmhouse. 
During the summer, the SLA members continued their fierce training program and 
planning for their future attacks.432 Another  major  activity  during  this  time  was  the  
making of tape-recordings for a book on the SLA. Jack Scott had not agreed to help the 
SLA only for mere benevolence, but he wanted to take advantage of the opportunity and 
write a book about the group.433
428 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 243–248, 260–267; McLellan & Avery 1977, 387–389. 
429 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 260–261. 
430 Communiqué reprinted in Berkeley Barb June 14–20, 1974. A copy of this and many more SLA-related 
pamphlets is also available at the Freedom Archives SLA collection. 
431 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 267–277. 
432 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 278–290. 
433 Jack Scott has himself stated that he had got interested in the SLA during the kidnapping. While it was 
the opportunity to write a book that played a major role in his decision to help the SLA, but so did his 
increasing disillusionment with how the authorities handled the SLA. This is stated, for example, in an 
article by Howard Kohn and David Weir which is allegedly based on information from Jack Scott (Kohn, 
Howard & David  Weir:  “The inside  story”,  Rolling Stone October  23,  1975).  See  also  Hearst  & Moscow 
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The relations between the Harrises and Scotts, however, deteriorated quickly. Jack 
Scott was irritated by the military posture of the Harrises and felt uneasy about their 
ongoing preparations for new attacks. The Harrises allegedly tried to recruit Jack Scott 
into the SLA, but he did not want to have any part in such plans. The Harrises, on their 
part, became scared that the Scotts, who had the access to the incriminating tape 
recordings, would betray them. According to Hearst, their distrust towards Jack and Micki 
Scott became so severe that they even decided to kill the Scotts, but did not get an 
opportunity to do that. By the end of the summer, it was decided that it was best for 
everyone if the Harrises and Hearst returned to the Bay area. Besides, the Harrises were 
eager to get back in business.434 
For the whole summer, the Harrises and Patricia Hearst had been helped only by the 
Scotts and their friends. Both the SLA members and the Scotts seemed to be annoyed that 
even though several people who had connections to the underground knew what the Scotts 
were involved in, they offered no help. They seemed to be particularly annoyed that the 
Weather Underground had not acted out its own call for solidarity.435 With their actions, 
the SLA had made itself such a high-risk business that almost everyone, including those 
who felt sympathy for it, were too afraid to help. 
3.9 Attempts to revitalize the SLA 
With the Scotts having withdrawn their support, the Harrises and Patricia Hearst landed 
back  at  the  doorstep  of  Kathy  Soliah,  James  Kilgore  and  their  friends,  henceforth  called  
the “new team”. The new team arranged an apartment for them in Sacramento. As they all 
had many acquaintances in the Bay area, it was felt to be safer to have their base 
somewhere else. Another reason for choosing for Sacramento was that the trial of the 
arrested  SLA  members  Joe  Remiro  and  Russ  Little  was  going  to  be  held  there.  The  
Harrises and Patricia Hearst moved in sometime in early October, 1974.436  
The initial and primary reason for the new team to get involved was to help Emily and 
Bill  Harris  and  Patricia  Hearst  to  hide  from the  authorities.  They  were  terrified  to  death  
with taking up the task, but they felt that they could not decline. The new team was not 
particularly well-equipped at all to help the fugitives. Besides Jack Scott, they had no 
connections that would help them in gathering the financial resources and in tapping them 
into any underground network. They merely went on with their lives as before, kept 
working and using the money they earned to support the fugitives. If they managed to 
keep the Harrises and Patricia Hearst safe and sound, they felt they had already 
accomplished a valuable political deed.437 
                                                                                                                                             
1982, 271; McLellan & Avery 1977, 387–389 who claim that Patricia Hearst has testified that the initiative 
to write the book came rather from Bill Harris. 
434 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 291–294; Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The inside story”, Rolling Stone 
October 23, 1975, 41–46, 76; McLellan & Avery 1977, 408. 
435 See e.g. Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The inside story”, Rolling Stone October 23, 1975, 76.  
436 McLellan & Avery 1977, 410, 418; Hearst & Moscow 1982, 295–300. 
437 Interview with Michael Bortin on June 9, 2008; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008; Interview 
with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008. 
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The Harrises, however, were not ready to settle for mere survival. They were 
determined to advance the struggle that had claimed the lives of six of their comrades. 
Furthermore, they wanted to help Russ Little and Joe Remiro escape from prison so that 
the SLA would again have an experienced cadre. They also looked at training their new 
associates to become part of their army. But the new team felt very uneasy about that. All 
but  Kathy  Soliah,  James  Kilgore  and  Michael  Bortin  were  not  interested  in  such  an  
endeavor in the first place. Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore had indeed played with the 
idea of getting involved in armed struggle. Michael Bortin, on his part, had already been 
involved in a bomb attack plan and was interested in new opportunities to engage in 
similar actions. However, with armed struggle, Soliah, Kilgore and Bortin were not 
thinking in terms of an SLA-style campaign that included attacks against people’s lives. 
They argued that instead of new attacks, the Harrises should take a critical look at what 
the SLA had accomplished so far and think again. It was clear for the new team that the 
SLA’s ideas had not found acceptance and legitimacy among the Left. Soliah and Kilgore 
argued that the Harrises should study classical Marxist literature and integrate that kind of 
analysis into their propaganda. The Harrises, however, remained steadfast in their belief in 
the power of SLA-type action in vitalizing the revolutionary struggle.438
These differences led to disputes about how they should work together. The Harrises 
looked at the new team as part of the SLA. As a consequence, the Harrises considered Bill 
Harris as their  leader and demanded the others to obey him. Nevertheless,  the new team 
resisted Bill Harris’ authority. They demanded instead that they should function in a more 
democratic way and make decisions together. The Harrises were also looking at recruiting 
a new black leader for the SLA. Their reasoning was that since they only had whites in 
their  organization,  they  could  not  legitimately  claim  that  they  represented  “the  people”.  
The new team thought that the Harrises’ third-world leadership idea was a ridiculous idea 
stemming from excessive white guilt and romanticization of blacks.439
Besides these political differences, there were also personal tensions along various 
lines that were exacerbated further by disagreements about how to deal with these 
differences. One of the rifts that developed over time was between Patricia Hearst and the 
Harrises. Early in the kidnapping, Patricia Hearst had started to agree with everything the 
SLA members said or suggested, because she felt that it was the best way to survive. 
Towards the fall of 1974, however, she started openly to resist the Harrises, Bill Harris in 
particular. In her memoir, she said that she found the new associates much more likable 
and reasonable and their conversations affected her thinking a great deal.440
438 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 300, 304, 322; Letter from James Kilgore on March 17, 2009; Interview with 
Michael Bortin on May 21 & 22, 2005; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008. 
439 E. g. Wendy Yoshimura’s letter to a friend (who was Willie Brandt, according to McLellan and Avery), 
quoted in Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The lost year of the SLA”, Rolling Stone April 22, 1976, 68 and 
McLellan & Avery 1977, 481–483. About the attempts to recruit a new leader, see e.g. McLellan & Avery 
(1977, 425–427) who claim that the Harrises may have tried to recruit Ulysses McDaniels soon after the LA 
shootout. The Harrises made renewed attempts to recruit a black leader in September, 1975. These will be 
discussed later in the text. 
440 E. g. Hearst & Moscow 1982, 300–302; McLellan & Avery 1977, 419–320. Also the Harrises, who have 
said little about their interaction with the new team, have acknowledged the existence of tensions between 
them and Patricia Hearst. At the same time, they have emphasized that there was also a great deal of 
comradeship. Like all comrades, however, they too needed some time away from each other: Patricia 
because she got tired of the way Harrises patronized her, and Emily and Bill Harris because they had a hard 
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The  new  team  did  not  constitute  a  single  entity,  either,  but  was  rather  a  mixture  of  
people. Kathy Soliah was the central person, along with her boyfriend, James Kilgore. 
Michael Bortin was also deeply involved, but was in and out of the group due to his 
clashes  with  the  Harrises  and  with  others  of  the  new team,  as  well  as  to  his  own mixed  
feelings about their plans. Kathy Soliah got her sister, Jo, and brother, Steve, involved in 
helping, but their commitment was based on their loyalty to Kathy rather than on any 
political  viewpoints.  Jo  Soliah  made  it  clear  to  the  others  that  they  did  not  want  to  be  
actively involved and took the propaganda-type activities as their responsibility. Steve 
Soliah  had  a  relationship  with  Patricia  Hearst,  but  beyond that,  his  commitment  did  not  
seem to be wholehearted. What added to the drama was that there were ever-changing 
relationships between those involved. While in the original SLA sexual relationships were 
politicized441, this time the relationships were something that happened aside from the 
other things they were involved in.442 
All  in  all,  while  these  differences  prevailed  until  the  very  end,  it  seems  that  the  
Harrises succeeded well in getting their way. They seemed to have three aces in their 
hands: The first was that they were more experienced in the business of revolution, which 
made it difficult for the less experienced new participants to dispute their arguments. The 
second ace was that the Harrises did not hesitate to remind everyone that six of their 
comrades had given their lives in the struggle. Finally, the third was that they often 
managed to wear out the opposition by their persistence.443  
Over time, the involvement of the new team started to extend from merely helping to 
survive into taking part in the Harrises’ plans for armed struggle. The process that took the 
new team towards deeper involvement in armed struggle started with what “helping” the 
fugitives entailed. During the first months, they tried to support the Harrises and Patricia 
Hearst by using the new team's savings and the money they earned from painting houses. 
But that job did not pay too well. By late 1974, it was clear that they needed other, less 
time-consuming, sources of income. As a result, they started to conduct petty thefts: 
shoplifting, stealing money from a mail truck and stealing wallets in health spas and tennis 
courts.444 The new team reasoned that money was needed to take care of the fugitives, so it 
was part of their commitment to help them. 
The new team also helped the Harrises in their planning of new acts, including acts 
against people. Although the new team was by far more horrified than excited by these 
plans, they still gathered information about the possible targets and conducted 
surveillance. In addition, taking part in the planning activities drew them closer to 
committing violent attacks. Michael Bortin later described the process as follows: 
Unfortunately, simply by the very act of discussing these major, major felonies, we tacitly 
accepted  our  assemblage  as  a  guerrilla  unit,  and  to  that  I  must  attach  much  blame  to  
                                                                                                                                             
time dealing with Patricia’s “bourgeois mentality” (Lyne, Susan & Robert Scheer: “Twenty months with 
Patty-Tania. By Bill & Emily Harris”, New Times March 5, 1976, 32). 
441 There were not supposed to be any exclusive relationships and the comrades were expected to take care 
of each other’s sexual needs. 
442 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 326; Letter from James Kilgore on January 30, 2009; Interview with Jo Bortin 
on June 10, 2008. 
443 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 304–305, 307, 321–322.  
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myself, because I co-operated with researching a hit list (or pretended I did) rather than 
challenge the legitimacy of such acts in my protracted visit since at our first meeting we 
had clearly stated our refusal to engage in those activities. And though we did not, 
thankfully, follow-up on these outlandish and clearly not executable acts by ourselves, we 
simultaneously bargained, or dumbed down, to committing ourselves to various and sundry 
petty felonies acts, which we did commit.  
[...] 
Ironically, we justified these petty crimes, although we were all painting together, in that 
we were developing cohesiveness and teamwork as a functioning guerrilla unit. And so we 
journeyed around on a syllogistic kind of tautologically closed system, where somewhere 
along the way the true premise at political involvement only in hiding out the trio and 
perhaps some guerrilla theatre [...] somewhere along the line that true and, I believe, heart 
felt premise, was substituted by a false premise – face-saving foot-dragging and 
procrastination now our tools of denial rather than straightforward discussion and political 
dialectic – the false premise being our defining ourselves as a guerrilla (if not combat) unit 
or at least one in a provisional stage of formation.445
Meanwhile, the group’s financial problems continued. The thefts provided them with a 
few hundred dollars now and then, but not enough. They tried to find ways to knock on 
the Weather Underground’s door to get help and looked for possibilities to make a book 
deal  for  the  Harrises  and  Patricia  Hearst.  That  did  not  bring  any  results.  Generally,  they  
were too scared of getting caught to approach other people for help.446 In the end, they 
decided to rob a bank. Bill Harris wanted the new team to do the job so that they would 
get their hands on the revolution properly. Planning for the robbery started in late January, 
1975, and a month later, Mike Bortin and James Kilgore entered a small Guild Savings 
and  Loan  Association  bank  on  the  outskirts  of  Sacramento.  They  walked  away  with  
several thousand dollars. The group issued no claim to the robbery and no-one got hurt.447
The  major  act  in  planning  during  the  winter  was  the  prison  escape  of  Remiro  and  
Little. Many messages were exchanged between the prisoners and the Harrises with their 
new team and the courthouse was under their surveillance. The plan was eventually put 
together, but it never materialized. There was opposition to the plan inside the group 
owing to its weaknesses (it would all fall apart if even one single thing went wrong). In 
fact, most from the new team had not thought at any stage of the preparation that such an 
operation could really work out. The decision did not please Remiro and Little. Some time 
afterwards, on March 1, they made a failed attempt to break out on their own. The police 
found out that there was a getaway car waiting for them next to the jail elevator. They 
evidently had help from someone, but according to Patricia Hearst, the SLA associates 
could not figure out from whom.448
445 Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin. 
446 Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin; Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008. 
447 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 309–312, 314–319; McLellan & Avery 1977, 432–434. 
448 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 307–308, 312–314, 319–320; McLellan & Avery 1977, 422–424, 438–439; 
Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin. 
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In mid-March 1975, with the help of information from Jack Scott’s brother, the FBI 
discovered that the Scotts had been involved in hiding the SLA and that the Harrises and 
Patricia Hearst had stayed in the Pennsylvanian farm house. In that house, the 
investigators found a fingerprint of Wendy Yoshimura. The discovery was a major news 
story and Yoshimura’s photo was all over the newspapers. In the fall of 1974, when the 
Harrises and Patricia Hearst left Pennsylvania, Yoshimura had also returned to the Bay 
area but announced that she did not want to have anything to do with the SLA. However, 
she  stayed  in  contact  with  the  new  team.  When  the  news  about  her  presence  in  the  
farmhouse hit the news, she ran to them and moved in with Patricia Hearst in one of their 
safe houses in Sacramento. The FBI went strongly after the Scott connection, but did not 
really start investigating Yoshimura’s background. 449
By this time, Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore, Steve Soliah and Michael Bortin had 
committed themselves to the armed struggle plans to the degree that they agreed to move 
to Sacramento (save for Michael Bortin, who continued to travel between the Bay area and 
Sacramento because of his obligation to report to his parole officer). Their friends 
involved in helping them, including Jo Soliah, stated that they still did not want to have 
any part in such plans. Wendy Yoshimura also had a very reserved attitude towards the 
plans that the others had. 450
The next act under intensive planning was another bank robbery. The target was to be 
Crocker National Bank branch in Carmichael, just outside of Sacramento. Bill Harris 
allegedly wanted to make it a full SLA operation, but the others talked him out of this idea 
because they thought it would put too much pressure on them. All eight of them (Emily 
and Bill Harris, Kathy and Steve Soliah, Patricia Hearst, James Kilgore, Mike Bortin and 
Wendy Yoshimura) were going be involved. On April 21, 1975, they acted upon the plan. 
The robbery was successful in terms of money – they walked away with over 15,000 
dollars. But there were serious complications. Emily Harris had shot one of the customers 
when she did not obey the order to go down quickly enough. The customer, Myrna Lee 
Opsahl,  died  quickly  of  her  wounds.  What  added  to  the  gravity  of  it  all  was  that  James  
Kilgore had stood directly behind Opsahl and had he stood in a slightly different position, 
he would have been hit.451
According to Hearst, the shooting incident provoked serious turmoil among the group. 
The  Harrises  played  the  whole  incident  down:  since  Opsahl  was  a  wife  of  a  doctor  and  
thus a “bourgeois pig”, it therefore really did not matter that much. But the others were 
deeply shaken by the event. It was the first time they were involved in an action that cost 
someone’s life. It seems that they had never really imagined that they would end up in 
such a situation. They were also very frustrated with the Harrises for their nonchalant and 
belittling attitude towards that incident.452
449 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 305, 322–323; McLellan & Avery 1977, 411, 435–441; Unpublished memoir of 
Michael Bortin. The new team had rented initially one apartment in Sacramento and got another one (where 
Patricia Hearst moved) in late 1974.The living arrangements of the SLA and the new team were in constant 
flux and I have not included all the details in the text.  
450 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 323–324; McLellan & Avery 1977, 428. 
451 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 331–333; McLellan & Avery 1977, 444–447. 
452 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 332–335. 
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With the police looking for bank robbers in Sacramento, they decided to leave the city 
and move back to the familiar Bay Area in early May. The Harrises and Patricia Hearst 
would stay underground, but all others would return to their normal lives as much as 
possible and get jobs. Part of the new team stayed in the apartments they had rented, while 
others lived with friends. Who lived where changed almost on a weekly basis, reflecting 
the ongoing personal disagreements between them.453
A new element was added to the internal dynamics of the fugitives and the new team 
around this time when the women involved (including Emily Harris and Patricia Hearst) 
started to work on the issues of feminism and revolution. What fed into this development 
were Emily Harris’ heated disputes with Bill Harris. The women established their own 
study group in which they worked on their own position on feminism and trained with 
weapons, with Patricia Hearst acting as their instructor.454
Once they had settled in San Francisco, the tensions from the previous months 
subsided, as everyone had more space and time away from each other. The planning for 
attacks, however, continued. Around this time, the group got a new recruit, Bonnie 
Wilder, who was a friend of Kathy Soliah. The plan was for her to become a police agent 
and thereby an agent for the group inside the Oakland Police Department. Wilder made 
the first steps in that direction, but depending on the source, either did not pass the 
physical test or did not show up to a required written test. She, however, stayed involved 
to some degree in the activities of the SLA associates.455
During the next few months, the Harrises and the new team seemed to find a common 
ground on which to operate. The idea was to conduct a bombing campaign and to claim it 
under the name of the New World Liberation Front (NWLF) and call themselves the 
Jonathan Jackson/Sam Melville Unit. They had no idea who those responsible for the 
bombings conducted in the NWLF’s name were, but they found it a good idea to connect 
their efforts to a bigger campaign. Furthermore, for the new team, this had the benefit of 
them  not  having  to  operate  under  the  name  and  heritage  of  the  SLA.  To  honor  the  
direction that the SLA had been moving in, they were still looking at targeting policemen, 
however. Indeed, that had been DeFreeze’s vision about how to spark the revolution. The 
hit list that the group compiled reportedly included such targets as the San Francisco 
police chief, whose department harassed blacks during the search for the so-called Zebra 
killers456, the FBI Office in San Mateo and the LEAA headquarters in Burlingame.457
453 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 338–339; Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin. McLellan and Avery (1977, 
449–451), evidently relying on Steve Soliah’s account, credit the move to San Francisco to personal 
conflicts. According to them, Emily would have moved first to Steve to Berkeley and the others had 
followed suit. 
454 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 339–341; McLellan & Avery 1977, 428–429. SLA Communiqué written by 
“sisters of the Symbionese Liberation Army” apparently driving from these efforts was published in Dragon
no. 4 (November 1975). 
455 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 341; McLellan & Avery 1977, 451; Letter from James Kilgore on January 30, 
2009.
456 A series  of  killings,  known as  the  Zebra  murders,  had  been committed  in  the  area  of  San Francisco  in  
1973–1974. During the first months of the Hearst kidnapping, some suspected that the SLA and the Zebra 
murders  would  have  been  linked  to  each  other.  The  SLA,  on  its  part,  claimed  that  it  was  a  covert  police  
operation directed against it (e.g. the tape released after the Hibernia bank robbery in mid-April 1974, 
transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 121–124). Later, it turned out that the murders were committed by a 
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Besides the slippery slope from helping the fugitives towards committing the crimes 
described above, there were also other processes at play that led people from the new team 
to  commit  themselves  to  armed  actions  despite  their  initial,  and  to  some  degree  still  
prevailing, reluctance: 
You accept certain assumptions and once you accept them your capacity for lateral/creative 
thinking is gone. Once you accept the “violence is the only true way” paradigm you got 
caught up in a cycle of bad decisions. It is like “group think”. […] I think we fell prey to a 
kind of blinkered thinking. If violence is the only way, then you think more violence is 
even better way. People’s value becomes measured not according to how well they can 
analyze, strategize or build organization but how far they are prepared to go. Once you 
accept that you are going to die soon (which we did, or at least be captured, tortured, etc.) 
then why worry about risk? The person who wants to go out with the biggest bang 
becomes the model. Now normally if you’re in a group and things get a little extreme, you 
can  walk  away  or  create  some  distance.  […]  But  when  you’re  in  a  small  group,  
underground, surviving on a shoestring, and every cop in the country is looking for you, 
you’re always immersed up to your eyeballs in this crazy logic you’ve created. Fortunately 
for us, the most extreme of our plans never came to fruition – either because we were 
incompetent militantly, scared but too afraid to admit it, or just too confused to pull off 
something big and crazy. […] 
I think the intensity of Bill and Emily, plus their moral weight as the heirs of the martyrs, 
gradually pushed us all with the mold of the urban guerrilla group think. I’m not trying to 
blame them. We could have pushed back harder. We could have walked away or just 
provided material support. We chose to jump into the whirlpool.458 
 
Around this time, impatience started to set in. Michael Bortin especially began to criticize 
the others for just talking and not really doing anything. According to Hearst, Bill Harris 
challenged  Bortin  to  come up  with  the  plan  for  action,  which  he  did.  He  proposed  they  
would  carry  out  a  bomb  attack  at  a  coffee  shop  in  the  Richmond  district  that  was  
frequented by police officers. However, the Harrises found this plan too risky. As a result, 
Bortin lost his temper and decided that he had had it with them and left.459 The urge for 
action, nonetheless, lived on and was now, according to Patricia Hearst, voiced primarily 
by Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore.  
Finally, a decision was reached to conduct a bomb attack against the police cars parked 
outside two stations, one in the Mission District (a classic target for attacks in the previous 
years) and one at the Taraval station. The operation was conducted on August 7, but with 
poor results. The Mission District bomb failed to ignite and moreover, Wendy Yoshimura 
                                                                                                                                             
group called the Death Angels, which was a group within the Nation of Islam. On the Zebra murders, see 
Howard 1979; Sanders & Cohen 2006. 
457 Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The lost year of the SLA”, Rolling Stone April 22, 1976, 35; Unpublished 
memoir of Michael Bortin. 
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and Kathy Soliah, who had been tasked to place the Taraval bomb, did not even have a 
chance to place their bomb.460
Six days later, they made another attack with an improved bomb design on the 
Emeryville police station, which was related to a well-known controversial police slaying 
of a young black called Tyrone Guyton that the SLA had referred to in its communiqués. 
That explosion destroyed the police car completely. Following that attack, they sent out a 
communiqué  in  the  name  of  New  World  Liberation  Front  and  called  themselves  the  
Jonathan Jackson/Sam Melville Unit. The Harrises insisted that they should add the SLA 
slogan “death to the fascist insect that preys upon the lives of the people” to the 
communiqué.461
The  next  operation  they  started  to  prepare  targeted  the  Marin  County  Civic  Center.  
They  decided  to  plant  two  bombs  in  the  building  so  that  the  first  explosion  would  take  
place in the parking lot and the other one in front of the sheriff’s office. In that way, their 
explosion  would  affect  as  many  policemen  as  possible.  Patricia  Hearst  has  said  that  
Wendy Yoshimura resisted this idea but could not make the Harrises change their minds. 
Later,  it  was  decided  that  with  the  Marin  County  bombing,  they  could  conduct  another  
bomb attack in Los Angeles simultaneously and thereby demonstrate that they had enough 
strength  to  carry  out  action  in  two  parts  of  the  state  at  the  same  time.  They  carried  out  
these  attacks  on  August  20.  Both  bombs  in  the  Marin  County  Civic  Center,  which  were  
placed there, according to Hearst, by Steve Soliah, herself, Bonnie Wilder and Jo Soliah, 
went off, but in the wrong order. There were no casualties. The bomb attack in Los 
Angeles, however, did not work out. The group charged with the bomb attack, according 
to Hearst, consisting of Bill Harris, Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore, placed two bombs 
under parked police cars in East Los Angeles and set them to go off when the cars left. 
The first bomb did not ignite and both bombs were later found.462
Even though the group managed to find enough common ground to pull off these 
operations together and some of those who had declared they did not want anything to do 
with such operations had taken part in them, the old grudges were not over. The disputes 
erupted in full force after the August 20 attacks. According to Patricia Hearst, the dispute 
concerned the proposition of Emily and Bill Harris to approach a recently paroled black 
convict, Doc Holiday, and to ask him to become the SLA’s leader. Hearst has said that the 
dispute had ended with Bill Harris declaring that it was all over and that they should split 
up. Emily and Bill Harris would find the black leader, while the others could do whatever 
they wanted. In fact, the new team was probably even less keen to continue the 
cooperation. Hearst stated she did not like the idea of a black leader because she feared the 
others would fall under the new leader’s control just as the first team had fallen under 
DeFreeze’s control.463
The dispute described by Patricia Hearst was only one among many similar disputes, 
but it was the last straw. Kathy Soliah, Steve Soliah, Patricia Hearst, James Kilgore and 
Wendy Yoshimura (and with them, practically all the group’s support networks) started to 
actually make new plans. As for Michael Bortin, he had already distanced himself from 
460 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 345–347. 
461 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 348–350. 
462 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 350–354. 
463 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 355–356. 
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the group. The Harrises were nonetheless still determined to revitalize the SLA. A few 
days later, with help from Kathy Soliah (who stayed still in touch with the Harrises and 
seemed to be somewhat ambivalent about the split), the Harrises made contact with Doc 
Holiday. However, he declined their offer for the SLA leadership position.464
For all this time, the FBI’s investigation was producing few results. That was certainly 
not due to a lack of effort. In an interview with a New York weekly, two special agents 
recounted that the resources that the FBI had invested in the case in ten months amounted 
to three million dollars, 270,000 man-hours and (attempted) interviews with 25,000 
people. The major obstacle for the investigation seemed to be the lack of cooperation. The 
majority of the people the FBI had approached had refused to talk.465 Even though the 
SLA  really  did  not  have  the  sympathies  of  the  Left  on  its  side,  many  still  held  to  their  
principle of not cooperating with the police, as they thought the police represented an 
illegitimate authority.466
In early July, the FBI started to investigate Jack Scott and his connections more 
carefully.  This  was  prompted  by  Scott’s  attempts  to  negotiate  a  deal  with  the  parents  of  
Patricia Hearst. The FBI eventually contacted Kathy Soliah’s father and with the help of 
information it got from him, found a track to Soliah and her friends. Alerted by Soliahs’ 
father, they all disappeared underground in late August, soon after the Marin County 
bombing. For the FBI, this provided a signal that they were on to something. By mid-
September, the FBI had located the Soliahs and their friends, allegedly through checking 
out independent painting jobs in the area. On September 18, Yoshimura and Hearst, as 
well as Emily and Bill Harris, were all arrested in two different locations. Kilgore as well 
as Jo, Steve and Kathy Soliah heard the news about the arrest of the Harrises on the radio. 
Steve Soliah went to the apartment of Yoshimura and Hearst to warn them, but did not get 
there in time and was arrested. Kilgore, Jo Soliah and Kathy Soliah fled immediately.467
The arrests were followed by lengthy trials. In the end, Steve Soliah was acquitted of 
the  charges.  Patricia  Hearst  was  convicted  of  the  Hibernia  Bank armed robbery  and  the  
use of a firearm to commit a felony in March, 1976, as the jury did not believe her claims 
that she had been forced into crime. She eventually was given a sentence of seven years 
and was released in February, 1979. Bill and Emily Harris got a prison sentence for 
kidnapping Patricia Hearst and some other crimes they conducted while being members of 
the  SLA.  They  were  released  in  1983.  Wendy  Yoshimura’s  sentence  was  one  to  fifteen  
years for which she spent less than a year in prison.468
464 Hearst & Moscow 1982, 356–359; Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The lost year of the SLA”, Rolling 
Stone April 22, 1976, 70; McLellan & Avery 1977, 478–479; Interview with Michael Bortin on June 9, 
2008; Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008. 
465 McLellan & Avery 1977, 413–414. 
466 E.g. McLellan & Avery 1977, 414–415, also “FBI chief losing sleep over Tania”, Berkeley Barb July 26 
– August 1, 1974. 
467 McLellan & Avery 1977, 458–462, 469–478, 483–494. 
468 Turner, Wallace: “Miss Hearst is convicted on bank robbery charges”, The New York Times March 21, 
1976; Fosburgh, Lacey: “Patricia Hearst gets 7 years on robbery charges”, The New York Times September 
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February 2, 1979. 
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The arrests effectively ended the campaign of the SLA. With the Harrises arrested, and 
no need to take care of Patricia Hearst, the driving forces of the struggle were gone. It is 
obvious that the Harrises did not expect Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore and others still 
outside the prison, to pick up the torch of the SLA and to continue the struggle. In fact, 
they angrily protested when a political statement by Soliah and Kilgore was published 
using the name of the SLA.469 Half a year after the arrests, Bill and Emily Harris, together 
with Russ Little and Joe Remiro, gave an interview where they called themselves the last 
four surviving members of the SLA and said that with their arrest, the SLA had ceased to 
exist.470 That corresponded with the self-perception of the new team. None of them ever 
thought of themselves as being members of the Symbionese Liberation Army.471 The 
demise of the Symbionese Liberation Army, however, did not dampen the spirits of the 
former SLA members, because the struggle continued in other forms.472 In the letter from 
Bill and Emily Harris from prison, as well as in other comments published in the BARC’s 
publication, Dragon, they portrayed their arrest as yet another desperate attempt to break 
the armed struggle.473
The Bay Area Research Collective (BARC), originally set up by Kathy Soliah and 
James Kilgore, continued to defend the SLA and called for solidarity with it. It organized 
a rally in Berkeley on September 27 to support the SLA and all other captured comrades, 
together with a number of other organizations.474 The last issue of its publication came out 
in late 1976. 
3.10 Aftermath 
After the arrests of September 1975, Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore, Jo Soliah and Bonnie 
Wilder became fugitives. Jo Soliah and Bonnie Wilder left directly to Seattle, while James 
Kilgore  and  Kathy  Soliah  first  stayed  for  a  few  weeks  in  the  Bay  area  in  their  friends’  
houses and then also headed to Seattle. They stayed there for about a year, doing odd jobs 
in restaurants and offices. Kathy Soliah also continued to act in plays under an assumed 
name. Michael Bortin stayed in the Bay area for about a year, because he was still on 
probation from the 1972 sentence and was still not, at least publicly, linked to the SLA.475
After having been in Seattle for about a year, Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore headed 
to Milwaukee, where they were joined by Michael Bortin. Seattle was, after all, too close 
to California to avoid the risk of meeting people they knew. Jo Soliah and Bonnie Wilder 
469 Harris, Emily, Bill Harris, Joe Remiro & Russ Little: “SLA”, Dragon no. 5 (December 1975). This 
statement is “History will absolve us” which will be discussed in more detail later in the text. 
470 Lyne, Susan & Robert Scheer: “Twenty months with Patty-Tania. By Bill & Emily Harris”, New Times
March 5, 1976; Harris, Bill and Emily, Russell Little and Joseph Remiro, as told to Susan Lyne and Robert 
Scheer: “The story of the SLA”, New Times April 16, 1976. 
471 Letter from James Kilgore on March 17, 2009; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008; Interview with 
Michael Bortin on June 10, 2008. 
472 The last SLA statement, 38. 
473 Dragon no. 3 (October 1975). 
474 “These days”, Dragon no. 3 (October 1975), 3. 
475 Letter from James Kilgore June 15, 2008; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008; Interview with 
Michael Bortin on May 21, 2005; Hendry 2002, 211–212.  
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stayed for some more months in Seattle and then decided to go back to the Bay area, 
because it became clear that they were not wanted for any crimes. As for Kathy Soliah and 
James Kilgore, they stayed in Milwaukee for about half a year and as they could not find 
anything of interest there, they moved on to Minneapolis. Michael Bortin moved with 
them, but soon headed by himself to Colorado. By this time, Soliah and Kilgore were no 
longer a couple, but were still regularly in contact with each other.476
Kilgore and Soliah had abandoned the idea of the armed struggle, because they thought 
it had proven to be an ineffective method to work for political change. The worst fault of 
the SLA and the campaign they had themselves been involved with was, in their opinion, 
that  it  was  not  connected  to  any  mass  movement.  A  closer  look  at  their  thinking  at  the  
time of the September, 1975 arrests is provided in a paper entitled “History will absolve 
us” that was distributed with the November 1975 issue of Dragon. This was published 
anonymously,  but  its  main  authors  were  James  Kilgore  and  Kathy  Soliah.477 This paper 
also reflects the differences that prevailed between the SLA tradition of the Harrises and 
the more moderate approach that the new team represented. This publication contained 
few poetic expressions or overtly militaristic language or name-calling. Instead, it offered 
an analysis of the state and recent history of revolutionary struggle in the international 
context that resembled rather the argumentation style of the WUO: 
There is a definite need for broader forms of organization than currently exist on the Left. 
Many comrades are presently trying to solve this problem by putting all their energy into 
organizing a new communist party. We believe this is a dogmatic application of 
revolutionary theory and ignores the reality of the state of the Left in this country. Before a 
viable party, one that could be meaningful to the lives of millions of people, can come into 
existence there is much work to be done. We are certain that any party which formed at 
this time would quickly come to be dominated by white male leadership, with Third World 
people, between men and women, and between mass organizers and guerrilla fighters 
before the revolutionary movement can unite under any form of democratic centralism.  
At  this  stage  of  the  struggle  we  see  a  practical  mechanism  for  uniting  serious  Marxist-
leninists, revolutionary nationalists, revolutionary feminists and gays, and non-aligned 
freedom fighters. The only prerequisite for membership would be a sincere commitment to 
fight  U.  S.  imperialism and  a  willingness  to  politically  support  and  share  resources  with  
other members of the federation. The important feature of the federation is that it would 
have no central command which would have power over the political ideology and actions 
of its members.478
As it is evident from this quote, Soliah and Kilgore still supported armed struggle and also 
thought it was necessary to prepare for it in the United States. But they argued against 
individual groups that commit attacks without any link to a larger context. Similarly, they 
criticized the aboveground Left for failing to support those involved in armed struggle: 
476 Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008; Letter from James Kilgore on June 15, 2008; Interview 
with Jo Bortin June 10, 2008; Interview with Michael Bortin on May 21, 2005. 
477 Letter from James Kilgore on June 15, 2008. 
478 “History will absolve us”, an appendix to Dragon, November, 1975. 
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Since September 18th the media has done everything in its power to remove all political 
content from the actions and philosophy of the Symbionese Liberation Army. The capture 
of revolutionaries has been made into another episode of “As the World Turns.” Many 
Leftists have also participated in this process, repeatedly issuing condemnations of 
terrorists to the straight press in the hopes that it will legitimize their own political work. 
When any revolutionary is thrown into a concentration camp, they should get nothing but 
support from the Left publicly. Political differences should been struggled out among 
revolutionaries, not brought into the living rooms of every home via the pig media.479
After September, 1975, Soliah and Kilgore continued being politically active, but in 
aboveground projects and movements. An important part of that was their processing for 
themselves the meaning of their experiences with the SLA, finding better ways to bring 
about  social  change  and  to  compensate  for  their  past  mistakes.  In  Seattle,  Kilgore  wrote  
texts under an assumed name for Northwest Passage, an equivalent of the Berkeley Barb.
In Minneapolis, they found a very diversified scene of left-wing activism. They joined a 
number of action and study groups and did volunteer work in progressive bookstores and 
research centers. In 1978, Kilgore and Soliah, together with a handful of other people, 
formed the Twin Cities Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa. They supported 
ZANU in Zimbabwe. Through a prominent ZANU leader, Farayi Munyuki, who lived in 
Minneapolis, they developed good connections with the movement and collected medical 
supplies and clothes to be sent to the Zimbabwean refugee camps in Mozambique.480
When Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980, Munyuki returned there. Soon 
afterwards, James Kilgore, now using the name Charles Pape (but keeping the name John 
he had used in Minneapolis as his nickname), likewise left for Zimbabwe. With the help of 
his contacts with Munyuki, Kilgore got a teaching job at a high school. In 1984, he 
became involved in curriculum development and later contributed to the writing of two 
widely used high school history text books in 1988. In the same year, he organized a night 
school for domestic workers.481
Two years later, in 1986, Kilgore moved to Melbourne, Australia with the intention of 
getting an academic degree under the name Charles Pape. He completed a B.A. in Social 
Sciences in 1987 at Deakin University. In 1988, he returned to Zimbabwe and went on six 
years later to complete a doctorate through distance education at Deakin University. In 
1991, Kilgore left for South Africa, as he got a teaching assignment at Khanya College. 
Three years later, he became the director of the same college. In 1997, Kilgore, together 
with wife and two sons, moved to Cape Town. Kilgore then started as the co-director of 
ILRIG (International Labour Research and Information Group). Kilgore spent his time at 
ILRIG much the same as he did at Khanya College, as his teaching activities were oriented 
towards educating union and social movement activists on how to advance their interests. 
Kilgore also wrote several publications on globalization.482
479 “History will absolve us”, an appendix to Dragon, November, 1975. 
480 Letter from James Kilgore on June 15, 2008; Hendry 2002, 212–213. 
481 Letter  from James  Kilgore  on  June  15,  2008;  Brown,  Mareva:  “Kilgore  given six  years  for  his  role  in  
SLA killing”, The Sacramento Bee, www.sacbee.com (retrieved on May 27, 2004). 
482 Letter from James Kilgore on June 15, 2008; Hrab, Neil: “’Comrade John’”, The National Post January 
21, 2003; Bond, Patrick: “Activists play tribute to ’fugitive’ John Pape”, Green Left online November 27, 
2002, http://www.greenleft.org.au/2002/518/27065 (retrieved on September 6, 2003).  
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In 1980, Kathy Soliah, using at that time the name Sara Jane Olson, married Fred 
Peterson, who had also been active in the action groups for Zimbabwe in Minneapolis. In 
February, 1981, they left for Zimbabwe (this was some time before Kilgore left). They 
worked in remote areas with poor people, providing them with healthcare and schooling. 
A few months after that, Soliah and Peterson moved back to the United States and settled 
in Baltimore, where Soliah completed a cooking certificate and Peterson earned a Masters’ 
degree at the medical school. In 1985, Soliah and Peterson moved back to Minneapolis. 
Soliah took more classes, did volunteer work and participated in theater productions. She 
has three daughters. 483
After the arrests of September, 1975, Michael Bortin stayed for some months in the 
Bay area. A year later, violating his parole conditions, he left the area. He joined Kathy 
Soliah and James Kilgore in Milwaukee and Minneapolis for a while, and then left by 
himself to Colorado. Unlike Soliah and Kilgore, he was still looking forward to some kind 
of radical action, but never got the opportunity for that. He stopped looking for that kind 
of opportunities when he got his first child in 1979. He returned aboveground in 1984 to 
fulfill the wish of his dying mother and was sentenced to 18 months for parole violation. 
After he was released, he was in contact with Steve Soliah again and also met Jo Soliah, 
whom he married in 1988. They lived in Berkeley for a while and moved to Portland, 
Oregon. Michael Bortin has his own hardwood floor company and Jo Soliah is a nurse. 
Both are still very much interested in politics, but not actively involved. They have four 
children, three of them from their former marriages.484
Not much is known about the lives of Emily and Bill Harris after being released from 
prison in 1983. They separated soon afterwards, but they have stayed in close touch with 
each other. At the time of the sentencing, Emily and Bill Harris still fiercely defended 
their viewpoints.485 Since then, both of them have left radical politics behind. 
Since Emily Harris, now called Emily Montague, left prison, she began a career with 
computers, using the skills she had acquired in prison. She started up her own successful 
consulting business in 1994. Besides that, she has been involved in various kind of charity 
activities.486
Bill Harris, on his part, became a private investigator in San Francisco and has worked 
occasionally for the district attorney’s office. He has married again and has two sons. To 
my knowledge, he has not been politically active since the mid-1970s.487 In an interview 
from 2001, he commented on his past activities: 
483 Hendry 2002, 212–220; Letter from James Kilgore on June 15, 2008. 
484 Interview with Michael Bortin on May 21, 2005 & June 9, 2008; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 
2008.
485 E.g. Fosburgh, Lacey: “A Girlish Fugitive In a T-Shirt, Smiling”, The New York Times September 19, 
1975; Chambers, Marcia: “Harrises demand dismissal of Jury”, The New York Times June 30, 1976; “Date 
set for kidnapping trial”, The New York Times December 4, 1977; The New York Times September 2, 1978; 
The New York Times September 3, 1978. 
486 Landsberg, Mitchell: “New Life, Old Murder: Ex-Radical Emily Harris Faces Charges 19 Years After 
Release from Prison”, The Seattle Times June 15, 2002. 
487 Johnson,  John  &  Mohan,  Geoffrey:  “Graying  Radicals  Are  Facing  New  Ire  in  America”,  Los Angeles 
Times January 29, 2002; Vollers, Maryanne: “Was This Soccer Mom a Terrorist?” The New York Times 
Magazine May 20, 2001. 
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I don’t want to make a bunch of reactionaries happy by saying it was all a bunch of 
garbage,” he says. “They want me to denounce what I did and what I thought and what I 
was. They want me to be David Horowitz, for Christ’s sake. And that’s not me. I’m not the 
person I  was when I  was 30 years  old.  The person I  was was a  very angry person,  and I  
probably was a little bit unconcerned about my mortality. I had nothing to lose. In my own 
mind  I  was  living  in  misery  because  of  what  I  saw  around  me.  And  I  felt  powerless  to  
change it. If anything, we were deluded into thinking that we could have any effect by 
doing the things we did. [...] But am I embarrassed? Yes. We were a bunch of amateurs. I 
wish everyone would forget us.488
Wendy Yoshimura is not known to have been politically active after serving her sentence 
and according to other SLA associates, her involvement in the armed struggle was always 
based more on unfortunate circumstances than on a politically-based commitment. She has 
worked as an artist in California.489 Steve Soliah likewise appears not to have been 
politically active since 1975. 
Soon after she was released from prison, Patricia Hearst married her former 
bodyguard, Bernard Shaw and is now know as Patricia Hearst Shaw. She has remained in 
the spotlight since. In 1982, she published her memoir, Every Secret Thing, which I have 
referred to several times in this study. She has also made a career as an actress. In January, 
2001, she was granted a full pardon by President Clinton.490
Since the 1970s, the crimes allegedly committed in the context of the SLA have 
occasionally been re-investigated. In 1999, the police in Los Angeles started to once again 
investigate the bomb attack attempts against the police cars in 1975, which were, 
according to Patricia Hearst, committed by Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore and Bill Harris. 
This led to the airing of the pictures of Kathy Soliah, who has now legally adopted the 
name Sara Olson, and James Kilgore. Soon afterwards, the police found Olson and 
arrested her in June, 1999. The arrest was followed by a lengthy and complicated legal 
process which ended with Olson being found guilty.491
This was also followed by prosecutions in the case of the Carmichael robbery 
committed in April of 1975, something that the son of Myrna Lee Opsahl had tried to 
make happen for years. Emily Montague, Bill Harris and Michael Bortin were arrested in 
January, 2002. Montague got a sentence of eight years, Bill Harris seven years, and Bortin 
and Olson both six years in February, 2003. Bill Harris was paroled in September, 2006 
488 Vollers, Maryanne: “Was This Soccer Mom a Terrorist?” The New York Times Magazine May 20, 2001. 
489 Interview with Mike Bortin on June 9, 2008; Hoge, Patrick: “SLA’s Yoshimura Keeps Mum While Ex-
comrades Serve Time”, San Francisco Chronicle December 27, 2003; 
http://www.wendyyoshimura.com/pages1/home.html (retrieved on March 15, 2009). 
490 When she was released from prison, her sentence was commuted by President Carter. Marjorie Hunter: 
“Carter Clears Miss Hearst's Release”, The New York Times January 30, 1979; Fosburgh, Lacey: “Miss 
Hearst and Ex-Bodyguard Are Wed Amid Intense Security”, The New York Times April 2, 1979; Morgan, 
Ted: “Everything but the Reason”, The New York Times January 3, 1982; Lacey, Marc: “Clinton Pardons 
Deutch but Not Milken Or Hubbell”, The New York Times January 21, 2001. 
491 The process from finding Olson until her verdict is described in Hendry 2002, 221–331; see also “70's 
Radical Is Arrested”, The New York Times June 17, 1999; “National News Briefs; Woman Acknowledges 
Being Fugitive Radical”, The New York Times July 10, 1999; Sterngold, James: “70's Radical Is Sentenced, 
Then Arraigned in New Case”, The New York Times January 19, 2002. On the process and the lives of the 
defendants afterwards, see also Jordan 2002. 
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and Emily Montague in February, 2007. Michael Bortin was released in February, 2006 
and moved back to Portland to resume his floor-contracting business. Sara Olson, who 
also had to serve the earlier sentence for the attempted murder of police officers, was 
paroled in March, 2009. She was allowed to serve her parole in Minnesota where her 
family lives.492
The last remaining fugitive, James Kilgore, was arrested on November 8, 2002, one 
day after the other four had pleaded guilty in the Carmichael bank robbery. His arrest was 
based on a federal indictment for the possession of an illegal explosive device issued in 
1976.493 After the Carmichael Bank Robbery case was reopened, Kilgore had established 
contact with a lawyer to initiate negotiations for surrender. Making this connection 
probably helped authorities to find him. Kilgore was sentenced to 54 months for explosive 
and passport fraud convictions and six years for his participation in the bank robbery. He 
was paroled in May, 2009 and allowed to join his family in Illinois.494 During his 
imprisonment, he wrote several novels. One of them entitled We Are All Zimbabweans 
Now was published immediately following his release.495
None  of  those  who  were  involved  in  the  SLA  currently  hold  its  flag  very  high.  The  
general feeling among the former associates is that the SLA rather contributed to the rise 
of conservatism and to an increase in investment in law enforcement, than to the creation 
of such a society as it had envisioned.  
492 Sterngold, James: “4 Former Radicals Are Charged In 1975 Killing in Bank Robbery”, The New York 
Times January 17, 2002; “4 in Radical Group of 70's Are Sentenced in Murder”, The New York Times
February 15, 2003; “1970s radical freed from California prison”, AP March 17, 2009; Mackey, Robert: 
“Former Symbionese Liberation Army Member Released From Prison”, The New York Times March 17, 
2009.
493 FBI San Francisco Press Office Press Release, April 26, 2004. 
494 E.g. “New Sentence For Ex-Radical”, The New York Times May 11,  2004;  “The Captured  Member  of  
‘70s Radical Group Is Freed”, The New York Times May 10, 2009. 
495 “Announcing James Kilgore’s We are All Zimbabweans Now (with Excerpt)”, 
http://umuzi.book.co.za/blog/2009/06/03/announcing-james-kilgores-we-are-all-zimbabweans-now-with-
excerpt/ (retrieved on September 30, 2009). 
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4 Comparison of the campaigns of the Rode Jeugd and 
the Symbionese Liberation Army 
In the preceding chapters, I have presented the historical narrative of the campaigns that 
reflect my understanding of how the situation looked from the participants’ point of view. 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  compare  the  development  of  the  campaigns  in  the  light  of  the  
research questions that were outlined in the introduction.496
4.1 Strategy 
Besides those well-known movements that are at the heart and in the limelight of a wave 
of terrorism, there are always several smaller groups that are inspired by the actions of the 
larger movements and decide to join their struggle. The Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands 
and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States are both very much cases in 
point. Both were small groups inspired by the successes of the bigger movements, such as 
the Weather Underground and the Rote Armee Fraktion and both believed that there was a 
role for them to play despite their lack in numbers.  
The Rode Jeugd was formed in 1966, but its initiatives for terrorism started only in the 
first half of 1971. The start of the campaign was signaled by the firebomb attack against 
the car of the Eindhoven police commissioner and the publication of the text outlining the 
logic and legitimation of violence “now” in its internal discussion paper. The highpoint of 
the campaign was reached in the latter half of 1972. After that, there was little action, but 
the planning went on until late 1976. The campaign ceased largely when Lidwien Janssen 
was arrested and the training trip to South Yemen became public knowledge.  
Initiatives  for  terrorism continued  under  the  banner  of  the  Rood Verzetsfront.  It  is  a  
matter of interpretation whether the RVF should be considered as a successor organization 
of the Rode Jeugd or the Rode Hulp, the latter being the most important of the groups in 
which the former Rode Jeugd members were active afterwards. Only one of the key 
members of the Rode Jeugd, Henk Wubben, was involved in it for any longer period of 
time. Ideologically, the RVF did share quite a few traits, but it made no positive reference 
to the legacy of the Rode Jeugd or the Rode Hulp.  
The campaign of the SLA began with the establishment of the group. Unlike the Rode 
Jeugd, the SLA was established for the purpose of conducting a terrorist campaign. Its 
first terrorist act occurred in November, 1973. This campaign had clearly two phases, with 
the LA shootout as the dividing line. The campaign ended in September, 1975, when 
several  of  those  involved,  including  Bill  and  Emily  Harris  and  Patricia  Hearst,  were  
arrested.  
496 Since most developments and incidents mentioned in this chapter have already been discussed in the 
preceding chapters, I have provided information on the sources only for such issues that have not yet been 
raised. 
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Below is a list of attacks that were part of the campaigns by both the Rode Jeugd and 
the  Symbionese  Liberation  Army.  To  provide  an  overview  of  the  activities,  the  lists  
include all the known successful or attempted politically motivated attacks as well as the 
felonies and violent incidents that are known to have involved those taking part in the 
campaign. 
Table 1: Terrorist acts, felonies and other violence incidents of the campaign of Rode 
Jeugd
Date Incident Claim
July 22, 1971 Firebomb attack against the car of 
Odekerken 
Rode Jeugd
February 23, 1972 Evoluon bomb attack PGAG
April 24, 1972 Attacks at Philips facilities in Rotterdam, 
Baarn and Hilversum 
No claim
May 8, 1972 Bomb attack at the Turkish airline 
company in Amsterdam 
RVN
May 28, 1972 Bomb attack at a Philips facility in 
Arnhem and an attempted bomb attack at 
a Philips facility in Amsterdam 
None
June 8, 1972 An attempted bomb attack at a Philips 
facility in Eindhoven 
None
June 18, 1972 Arson at the America Institute in the 
Museumplein, Amsterdam  
RVN
October 4, 1972 Bomb attack at the Holiday Inn in Utrecht RVN, claim later 
withdrawn 
October 16, 1972 Bomb found in front of the Bank of 
America in Rotterdam 
RVN, claim later 
withdrawn 
October 17, 1972 Bomb found under Bavinck's car in 
Eindhoven 
No claim, but a letter sent 
to Philips 
October 18, 1972 Bomb found at Zwolsche Algemeene in 
Utrecht 
RVN, claim later 
withdrawn 
October 19, 1972 Bomb (possibly a fake) found in front of 
a taxation office in Leiden 
None




Table 2: Terrorist acts, felonies and other violence incidents of the campaign of the 
Symbionese Liberation Army 
Date Incident Claim
November 6, 1973 Murder of Marcus Foster and an attempted 
murder of Robert Blackburn 
SLA
February 4, 1974 Kidnapping of Patricia Hearst SLA
April 15, 1974 Hibernia bank robbery SLA
May 16, 1974 Shooting at Mel’s Sporting Goods None, but soon known 
that the SLA was involved 
May 17, 1974 LA shootout claiming the lives of six SLA 
members 
The SLA presence in the 
house known 
February 25, 1975 Guild Savings and Loan bank robbery None
April 21, 1975 Carmichael bank robbery None
August 7, 1975 An attempted bomb attack in the Mission 
district and at the Taraval Street police 
stations 
None




Unit, SLA slogan included 
August 20, 1975 Bomb attack at the Marin County Civic 
Center, failed attempt for a simultaneous 




When comparing the development of the campaigns in terms of strategy, the most striking 
difference concerns the nature of the attacks. In the first phase, the SLA was involved only 
in those actions that targeted people, while the Rode Jeugd or its successors never crossed 
that border. The Rode Jeugd committed a few bomb attacks that were targeted against 
personal property, but not with the intention of killing a person. The Rode Jeugd members 
had guns in their possession, but to my knowledge, not a single shot was fired during the 
campaign in the context of attacks or arrests. Even though the Rode Jeugd called for 
armed struggle, its strategy was not based solely on terrorism. Instead, their position was 
that capitalism should be attacked by all means possible. Towards this objective, illegal 
actions should be the priority but it should be combined with legal forms of action that 
would convince more and more people to join and support the revolutionary struggle.497
Having said that, it must be added that when compared to the prevailing attitudes and 
legitimate strategies in the surrounding (counter)culture of that time, both campaigns 
represented the most radical edge. Few people in the Netherlands wanted to have anything 
to do with any form of political violence, including small-scale symbolic bombings. In the 
United States, political murders had not been part of the action repertoire of the radical 
Left and the kidnapping of Patty Hearst was the first political kidnapping in US history.498
Typical for both campaigns was that after their initial period of activity, their campaign 
started to wind down, both in terms of the number of actions and of their scope. After the 
arrests of Luciën van Hoesel and Ger Flokstra, the campaign of the Rode Jeugd became 
497 See e.g. Voorwaarts 1, no. 4 (1971), Voorwaarts 2, no. 2 (1972). 
498 E.g.  Koopmans  1992;  Verbij  2005;  a  typical  example  of  the  New  Left’s  attitude  towards  the  SLA  is  
“Terrorism from the left”, Ramparts May 1974. 
122
paralyzed and efforts to revitalize it afterwards failed. As for the SLA, there was a clear, 
though unintended, strategic shift after the LA shootout. That shootout was followed by 
months of inactivity. When the plans to start up the campaign again began to materialize, 
they took the form of bombings targeted at the police and bank robberies. The SLA 
members had many long and heated discussions about what kind of attacks they should 
commit. Emily and Bill Harris supported the idea of attacking the police because such acts 
had been the next step in DeFreeze’s plan. Finally, they managed to win most of the others 
over, some of them despite their opposition to the use of violence. 
While revolution was the ultimate objective of both campaigns, the groups had 
different  views  on  their  role  in  the  struggle,  as  well  as  on  the  effects  of  their  terrorist  
attacks.  The  SLA  set  out  to  provide  the  revolutionary  struggle  in  the  US  with  the  
committed and uncompromising leadership it had lacked and to unite all oppressed people 
to fight the common capitalist and imperialist enemy. With their bold actions showing the 
potential of armed action committed by dedicated revolutionaries, the SLA hoped to bring 
new life to the revolutionary struggle.  
The Rode Jeugd’s strategy was based on the idea of developing a worldwide 
revolution that was articulated by Lin Piao. This theory placed the Netherlands on the 
periphery of the revolutionary struggle at the moment and thereby ascribed a secondary 
role to the Rode Jeugd. Its members saw themselves mostly as one among many (future) 
foot  soldiers  in  this  struggle.  By  creating  chaos  at  home,  it  sought  to  contribute  to  the  
attrition of the global capitalist and imperialist enemy. At the same time, they would give 
the people of the Netherlands a good, concrete example of how imperialism and capitalism 
can be attacked and for those who committed the attacks, this was a valuable exercise for 
the coming struggle. After the disbandment of the Rode Jeugd, the support function 
became all the more pronounced, as the prospects of any kind of armed action in the 
Netherlands became dimmer. Especially the group around the Rode Hulp, which was led 
by Evert van den Berg, Luciën van Hoesel and Annie Westebring, oriented itself strongly 
towards the Rote Armee Fraktion.  
Finally,  what  was  common  to  both  campaigns  in  all  their  phases  was  that  terrorism  
was considered to be a strategy of the first phase only. Later, when more and more people 
would become mobilized and the vanguard developed better resources, the struggle would 
be escalated. 
4.2 Organization 
An evident common denominator between the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation 
Army is that they were both very small groups. They had more supporters and helpers at 
first,  but  they  cut  ties  after  the  decision  was  made  to  start  using  terrorism.  Both  tried  to  
recruit more people to join their struggle all the way through, but they never managed to 
increase their ranks. In both cases, there were organizational changes during their 
campaigns.  The  overall  organizational  trend  after  the  start  of  the  campaign  was  in  both  
cases that of deterioration despite their constant attempts to revitalize the struggle.  
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The original team of the SLA was a very closely-knit and coherent group that placed a 
significant number of expectations, rules and demands on its members. Their participation 
was full-time and they lived a very isolated life after the arrest of Joe Remiro and Russell 
Little. The group had a clear leader, Donald DeFreeze, who as the only African American 
in the group, was the only one who could make a legitimate claim on leadership. Besides 
the core group, the SLA initially had a network of friends and associates who helped them. 
However, after SLA members went underground they were practically left alone. 
Illustrative to their isolation was that when they needed people to assist them with getting 
supplies, they went door-to-door to find people to help them in this task. Thus, the realities 
were very different from the organization that they envisioned and portrayed in their 
documents, a federation of units composed of people from all races, gender and ages. 
After  the  LA  shootout,  the  Harrises  with  Patricia  Hearst  found  people  to  help  them  
through their former social contacts. They were looking at revitalizing the struggle. The 
plan included helping Russ Little and Joe Remiro escape from prison and training their 
new helpers to become guerrilla fighters. They were also looking for a new non-white 
leader. This plan never worked out properly: they did not manage to devise a realistic plan 
for the prison escape, no new non-white leader was recruited and their new associates 
were reluctant to take part in the type of struggle that they envisioned. While the Harrises 
were still carrying the flag of the SLA, they did not really bestow its membership to them. 
Neither did the new team think of themselves as being part of the SLA. Rather, they were 
helpers or “freelancers” working with it. 
In the end, the Harrises and the new team managed to find enough common ground to 
commit  a  few  bomb  attacks.  In  the  context  of  those  attacks,  they  used  the  name  of  the  
New World Liberation Front. According to Patricia Hearst, this was because the new 
associates thought that referring openly to the SLA would put them under too much heat.  
At this phase, there were basically three layers of people involved in the campaign: the 
remnants of the SLA, i.e. the Harrises and Patricia Hearst who were underground, a small 
group of people (Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore, Michael Bortin, and to some extent both 
Josephine Bortin and Wendy Yoshimura) who worked with them, and a group of their 
friends who occasionally helped them. Patricia Hearst and Emily and Bill Harris continued 
to live in isolation. The ones who started to help them, however, did not go fully 
underground and preserved some level of normal life. They seemed to have wanted it this 
way because rather than a sudden disappearance, this way of life provided them with 
security. While their lives appeared normal to an outsider, this was not how they 
experienced it. In reality, they felt mentally detached and isolated from the society and 
were totally oriented towards the underground existence. All other social contacts were a 
smoke screen.499
The dynamics within this group of people were very different from those that prevailed 
within the SLA before the LA shootout. Those who joined the Harrises and Hearst simply 
did not come to possess the same kind of mentality that the founding SLA members had 
had. This is because they were not in it to fight for the bitter end and they did not become 
as paranoid. Furthermore, the leadership was more contested. Bill Harris made the claim 
for leadership as the successor of Donald DeFreeze, but this was not accepted by everyone 
499 Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008; also unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin. 
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unconditionally. Emily and Bill Harris commanded the others’ respect to some degree 
owing to their experience with armed struggle, but there were several issues of 
disagreement. There was a dividing line between the Harrises and the others, but there 
were also shifting alliances along other lines as well. The inner dynamics of the original 
SLA were all the way through influenced by relationships between those involved.  
The difficult situation inside the group finally led to the decision to split into smaller 
teams and to go on from there as each of them wanted. This plan did not materialize 
before the arrests and it is not self-evident that it would have. On the other hand, had it not 
been for the security concerns and especially the need for protecting Patricia Hearst, they 
probably would have made the decision to split much earlier. The arrests in September, 
1975 effectively destroyed the organization. Those arrested included the driving forces 
behind the initiatives for armed struggle (Emily and Bill Harris) and the main reason for 
underground existence (them and in particular, Patricia Hearst). Those remaining who had 
been genuinely motivated for some kind of political action were now fugitives. Now, 
instead of staying and fighting, they decided to leave California and search for other ways 
of doing political work. By this time, the SLA had earned such a bad reputation that no-
one saw any good in taking up its banner.  
Table 3: The organization of the SLA’s campaign 
1973 1974(Jan-May) 1974(Jun-Dec) 1975
Name SLA Using the name of NWLF 
State of 
organization 
Small coherent core 




Ex-SLA members underground, new 
associates closely in touch with them, 
partly underground 
Numbers Less than 10 core 





Core of less than 10, some friends who 
occasionally helped 
The Rode Jeugd and its successors were very different in terms of organization. They were 
loose networks of part-time activists. Originally, the Rode Jeugd consisted of a number of 
core members around the country, their local associates, and a network of youths who 
showed up to participate in its demonstrations and activities. After the Rode Jeugd started 
to escalate its campaign and the protest movement began to ebb, the last group of people 
largely disappeared. The Rode Jeugd had a formal organizational structure with the 
leading troika and a committee consisting of local leaders, but in reality, it worked much 
less hierarchically. The local cells acted rather autonomously and cooperation crossed 
these lines. 
When the decision was made to move from protest to resistance, efforts were made to 
increase discipline and organization within the core group. These efforts had mixed 
results. The Rode Jeugd continued to be a loosely organized network of people, but it 
managed to create a small core group that was not easily penetrated by outsiders. 
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Furthermore, no-one from the Rode Jeugd ever went underground or even became 
partially detached from their previous life. They did not establish communes, neither did 
they spend longer periods of time together as a whole group. Therefore, the Rode Jeugd 
never developed the same kind of group dynamics and cohesion among its ranks as the 
SLA.  One  issue  remained  an  issue  until  the  very  end  –  the  lack  of  discipline  and  
organization. The Rode Jeugd members, however, also became somewhat paranoid after 
the arrest of Luciën van Hoesel and later Ger Flokstra, when the degree of infiltration 
became evident and trust and reliability among the members became a question. 
After the disbandment of the Rode Jeugd, organization became even more diffuse than 
it had been during the Rode Jeugd. The former Rode Jeugd people and their associates had 
their own informal networks of people who were to some degree aware of what the others 
were doing. What is illustrative of the situation is that the networks barely had names at 
this stage. Moreover, the little structure that there was fell largely apart after the training in 
South  Yemen.  As  a  consequence,  a  new  organization  called  the  Rood  Verzetsfront  was  
established, but in terms of people involved, it was derived only loosely from the Rode 
Jeugd. By the end of 1970s, almost all those who had been involved in the Rode Jeugd 
came to the conclusion that there were no prospects for engagement in armed struggle in 
the Netherlands.  
Table 4: Organization of the Rode Jeugd’s campaign 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Name Rode Jeugd Rode Jeugd (radicals 
left)/action names RVN and 
PGAG 




Loose network of largely 
autonomous branches 











Very loose and 
informal 
networks 
Numbers Core group (20-30), loosely 
attached supporters (a 




Core group of max 20 
members left, few new 
recruits 
Less than 20 
key persons 





4.3 Ideology and political objectives 
With  regard  to  their  ideology  and  worldview,  the  Symbionese  Liberation  Army  and  the  
Rode Jeugd shared many basic tenets. Both were fighting against the capitalist system that 
they considered to be oppressive and in conflict with the interests of the people. Both were 
striving for a revolution that would lead to the demise of capitalism and imperialism and 
to the establishment of a new system that would be based on equality between all people 
and a more even distribution of wealth. Both believed that there was no other way to 
destroy the system than through violence and that instead of mass organizing, the 
revolution could be sparked by actions of a committed vanguard. They also believed they 
were in the beginning stages of a revolutionary struggle. For these reasons, it was 
unavoidable that they would face setbacks and get beaten by the authorities. After all, they 
thought  that  it  was  part  of  the  evolution  of  the  revolutionary  struggle  that  people  make  
mistakes and others learn from these mistakes. 
The Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army also shared heroes and models. 
For example, both admired the Latin American struggles and thinkers, Carlos Marighella 
in particular. Both were influenced by Marxist-Leninist thinkers, although in the case of 
the Symbionese Liberation Army, these references were not as explicit and as frequent.  
The focus of these two organizations on this revolutionary struggle was, however, 
different in many ways. While the communiqués and tapes of the Symbionese Liberation 
Army indicate that its members were very aware of the progress of revolutionary struggles 
abroad, its own program focused strongly on the United States. The objectives and 
worldview of the SLA were strongly influenced by the race question as well as by the 
political prisoner movement, and by the writings of George Jackson and other convict 
authors. The oppression of people was rather a race issue than a class issue for the SLA. 
Furthermore, revolution was not only a question of the economic system, but it was just as 
much a cultural issue. Besides capitalism itself, the SLA opposed all kinds of ideologies 
and institutions that supported capitalism. To the SLA, that made the SLA a representative 
and a leader of all oppressed people. Overall, its objectives were ambitious and 
heterogeneous. They were almost like a showcase of the issues that were raised by the 
protest movement and the New Left in the 1960s and 1970s.  
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Table 5: Ideology and objectives of the Symbionese Liberation Army (1973–1974)500
Goal Revolution establishing freedom, self-determination and the 
independence of all people (in the US) 
Group’s contribution to 
struggle 
Mobilizing all oppressed people to a revolutionary struggle by 
providing leadership 
Enemies Capitalism and institutions supporting it, incl. racism, sexism, 
ageism, fascism, individualism, possessiveness, competiveness 
Potential allies All people, particularly non-white 
Ideological influences Marxism, revolutionary nationalism, revolutionary feminism, 
George Jackson, Carlos Marighella 
Models Tupamaros, Weather Underground 
The Rode Jeugd’s vision of the revolutionary struggle was closer to the classical 
communist model. The Rode Jeugd explained the situation in the world and how it would 
proceed towards a worldwide revolution largely in Marxist-Leninist terms. The Rode 
Jeugd looked more outside the Netherlands, in those areas where the revolutionary 
struggle was already ongoing or imminent. At home, it paid considerable attention to 
traditional working class issues, such as the treatment of workers in companies, the wages 
paid to young workers and the living conditions in the neighborhoods. The Rode Jeugd’s 
self-image differed from the Symbionese Liberation Army in that it considered itself to be 
a working-class youth movement. However, the Rode Jeugd did not really prioritize 
feminist issues or the equality between people of different ages. The Rode Jeugd was 
largely a men’s club – women were also involved, but they were mostly viewed as 
girlfriends.501
Table 6: Ideology and objectives of Rode Jeugd (1971–1972)502
Goal Worldwide communist revolution 
Group's contribution to 
struggle 
Support to Third World struggles, preparing for revolution in the 
Netherlands, one of the many similar revolutionary groups 
Enemies Capitalism and imperialism 
Potential allies Working class youths, other similar movements abroad 
Ideological influences Marxism-Leninism, Lin Piao, Carlos Marighella 
Models Rote Armee Fraktion, Brigate Rosse 
The premises of the revolutionary struggle as summarized in the table above were largely 
articulated during 1971 and 1972. After that, attempts were made to refine their 
ideological position, but no significant changes appeared. After the Rode Jeugd was 
500 Information presented in the table is a synthesis of the key documents of the SLA that it demanded to be 
published in its first lengthy communication that it sent out during the kidnapping of Patricia Hearst. 
501 Interview with Marjanne Stas on October 14, 2008; Interview with Aat van Wijk on June 30, 2003. 
502 Information on this table derives mainly from Voorwaarts 1,  no.  4;  Voorwaarts 2,  no.  2; Rode Jeugd. 
Stadsgeurilla Cahier, no. 1 (1972). 
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disbanded, the activities of those who had been involved seemed to generally develop 
away from supporting the third world struggles to supporting other European movements, 
with the Rote Armee Fraktion being the most important one. Preparing for revolution at 
home was also still on the agenda for some. 
Those involved in the Symbionese Liberation Army also kept on working on its 
theoretical premises. After Bill Harris, Emily Harris and Patricia Hearst returned to the 
West Coast, they, together with their new associates, were prolific writers and developed 
their position on various matters. The original program of the SLA became strongly 
contested by the new associates and equally defended by the Harrises. While the new 
associates eventually went along with the Harrises in terms of the actions they took, their 
ideological differences were never fully solved. The somewhat less radical form that their 
actions took reflects the practical compromise that they were able to reach. What is 
noteworthy is that, despite all those disputes, the ideological position of the SLA was not 
publicly or privately redefined in such a way that would essentially change its basic 
premises. When the new team distanced itself from the Harrises shortly before the arrests 
of September, 1975, the Harrises seemed to look at operating according to the original 
SLA program and goals. 
Since terrorism as a strategy crosses the prevailing legal and moral norms, one critical 
issue for all involved in terrorist campaigns is to establish the legitimacy of their strategy, 
for themselves as well as for others.  
In the case of the Rode Jeugd, a coherent effort to justify their armed struggle is 
provided in the article establishing the theoretical foundations of their armed struggle that 
was published in their internal paper in 1971. In that article, violence is justified as a 
logical response to the physical and psychological violence that the state is perpetrating 
against the working class. Therefore, violence is merely a technical question and there is 
no need for further moral reflection on it. Violence does, however, serve a purpose for an 
individual that is linked to morals and norms: in order to break from the role to which the 
capitalist society has submitted the working class, it is necessary to break the norms and 
morals that maintain that social order. Besides that, violence was also justified on the 
grounds that the violence of the Rode Jeugd, unlike that of the state, served the interests of 
the people. 
What  constitutes  violence  can  range  from small-scale  sabotage  to  mass  killings.  The  
aforementioned  text  calls  to  attack  capitalism  by  all  means  possible  and  it  explicitly  
mentions fraud, intimidation, sabotage, the destruction of lives and stratagems as 
necessary means. Theoretically speaking, the Rode Jeugd did thus consider attacks against 
people as being morally legitimate and theoretically feasible, although the organization 
never committed such acts. 
Considering that the Symbionese Liberation Army adopted such radical methods of 
action, one might expect that considerable effort was made to also establish their 
legitimacy. That was indeed the case with the SLA in the sense that the tapes and 
communiqués include many passages that address this question. The attempts to justify 
their actions are, however, quite vague and abstract. They make no reference to Marxist-
Leninist literature, or to any other thinker or ideology to provide a theoretical basis for the 
use of violence. 
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The following fragment from the so-called eulogy tape, in which the remaining SLA 
members defend the conduct of the SLA members during the LA shootout, is a typical 
example: 
The pigs want the people to believe that the bad-ass tactics of the SLA guerrillas drove the 
fascists to use such barbaric force. But we say that the SLA is a reaction to fascism. The 
SLA uses automatic weapons and homemade bombs because the pigs have automatic 
weapons, artillery, and hydrogen bombs.503
The presentation of each parties’ weaponry parallel to each other may sound beautiful and 
illustrate that the SLA was the underdog fighting an evil system. The argument, however, 
would have been more convincing had the authorities actually used such weapons against 
the SLA.  
The logic that the SLA employs in its justification of violence is that the enemy, often 
described in poetic terms, is committing horrible acts and the people must defend 
themselves. The enemy is “murdering, oppressing and exploiting” the people and 
therefore, the lives of the people are under threat. The negative characteristics of the 
enemy are underlined by making unfavorable comparisons to Germany under Nazi rule. 
Those who believe that the Left could survive without developing a military arm are 
advised to look at what happened in Chile.504 Considering the wretchedness of the enemy, 
the people must then defend themselves if they wanted to stay alive. The only means left 
is violence. During the spring of 1974, this becomes increasingly pronounced and finally, 
in the last tapes, an explicit and urgent call is made for people to defend themselves or 
they would die at the hands of the fascist ruling class.  
 Whereas the SLA did not spare its words when describing the evil nature of its enemy, 
the vocabulary of the Rode Jeugd was much more modest. In the Rode Jeugd publications, 
the  enemy  is  usually  referred  to  in  such  terms  as  monopolies,  the  capitalist  system  and  
imperialism. There are few cases of an unfavorable comparison and also fewer 
euphemisms or metaphors are used. As for the SLA, it was routine to refer to the United 
States  as  Amerikkka,  describe  its  practices  as  genocide  and  use  the  word  “pigs”  for  the  
police. In the Rode Jeugd publications, the word pig is used a few times only. Overall, the 
most extreme expression I have found along these lines is: “We should not let us be 
treated like cattle. The ones who treat us that way, we should not view as humans but as 
rats. With rats, you do not speak, but you catch them and kill.”505
Overall, however, the language used by the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese 
Liberation Army differ radically from each other. The style of the Rode Jeugd publications 
is largely matter-of-fact, not very different from the publications of other youth political 
movements of that time. In the first years, the style of the Rode Jeugd was even 
503 A transcript of the tape is reprinted in e.g. the Berkeley Barb June 14–20, 1974. 
504 With this, they refer to the fall of Salvador Allende’s regime in 1973. Allende became the president of 
Chile after winning the elections in 1970 and declared that he would establish socialism in the country. He 
was removed from power by a military coup. Those in the radical Left who called for the use of violence in 
the revolutionary struggle interpreted this incident as a proof that revolution would not succeed if the 
revolutionaries were not able to defend themselves militarily. The Rode Jeugd also refers to Chile in its texts 
in the same light (Voorwaarts November 15, 1973). 
505 Rode Jeugd – in dienst van het volk (June 1971). 
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whimsical, mirroring the style of Provo, the most important manifestation of the protest 
movement of that  time. Moreover,  the Rode Jeugd did not refer to itself  as an army, nor 
did it use titles or ranks that referred to military organizations. The Symbionese Liberation 
Army, in contrast, had all that in use. The SLA’s codes of war read like rules of an army, 
its leader called himself Field Marshall, and his unit prepared itself for combat. The style 
of writing is overall poetic, exaggerated and extreme. 
Last, and by far not least importantly, the original program of the Symbionese 
Liberation Army had a dimension that the Rode Jeugd lacked almost completely. In her 
letter to the people, Nancy Ling Perry wrote that “revolutionary violence is nothing but the 
most profound means of achieving internal as well as external balance.”506 The campaign 
of the SLA was therefore not only about changing the social and economic system, but 
also about personal transformation. As the capitalist system would not be destroyed unless 
the  value  systems  that  supported  it  are  abolished,  one  should  also  get  rid  of  his/her  
bourgeois values and habits. This need to change was dictated by the conflict between the 
background of the SLA members (and the majority of white revolutionaries in the US in 
general) and their political agenda. By birth, most SLA members were privileged middle-
class people, the very people whose position and values they opposed. The Marxist-
Leninist thinkers were unanimous in that it was not going to be the middle-class that made 
the revolution. Therefore, to become fully part of the revolutionary struggle, it was 
necessary to renounce the privileges and adopt a lifestyle and values that made them one 
among “the people”. Bill Harris said in his message to white revolutionaries: 
Many of us have been “bold” enough to intellectualize about revolution, but far too 
chickenshit to get down and help make it. Most of us have been nearly fatally stricken with 
the vile sickness of racism. Again, most of us have been immobilized by our sexist egos 
and have watched and done nothing as our sisters have rushed by us into battle. [...] 
However many of us have seen through this sham, and are fighting beside comrades from 
all races and classes, women and men, old and young. We know we have a long way to go 
to purify our minds of the many bourgeios poisons but we also know that this isn’t done 
through bullshitting and ego tripping [...] It is done by unleashing the most devastating 
revolutionary violence ever imagined, by proving that all races and groups of people can 
unite and fight together for the true freedom of us all.507
This aspect was significantly less pronounced in the period after the LA shootout as the 
new team did not share the SLA position on the role of the third world people vis-a-vis the 
whites in the revolutionary movement. 
These  differences  between  the  Rode  Jeugd  and  the  (original)  SLA  in  this  regard  
resemble the description by Gordon McCormick508 about the two competing philosophies 
of terrorism that developed in the late 19th century. The first one of them was a 
philosophy of rationalism, which entailed violence as means to an end, which was 
represented, for example, by the Russian movement Narodnaja Volya. The second one 
was terrorism as means of individual expression, as a redemptive act. This type of 
terrorism served not only a political function, but also responded to the psychological 
506 “A letter to the people from Fahizah”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 43–50. 
507 Transcript reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 104–105. 
508 McCormick 2003. 
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needs of the terrorists themselves. In other words, the commitment to terrorism presented 
an  existential  choice  and  a  personal  leap  of  faith.  McCormick  sites  one  of  the  later  
proponents of anarchism saying that “an idea must not be left to pure understanding... 
Only feeling, passion, and desire have moved and will move men to acts of heroism and 
self-sacrifice; only in the realm of passionate life, the life of feeling, do heroes and martyrs 
draw their strength”509. While the Rode Jeugd was clearly rather the heir of the first 
tradition, the description of the second tradition seems to touch the heart of the SLA’s 
character. 
4.4 Incentives and interests 
The differences between the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army become 
even more obvious when one looks at the incentives and interests involved in being part of 
these campaigns. Membership in a terrorist group had different kinds of implications and 
incentives in these cases. The Rode Jeugd and even more its successors were part-time 
enterprises that were largely based on everyone’s own initiative. There were rules for the 
members,  but  by  and  large,  the  requirements  set  for  individual  members,  as  well  as  
incentives that a membership in the group provided its members with, were all rather 
modest. Being a member of the Rode Jeugd was clearly a source of self-esteem and pride 
for its members. It gave them a positive ego-boost and ways to make adrenaline flow. In 
addition, it provided them with opportunities to educate themselves. Even though the 
Rode Jeugd was not very dogmatic, it invested in political schooling. The schoolings were 
open to everyone interested, so joining the Rode Jeugd was not a prerequisite for entering 
the schoolings. While the Rode Jeugd provided these incentives for participation, there 
never developed very strong vested interests that depended in the existence of it or its 
successors as organizations.  
The clear differences between the Rode Jeugd and the SLA emerge particularly in how 
the requirements and characteristics of an individual revolutionary and guerrilla fighter are 
dealt with in their publications. In the Rode Jeugd publications, actually very few 
references are made to the conduct of individuals. The Rode Jeugd publications and 
internal discussion papers contained various action programs, but they deal with what they
should do and less with how an individual should be. The closest that the Rode Jeugd texts 
come to the conduct of an individual are the rules that were published in the Rode Jeugd
paper in 1970 when there were calls for more disciplined and organized action: 
 Each RJ member must be constantly involved in political propaganda. 
 Each RJ member has to prepare for hard and violent struggle. 
 Each RJ member must constantly enhance his/her ideological knowledge. 
 Everyone must be on time. 
 Everyone has to pay his/her contribution on time. 
 Everyone must show comradeship towards the others. 
509 McCormick 2003, 478. 
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 It  is  not  allowed  to  be  a  member  of  another  organization  without  first  getting  a  
permission for that from RJ. 
 It is not allowed to give information about RJ to third parties. 
 If arrested, the RJ member gives only his name and address and does not explain 
anything to his political opponents. 
 No excessive drinking or use of drugs.510
As  we  can  see,  this  is  very  much  a  list  of  what  to  do  and  not  to  do,  rather  than  how  a  
revolutionary is like. I have not found a single Rode Jeugd document that would praise a 
single individual for his/her character and qualities. The Rode Jeugd members also did not 
give out public messages, neither at that time or right afterwards, where they would have 
explained their own background, world view and commitment to the struggle.  
The Symbionese Liberation Army is a very different story in this respect. For the 
original members, it was a full-time job and high expectations were set for each individual 
member, including the transformation of one’s values and lifestyle. The group had strict 
rules written down in the Codes of War. These rules were made public during the 
kidnapping of Patricia Hearst, probably at least partly to impress the authorities and the 
radical Left. These codes defined the rules and the punishments for violating these 
regulations, including the death penalty. The codes also defined how the members should 
treat their prisoners and act with the people. The tone of the Codes of War was very 
militaristic:  
Penalty by death 
[...]  
1. The surrender to the enemy. 
2. The killing of a comrade or disobeying orders that result in the death of a comrade. 
3. The deserting of a comrade on the field of war. 
a. Leaving a team position, thereby not covering a comrade. 
b. Leaving a wounded comrade. 
4. The informing to the enemy or spying against the people or guerrillas. 
5. Leaving a cell unit or base camp without orders. 
Penalty by disciplinary action 
 [...]  
1. Lack of responsibility and determined decisiveness in following orders. 
2. Nonvigilance or the leaving of an assigned post without orders. 
3. Lack of responsibility in maintaining equipment or proficiency in all guerrilla skills, 
especially shooting. 
4. The use of any unmedically prescribed drug.511
In exchange for their investment, the members got the self-image of a top-class 
revolutionary. Being a member of the SLA and living by the standards they set for 
revolutionaries became an issue of identity. The communication of the Symbionese 
Liberation Army is littered with emotional language and the individualization of the 
510 “Rode Jeugd”, Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad, no. 1 (1970).  
511 “Codes of war of the United Symbionese Liberation Army”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 99–100. 
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revolutionary struggle. The six members who were killed in the LA shootout were 
eulogized (with the voice of Patricia Hearst) for their courage, commitment, love for the 
people and for their prowess as guerrilla fighters, as is expressed below:  
Zoya wanted to give meaning to her name, and on her birthday she did. Zoya, female 
guerrilla, perfect love and perfect hate reflected in stone-cold eyes. She moved viciously 
and with caution, understanding the peril of the smallest mistake. She taught me, ‘Keep 
your ass down and be bad’. 
Cinque loved the people with tenderness and respect. They listened to him when he talked 
because they knew that his love reflected the truth and the future. [...] Most importantly, he 
told me how to show my love for the people. He helped me see that it’s not how long you 
live that’s important, it’s how we live.512
The campaign of the Rode Jeugd also had an element of transforming individuals, since it 
called for abolishing alienation and becoming a subject of one’s own life again instead of 
an object exploited by the capitalist system. This did not, however, translate into the same 
kind of personal reform programs. All that the program of the Rode Jeugd called for was 
to break free from the capitalist laws in order to overcome alienation. 
While the personal rewards in the form of providing positive identity and purpose for 
oneself  motivated  the  original  members  of  the  SLA,  the  new  associates  that  joined  the  
Harrises and Patricia Hearst  after the LA shootout had other motives.  Their eagerness to 
help the remaining SLA members was based partly on political grounds, but even more on 
personal bonds. Kathy Soliah was devastated by the loss of her friend, Angela Atwood, in 
the shootout, which certainly increased her motivation to help the remaining ones. Many 
of those who joined her in the effort were cooperating out of loyalty to her and to the 
others involved, rather than out of political concerns. Their participation in the team is a 
manifestation of the importance of social bonds that can sometimes override the disinterest 
or even hostility towards the political side of the activities. 
Looking at the incentive structure and development of the campaigns, it appears that 
those involved in the Rode Jeugd’s campaign were more sensitive to the changes in their 
political environment and were more open for reconsidering the adopted strategy. It also 
seems  that  their  decisions  followed  closer  the  cost-benefit  type  calculation  that  the  
instrumental model for explaining terrorist behavior suggests than is the case with the 
SLA.  
If one adopts a strict definition of rationality, it is difficult to defend the claim that their 
actions would have been rational. However, in the context of their political objectives and 
worldview, the decisions they took show signs of instrumental calculation. The choice by 
the Rode Jeugd to adopt terrorism can be seen as the best among the choices that the 
participants saw open to them at that point. The protest movement was in decline and their 
numbers were shrinking. That called for a new strategy that would make the most out of 
their limited resources. The strategy they came up with was their solution to how to 
contribute to the revolutionary struggle in that particular situation. The decision to disband 
the Rode Jeugd suggests that concerns of instrumentality won over those of organization. 
512 Transcript quoted in McLellan & Avery 1977, 366. 
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Having said that, there were other considerations that ran against their best political 
judgement. One of the most important of such considerations was their striving for action. 
It was the Rode Jeugd’s readiness for hard action that was particularly appealing for its 
adherents and it became an important part of the group’s self-image. Even so, there were 
limits to their hunger for action, however. One manifestation of this was the leaders’ 
reaction to the firebomb attack against the car of the Eindhoven police commissioner and 
the following press campaign in July-August of 1971. While the leaders had nothing 
against the use of these kinds of methods as such, they thought the press campaign in 
particular was stupid and counterproductive. 
All in all, the SLA corresponds closer to the organizational model than the Rode Jeugd 
or its successors. The first team of the SLA was clearly fighting for survival and the major 
motivating  force  for  Bill  and  Emily  Harris  to  go  forward  was  to  carry  the  torch  of  the  
SLA. This difference in focus derives at least partly from the fact that the Rode Jeugd 
never became an underground organization. Rode Jeugd members thus did not have the 
same kind of need to struggle for survival. Moreover, the rewards that working as an 
organization could provide and the investments that the members had made in it were not 
worth fighting for to the end.  
4.5 External factors 
The Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army had the same problem, namely a 
lack of public support.  What  the  SLA  strived  for  was  to  unite  all  people  in  their  fight  
against the capitalist system and they laid their hopes especially on combining the forces 
of white and non-white people. The reception that they got was mixed at best. The public 
in general was flabbergasted, horrified and did not comprehend the SLA’s project. In the 
highly politicized milieu of Berkeley and Oakland, there was no need to explain why 
setting  fire  to  a  Bank of  America  location  was  a  political  act  even  though not  everyone  
agreed that it was a good political act. Still, the SLA took their ideas and methods of 
action so over the top that it managed to alienate itself from that scene. As a result, the 
reactions they received from those they tried to approach when setting up the army were 
largely hostile and filled with suspicion. This was sealed with their highly controversial 
opening attack, the murder of Marcus Foster. 
The reactions to the SLA among the radical Left followed generally three lines of 
argumentation. The first common argument was that the SLA was an unfortunate and 
utterly counterproductive development that the establishment was likely to use to discredit 
the whole Left. Among others, this interpretation was voiced by Jerry Rubin, one of the 
big stars of the protest movement, in his widely publicized letter.513 It was argued that the 
SLA  was  a  result  of  the  organized  Left’s  failure  to  regroup  and  revive  itself  after  its  
513 “Jerry Rubin’s letter to the U.S. – and SLA”, San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle February 17, 1974. 
See also “The Hearst kidnapping: Romantic ultra-‘leftism’” etc., Guardian February 27, 1974; “Left running 
scared of revolution?” Berkeley Barb February 22–28, 1974; “Daily Cal criticizes kidnapers”, San Francisco 
Chronicle February 12, 1974; “Symbionese Liberation Army: Terrorism from the left”, Ramparts May 
1974.
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collapse in the late 1960s. As there was no mass movement, there was also no moral 
community that would restrain excesses but extreme frustration at the lack of action. In an 
article written by the editors of Ramparts, a high-profile New Left magazine, it was 
concluded that in a country like the US, they could not “afford to be without an organized 
mass movement of the Left”.514
Second, there were those who blamed the enemy for the existence of the SLA. Part of 
these people saw SLA as a product of the forces that the Left opposed, a manifestation of 
the moral crisis in the US, karma reaching the capitalists. Or as the ex-Venceremos leader, 
H. Bruce Franklin, summed up the argument: 
I cannot imagine what political movement the SLA is part of. I blame this on the 
government in power now in the country. The whole moral fabric of the society is falling 
apart. We had (Charles) Manson and now we have the SLA.515
Others suspected that the SLA was literally a product of the enemy. This interpretation got 
its  credibility from the observation that no-one in the Bay area radical circles seemed to 
know the SLA members and few of these members had any long-term background in 
political activism. There were also reports that DeFreeze had been a police agent at the 
end of the 1960s. Furthermore, everything the SLA did, seemed to serve more the interests 
of the right-wing forces than the agenda they presented in their communiqués. This view 
was  expressed  particularly  by  those  who  appeared  to  fear  most  that  they  would  be  
discredited  because  of  the  SLA,  for  example  the  Black  Panther  Party.  Furthermore,  the  
SLA provided further proof for some people who were developing wider theories about 
the sinister forces that shaped the US secretly behind-the-scenes. Ironically, they claimed 
that the SLA was part of the very same projects the SLA had announced its opposition to 
in its pamphlets and accused Foster for being part of.516
Finally, there were those who supported the SLA, such as the Black Liberation 
Army.517 The SLA was also warmly, although more reservedly, greeted by the Weather 
Underground. In a communiqué signed by Bernardine Dohrn, it stated that the kidnapping 
dramatized what is wrong with the society and that change was needed. Dohrn gladly 
514 “Symbionese Liberation Army: Terrorism from the left”, Ramparts May 1974. See also Viewpoint: One 
tendency covers another”, Guardian March 27, 1974. 
515 “How some Bay activists view kidnaping of Patricia”, San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle
February 10, 1974.  
516 “How some Bay activists view kidnaping of Patricia”, San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle,
February 10, 1974. See also “SLA part of CIA zombie program” [anonymous letter], Berkeley Barb
February 22–28, 1974; “Marxists say SLA short on analysis”, Berkeley Barb March 1–7, 1974; S.L.A.’s 
Field Marshal Cinque: Revolutionary or police agent?” The Black Panther April 13, 1974; Avery, Paul: 
“Cinque called ex-informer”, San Francisco Chronicle May 11, 1974; Flynn, William: “Venceremos 
founder says SLA subverts radical causes”, San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle April 28, 1974. 
The best known “conspiracy theory” account on the SLA is probably the one of Mae Brussell, see her 
interview Brussell, Mae & Stephanie Caruana: “Is SLA’s Cinque the first black Lee Harvey Oswald?” 
Berkeley Barb April 19–25, 1974. Her arguments made Russ Little angry enough to write a response to her: 
[Little], Russ: “Solution is revolution, says Little”, Berkeley Barb May 3–9, 1974. On DeFreeze being a 
police agent, see the above-mentioned article in The Black Panther; “L.A.P.D. search and destroy tactics 
exposed”, The Black Panther June 15, 1974; Pepper, Sgt: “Cinque called police patsy”, Berkeley Barb April 
19–25, 1974.  
517 “Black Liberation Army welcomes SLA struggle”, Berkeley Barb March 1–7, 1974. 
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points that even though the media has concentrated mostly on the violent aspect of the 
deed, many organizations and leaders have provided support for the SLA’s goals and 
demands and called for the safety of both the SLA and Patricia Hearst. Even though the 
WUO did not comprehend the Foster murder, it underlined that it should not legitimize an 
all-out  leash  on  the  SLA.518 In  a  later  communiqué,  the  WUO  called  everyone  to  show  
solidarity to the SLA and to help it.519
Another stronghold of the SLA support were the prisons. The Black Guerrilla Family 
expressed its solidarity520 with the SLA in a public communiqué. Eric Cummins recounts 
in his study how the support for the SLA was very high among the San Quentin inmates. 
The idea of kidnapping someone like Patricia Hearst had lived in the dreams of some 
inmates.521 Among those  who praised  the  SLA were  also  Martin  Sostre,  a  black  activist  
and bookstore keeper who at that time served a COINTELPRO-related prison sentence. 
He  lashed  out  at  the  Left  for  failing  to  support  or  for  even  seriously  discuss  the  SLA.  
Armed struggle seemed to be all right when it took place in Latin America, but when 
someone started it in the US, the Left was appalled. Most of the movement just 
condemned the SLA outright and evidently tried to isolate it without any real examination 
and criticism of its program.522 In this, Sostre has a point. There were indeed few articles 
in the movement publications (besides a couple of WUO communiqués) where the SLA 
program was discussed in detail.  
The lack of such discussion may reflect the fact that the general distaste of the Left did 
not derive from the details of the SLA program, but more about the morals of its methods 
and choice of targets. There were fundamental disagreements among the Left about the 
necessity and sensibility of waging the armed struggle in the US at that moment. Attitudes 
were further polarized by the specific style of armed struggle adopted by the SLA. 
Completely overruling the need for legal mass work, it relied on the power of the bold and 
audacious action of the committed and uncompromized vanguard. Adopting assassination 
and kidnapping as methods of revolutionary struggle were more radical choices than the 
Left in general was prepared to digest, especially when it involved murdering a person 
who was not generally considered to be an enemy and the kidnapping of an innocent 
girl.523
The  LA  shootout  that  cost  the  lives  of  six  SLA  members  was  generally  met  with  
outrage among the radical Left. All found the brutality of the LAPD appalling.524 The 
518 Letter from Bernardine Dohrn/Weather Underground, February 20, 1974. Freedom Archives. For more 
supportive statements about the SLA, see especially Berkeley Barb, e.g. Albert, Stew: “Fear, Loathing and 
paranoia on the left”, Berkeley Barb March 1–7, 1974; “SLA helping revolution struggle to spread”, 
Berkeley Barb March 1–7, 1974; “A Silent Supporter” and “Welcomes Guerrilla Warfare”, Berkeley Barb
February 22–28, 1974. Solidarity with the SLA was also called in some letters from the readers published in 
the Guardian on March 20 and 28, 1974. 
519 Communiqué reprinted in Berkeley Barb June 14–20, 1974. A copy of this and many more SLA-related 
pamphlets is also available at the Freedom Archives SLA collection. 
520 “Power to SLA, Off the Pigs”, Berkeley Barb February 22–28, 1974. 
521 Cummins 1994, 242–243. Whatever the number of SLA supporters in the prisons may have been, it did 
not really help the SLA. 
522 Sostre, Martin: “Armed struggle natural response to fascist rule”, Berkeley Barb May 3–9, 1974. 
523 For these points, see especially “Symbionese Liberation Army: Terrorism and the Left”, Ramparts May 
1974.
524 E. g. “L.A.P.D. search and destroy tactics exposed”, The Black Panther June 15, 1974. 
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outrage, however, did not really translate into support for the SLA. The incident further 
underlined the risks that helping the SLA might entail.525 Those who had supported it 
before, mourned the deaths of these revolutionaries.526 Memorial rallies were organized in 
the Bay area and were attended by a few hundred people.527 Those who had been 
particularly fierce in their criticism of the SLA from the beginning, had little sympathy for 
the  dead.  The  SLA  lost  the  battle;  they  knew  what  they  were  up  to  and  they  were  silly  
enough to choose to fight. Those who praised the SLA were accused of “murder 
mouthing”: 
It is murder mouthing when you incite people to warfare, but you don’t really believe it 
yourself. It is murder mouthing when you confuse strategy with despair. And it is murder 
mouthing when you hype the SLA as some kind of revolutionary example for other 
tormented and guilt-ridden militants to follow.528
All in all, the politics of the SLA together with the massive hunt for Patricia Hearst made 
many in the Left  to view the SLA rather as a security risk than as a group to be solidar 
with. The massive investigations brought investigators to Berkeley and the Left was afraid 
that the right-wing forces in the country would use the SLA as an excuse to leash an attack 
on the whole left-wing scene.  
That kind of drama never developed around the Rode Jeugd. It operated in a largely 
different context than the SLA, because it was practically a lone island of activists 
supporting the armed struggle in an otherwise moderate and non-polarized political 
climate. The reception they got from other left-wing organizations was largely disinterest. 
The supporters of the Rode Vlag, Rode Jeugd ML (the original “mother” organization and 
the splinter group of Rode Jeugd) and KEN ml (another Maoist organization) published 
some critical articles and expressed their solidarity when members of the Rode Jeugd were 
arrested. Articles discussing the Rode Jeugd do not, however, abound in the left-wing 
publications. The radical Left in general did not really like what the Rode Jeugd was 
doing, but on the other hand, hardly any of them felt a need to discuss the Rode Jeugd in 
their publications. While the Rode Jeugd was a competitor, it did not seem to pose a 
serious  threat  to  them  in  their  opinion.  At  the  same  time,  there  was  not  very  much  
solidarity, either. When Luciën van Hoesel was arrested in December 1972, there were 
some calls for solidarity with him, but it seems they remained as isolated articles and 
pamphlets that hardly became backed up by action.  
The Rode Jeugd was a rather atypical New Left group, because it consisted almost 
entirely of young workers. The organization saw its biggest recruitment opportunities 
among other young workers and drop-outs. Its relations with the students were mostly 
hostile. The Rode Jeugd members despised and ridiculed the students who went to the 
525 See e.g. “YIP forms SLA defense”, Berkeley Barb June 12–18, 1974. 
526 E. g. “A.I.M. on S.L.A.”, The Black Panther June 8, 1974; WUO communique reprinted in Berkeley 
Barb June 14–20, 1974; Johnston, David: “SLA part of the struggle”, Berkeley Barb June 7–13, 1974; “SLA 
supporter will act alone”, Berkeley Barb June 7–13, 1974. 
527 Avery, Paul: “S.F. eulogies for the SLA”, San Francisco Chronicle May 24, 1974. In the memorial rally 
organized in Berkeley on June 2, there were about four hundred people, many of them reportedly there just 
out of curiosity. No-one of the biggest stars of the Left attended the rally (McLellan & Avery 1977, 376). 
528 “Murder mouthing” [Editors in response to a letter from Stew Albert], Ramparts August 1974. 
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factories to learn about the real life of the working class. What the Rode Jeugd members 
wanted was to get out of the factory and to establish another kind of life for themselves 
and their kind.  
When the Rode Jeugd members became disappointed by the disinterest and lack of 
commitment among its primary recruitment pool, it started to reconsider recruiting among 
the intellectuals. This possibility was discussed in its internal paper in late 1973. This idea 
was based on the observation that there might be more support for armed struggle in those 
circles. In order to be successful in their recruitment efforts, they felt that they should step 
up  their  level  of  theory-forming.  However,  there  were  clearly  worries  about  where  
bringing such people into the group may lead to, and it was underlined that the workers 
should remain in control. The plan did not materialize before the Rode Jeugd had 
disbanded, but in their successive attempts to revitalize the revolutionary struggle, the 
former members cooperated with students and intellectuals as well. 
The participants in both campaigns generally used similar kinds of lines of explanation 
for  their  lack  of  support.  First,  it  was  considered  to  be  natural  for  the  stage  of  
revolutionary struggle they were in. In the beginning stages, there would be ups and 
downs,  as  that  was  considered  to  be  part  of  the  picture.  Furthermore,  they  did  not  even  
aspire to be a big organization, but rather stayed as the vanguard of professional 
revolutionaries. Second, in the context of both campaigns, the stagnation of theory-
forming among the Left was blamed for the underdeveloped state of the revolutionary 
struggle. The explanation was evidently a defense against the critique against their 
theoretical positions. Both represented themselves as much-needed reformers of the dusty 
and outdated Marxist-Leninist dogma. The Rode Jeugd core members blamed those who 
supported the mass-line for not grasping the realities and not appreciating the fact that for 
a revolutionary movement to prevail, it was necessary to create an illegal arm to the 
struggle. The SLA members explained in retrospect that those who had criticized the SLA 
for its poor attempt at Marxist-Leninist policies were missing the point. The SLA had 
consciously tried to distance themselves from these politics and “took up the philosophy 
of  revolutionary  direct  action  as  a  tactic  to  provide  initiative  and  incentive  we  felt  was  
necessary to get people out of the stagnant dogma and practice so characteristic to the 
“New Left”.”529 In other words, those who had failed to support their theory and action 
plan were the ones who were ultimately to be blamed for the miserable state of affairs. 
That other leftists did not get excited about their dogmatic breakthrough finds its 
explanation in the political culture that surrounded them. The Netherlands in the 1970s 
was not a very supportive environment for armed struggle. The liberal climate had its 
basis in some more general features of the Dutch culture. The Dutch political system was 
essentially based on pluralism and consensus. In other words, conflicts and confrontations 
were avoided and the authorities felt uneasy with the use of violence. There were some 
overreactions to the first protests, but the authorities soon learned to avoid unnecessary 
provocations.530
The protesting in the Netherlands in the late 1960s had largely channeled into small 
parties or single-issue movements which directed their activities towards influencing the 
529 The last SLA Statement, 37; Over gewapende strijd. Aanzetten tot de stadsguerilla in Nederland. 1966–
1974 Rode Jeugd (Marxisties Scholings Kollektief 1975). 
530 Kennedy 1995/1999, 149, 155–168; Schmid 1993, 80–83.  
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decision-making within the political institutions. There was not very much support for 
revolution in general, and hardly any support for starting up the violent revolutionary 
struggle at that moment. There was considerable support for ideas brought up by the 
revolutionaries and the left-wing liberal consensus ruled the country. However, there was 
a big difference between the revolutionaries and the rest: While revolutionaries were 
against the entire system, most people limited their political and societal involvement to 
smaller issues and worked within the context of the parliamentary system. There was some 
degree of sympathy for the Rote Armee Fraktion and other similar organizations in West 
Germany, but that was more typically based on opposition to the German political system 
and to measures taken by the authorities than on what the Rote Armee Fraktion itself 
did.531
Besides in terms of political climate, the Netherlands was not a very convenient place 
for armed struggle in terms of geography, either: 
Everybody  lives  close  to  each  other  and  therefore  there  are  few  places  to  hide.  In  the  
United States there were whole neighborhoods the police did not dare to enter. Those are 
perfect hiding places for urban guerrilleros. Such places do not exist in the Netherlands. 
You saw also what happened in Germany. Germany is many times bigger than the 
Netherlands, but it did not work out there either, because the social control and the 
technical level of the police and intelligence services were so high. 532
Politically and geographically, the Symbionese Liberation Army operated in a very 
different milieu. There was considerably more support for armed struggle, although in the 
context of the entire country, it was also very limited. The SLA did not manage, however, 
to tap into that support. This was most of all due to the aforementioned extremity of its 
actions, but also because it started to operate relatively late. By 1974, consensus was also 
building up in the radical fringes of the Left about the futility of armed struggle. One 
indication of that were the efforts of the Weather Underground to build itself an 
aboveground existence. The WUO’s political program Prairie Fire calling for this kind of 
change of direction was published in May, 1974. It is questionable whether the SLA’s 
actions would have met much more support earlier, but at least it affected its possibilities 
to gain support from the Weather Underground. 
Those involved in the campaigns of the Rode Jeugd and Symbionese Liberation Army 
also faced very different kinds of countermeasures. This was due to both the differences 
between the culture of law enforcement in the Netherlands and the United States, as well 
as to the nature of their own attacks. What, however, is similar in the campaigns is that 
those involved expected no less from the authorities than they actually became faced with. 
What the authorities did in the case of the Rode Jeugd was essentially that they tried to 
operate low-key, to control the Rode Jeugd through infiltration and to avoid doing 
anything that would radicalize them and their potential supporters.533 At  least  some  
531 Kennedy 1995/1999; Koopmans 1992; Verbij 2005 (especially 11–12); Pekelder 2007. 
532 Interview with Aat van Wijk on June 30, 2003. 
533 The measures against the Rode Jeugd will be discussed in more detail in an upcoming article by me and 
Beatrice de Graaf (De Graaf & Malkki forthcoming). See also Klerks 1989; Schmid 1993; Hoekstra 2004; 
Engelen 2007.  
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politicians and security service personnel actively tried to avoid creating the same kind of 
alarmist and polarized atmosphere that had developed in West Germany. It must be added, 
though, that the policy against the Rode Jeugd was not wholly uniform and concerted. 
Sometimes, police officers – especially in Eindhoven – went quite far to get the Rode 
Jeugd members convicted, and were not very subtle in doing so. Nevertheless, the basic 
tone was low key. After September of 1972, weekly meetings took place in order to 
coordinate all prosecuting, intelligence gathering and other measures against the Dutch 
revolutionaries. Furthermore, the “success” did not result only from good policies and 
skillful implementation, but was also a product of failures. The authorities would have 
liked to see more processes against the Rode Jeugd members but these attempts failed due 
to lack of evidence.534 The advantages of this were also noted by the director of Landelijk 
Bijstandsteam Terreurbestrijding (LBT, National Support Group for Combatting 
Terrorism) who concluded in 1981: 
Even though the LBT has had many successes, the penal wrapping up of terror cases 
[through convictions] has been one of the exceptions. But we are not very sad because of 
that. The experiences in the last years have taught that terror can be combated very well by 
“disturbing” it. That way, more than one act has been prevented. That is perhaps not very 
spectacular, but effective.535
The Rode Jeugd members were early on aware that countermeasures were being taken 
against it and that there were informers in its ranks. In fact, reading the texts published in 
its paper, one gets the impression that they were expecting more severe repression than 
they faced.536 This understanding translated poorly into action. The Rode Jeugd members 
knew fully well that if they wanted to commit to armed struggle, they needed to strengthen 
their organization, but they did not manage to bring about the changes that it would have 
required. One reason for this stemmed from their reluctance and fear of becoming isolated. 
Besides that, evidence from neighboring West Germany suggested that if they chose to go 
underground, they probably would not have been able to sustain the organization for any 
length of time that would have made it worth their effort. When they were not pushed 
underground, there were still realistic opportunities to abandon the struggle. 
From  the  Rode  Jeugd’s  point  of  view,  the  countermeasures  that  the  authorities  took  
against them slowly drove them into a situation where they could do nothing without the 
authorities knowing about it. The most debilitating effect of the countermeasures was the 
paranoia created by the knowledge that informers were among them.  
The SLA was faced with intensive countermeasures almost from the start. Committing 
a murder and a kidnapping ensured that the authorities would initiate an intensive hunt to 
find them. The kidnapping of Patricia Hearst put the SLA under immense pressure. The 
search for Patricia Hearst was probably the biggest manhunt in US history. While the FBI 
was investing vast resources in locating the SLA and Patricia Hearst, in the first weeks of 
the kidnapping, the FBI announced that it respected the wishes of the Hearst family and let 
them negotiate. The attitude changed, however, after Patricia Hearst announced she had 
534 See e.g. Klerks 1989, 95–99. 
535 Cited in Klerks 1989, 99. 
536 E.g. “REBO”, Publikatie aktiegroep Rode Jeugd, no. 3 (1969). 
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joined the SLA and participated in a bank robbery. From then on, the message was that the 
FBI would find the SLA and arrest them. 
The SLA expected nothing less from the authorities. They were fully disillusioned 
about  the  authorities  and  they  routinely  called  them  fascist  pigs.  The  SLA  members  
appeared literally to wait for the police to come and expected that they would try to shoot 
them, including Patricia Hearst, on sight. The feeling of being hunted at all times clearly 
consumed the SLA members. The massive countermeasures most likely acted as a 
deterrent for potential supporters and friends of those involved in helping the SLA.  
After the Los Angeles shootout, the need to escape from the authorities started to 
dictate the development of the campaign even more. Even though a new series of attacks 
was initiated in the late summer of 1975, the SLA did not manage to move properly from 
defensive to offensive action.  
During the time from the Los Angeles shootout to the arrests in September, 1975, 
those involved benefited greatly from the fact that the FBI largely neglected the possibility 
that Kathleen Soliah and her friends could be involved in the SLA. In retrospect, it seems 
astounding that it took so long for the FBI to start to investigate seriously Kathy Soliah, 
Kilgore and their friends. A more careful look at Yoshimura’s past would have brought 
them quickly on the right track. As McLellan and Avery put it, “from Yoshimura to 
Brandt to Soliah and Company there was a trail like a five-lane interstate”.537 Soliah, 
Kilgore, as well as the Scotts, and Bortin’s girlfriend, Pat Jean McCarthy, were on Willie 
Brandt’s (who was Yoshimura’s boyfriend) visitor list.538
The most plausible explanation for that seems to be that the FBI considered Soliah and 
Kilgore to be too obvious and visible SLA sympathizers to play a role in the 
underground.539 Besides, it may have seemed improbable that a handful of working people 
could support three wanted fugitives for months. This interpretation is supported by the 
fact  that  when  the  FBI  got  on  Soliah’s  track,  she  was  not  expected  to  lead  them  to  the  
Harrises and Patricia Hearst directly, but to provide further clues about their helpers and 
whereabouts. The same may have applied to Michael Bortin, who was on parole for the 
entire time (and who evidently benefited from having a sympathetic parole officer who let 
him report flexibly). According to Bortin’s own recollections, Bortin was monitored by 
the police at least occasionally, but if that was the case, it did not lead to the discovery of 
Bortin’s links with the fugitives.540
The media attention that the campaigns of the Rode Jeugd and Symbionese Liberation 
Army received was very different. The Rode Jeugd and its successors did not figure very 
prominently in the media, some occasional sensational reporting notwithstanding, and 
they never became demonized in the public debate. In fact, its name hardly ever appeared 
in the context of bomb attacks. There was some speculation as to whether the Rode Jeugd 
was behind the action names, but the reporters did not appear to make much effort to get 
to  the  bottom of  it.  The  whole  affair  seemed very  easily  forgetten  for  the  public,  maybe  
save for Eindhoven, where it had been a rather prominent local phenomenon.  
537 McLellan & Avery 1977, 441. 
538 McLellan & Avery 1977, 440–441. 
539 See e.g. McLellan & Avery 1977, 377. 
540 Interview with Michael Bortin on June 9, 2008. 
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This  was  at  least  partly  due  to  a  deliberate  policy  of  the  authorities.  There  are  
indications  that  the  BVD consciously  tried  to  withhold  information  from the  public  that  
could have caused upheaval.541 The treatment of the Rode Jeugd reflects the more general 
line adopted with regard to such politically-motivated activism as it was called. The key 
objective of the policy was to maintain legal order and at the same time, to avoid any 
unnecessary provocation, to try to prevent the isolation of those who are frustrated, and to 
use violence only when it was necessary and in proportion to the threat. An illustration of 
the  Dutch  policy  is  that  the  Dutch  government  chose  not  to  use  the  term  terrorism  and  
instead rather used the term politically motivated activism. This was because it was felt 
that speaking about terrorism could turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the BVD 
reports, however, the term terrorism is used and the activities of the Rode Jeugd are 
included in this category.542
One of those occasions of sensational reporting was after the arrest of Lidwien Janssen 
and the trip to South Yemen. This extensive media coverage served as a final catalyst for 
disbanding the Rode Hulp and for finding a new direction. If it had been difficult to do 
anything worthwhile for the revolution in the Netherlands before, after those reports, those 
involved concluded, it would have been hopeless. 
What  also  played  a  role  in  the  non-demonization  of  the  Rode  Jeugd  was  that  it  was  
outshined by other, more serious incidents. The prime domestic concern with regard to 
terrorism-like activities in the Netherlands were the radicalized young Moluccans who had 
occupied the residence of the Indonesian ambassador in 1970 and later in 1975 and 1977, 
hijacked a train twice and occupied an Indonesian consulate and a school. Another serious 
concern was Palestinian terrorism. In early February of 1972, there were two (one 
successful and one failed) big bomb attacks on the Gasunie facilities in Ommen and 
Ravenstein which were claimed by the Palestinian Black September. When the bomb 
exploded in Evoluon at the end of February, 1972, the first question was whether it was 
work of a foreign organization. When it immediately came out that the attack was far too 
amateurish to be that, there must have been a degree of relief. The same kind of 
comparison also took place in the case of many other (attempted) bomb attacks by the 
Rode Jeugd later on.543
The media attention that the Symbionese Liberation Army received was huge. The 
murder of Marcus Foster was big enough news to be printed not only in the Californian 
newspapers, but also in The New York Times. The kidnapping of Patricia Hearst has been 
called a media event of the decade and it was also a prominent news story internationally. 
Achieving  this  kind  of  attention  was  definitely  a  success  in  the  SLA’s  own  terms.  The  
action plan of the Symbionese Liberation Army depended highly on getting their message 
through in the “bourgeois” press. Getting so many newspapers to print out their 
documents as they requested must have made them happy. 
541 See especially Hoekstra 2004, 73. 
542 Schmid 1993; e.g. “Informatie politiek terrorisme,” BVD report March 22, 1973.  
543 E.g. “Aanslag in Eindhoven werk van amateurs”, De Telegraaf February 25, 1972; “Aanslag Evoluon 
duistere zaak”, De Volkskrant February 25, 1972; Bank, Jan: “Terrorisme in Nederland toch kneuterig”, De
Volkskrant October 19, 1972. 
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The media attention, however, also had very negative consequences for the group. In a 
retrospective evaluation of the successes and failures of the SLA, Emily Harris touches 
upon this point:  
One of the main criticisms that I have was how the SLA got caught up in a sensationalized 
portrayal of the organization through the media. Revolutionaries can’t do that – they have 
to keep their ideas and actions grounded in reality. I think in some ways the drama of the 
whole thing even discouraged people. They began to see the SLA as such a fantasy that the 
group lost its potential for motivating other people to act and participate in some form of 
revolutionary struggle.544
Soon after the SLA started its campaign, it became first and foremost a literary product. 
The original team of the SLA seemed almost obsessed with its public image. The tapes 
and communiqués are filled with reactions to other people’s comments about the SLA. 
Truth in terms of what really had happened became often the victim in this media struggle. 
The SLA seemed to put its hope in the power of communication. From Patricia Hearst’s 
memoir, one gets the impression that the SLA members would have believed that when 
they managed to explain themselves in a way that people “get” what they are saying, when 
all those misunderstandings about the SLA are cleared, then people would join the SLA in 
its fight. The SLA managed cleverly to provoke the media to talk about it, but it was 
clearly not very well prepared to deal with the fame. 
To the list of external factors, I would add the other similar movements which were 
conducting the armed struggle that the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army 
members viewed as their comrades-in-arms. The global context not only brought 
inspiration for starting up the campaign. All the way through, those involved in the 
campaigns thought they were part of a world-wide revolutionary movement. Being part of 
a global wave of terrorism was thus not merely a classification made by scholars, but a 
reality that at least the most committed ones felt they were living in, a reality which 
influenced their evaluations and decisions. The knowledge that they were not alone in 
their fight provided them with a rationale to continue their struggle despite their lack of 
numbers. Every little action they did would contribute to the larger struggle in any case. 
When the perspectives for revolutionary struggle declined in the Netherlands, the 
possibilities for helping other organizations made it possible for the Dutch activists to 
continue their contribution to revolution. On the other hand, the setbacks faced by other 
movements, most notably the German ones, influenced the calculations by the Rode Jeugd 
and its successors concerning their own chances.  
544 The last SLA statement, 31. 
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5 Discussion: Ways forward in understanding the end of 
terrorist campaigns 
If one was to provide a simple answer to the question of why the terrorist campaigns under 
study ended, it would be the lack of public support. The Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese 
Liberation Army did not have many members and supporters to begin with, and despite all 
their efforts to recruit more people, their ranks became increasingly fewer towards the end 
of the campaigns. In many respects, the campaigns of the Rode Jeugd and that of the 
Symbionese Liberation Army in particular, are examples of terrorist campaigns that 
Audrey Kurth Cronin has described as campaigns ending primarily due to failure, that is, 
resulting from imploding, provoking a backlash or from becoming marginalized.545
Another important point to add is that the countermeasures taken by the authorities had 
a significant impact. While these countermeasures did not “eliminate” the campaigns as 
such, in both cases, the (temporary or permanent) de-escalation of terrorism (in terms of 
attacks that reached the execution stage) almost always followed the countermeasures 
taken by the authorities.  
Countermeasures  and  the  lack  of  support  also  featured  in  the  explanations  that  those  
involved in the campaigns gave to the decline both at the time and afterwards. However, 
they blamed themselves too. Looking more closely at these case studies, it is clear that the 
countermeasures and the lack of public support would not have had such an impact as they 
had on the campaign, were it not for certain characteristics of the organizations and 
individuals involved in the campaigns.  
While it may not be very surprising why the campaigns ended, several important 
insights arise from the case studies in terms of how these terrorist campaigns subsided. 
This is at least equally important as the question of why their campaigns ended. It has 
been often emphasized that terrorism, including the processes that lead to its decline, are 
highly context-specific. Looking at historical cases in detail helps us move forward to gain 
a more sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of terrorist campaigns. This not only 
brings light to the role of the internal factors, but also furthers our understanding of how 
exactly contextual factors such as countermeasures and public support affect the course of 
terrorist campaigns.  
I will start the discussion by focusing on the internal development of the campaign in 
terms of its organization and ideology and then return to how the above mentioned 
contextual factors influenced the course of the campaign.  
5.1 When does a terrorist campaign end 
First, to return to what was stated in the introduction, my initial understanding on the issue 
of  “how terrorism ends”  was  that  the  demise  of  a  terrorist  organization,  the  decline  of  a  
terrorist campaign and the (collective) deradicalization of the beliefs and goals of the 
545 Cronin 2009b, 94–114. 
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participants should all be treated as analytically separate processes that may or may not 
coincide. This was confirmed by the analysis of the case studies.  
In the cases of the SLA and Rode Jeugd, it  could have been easy to assume that the 
campaigns ended when the original organizations had collapsed. This is because in both 
cases, it took a long time before the successor groupings conducted attacks that actually 
went beyond the planning stage. This did not, however, mean that the initiatives for 
continuing the campaign had ended. Indeed, the remnants of the SLA, together with their 
new associates, initiated a new bomb campaign a year after most of the original members 
of the group had died in a police shootout. In contrast, the successor networks of the Rode 
Jeugd did not commit a single successful bomb attack from 1973 to 1976. Nonetheless, 
planning for such attacks continued all that time. Later, bomb attacks and sieges were 
conducted in the context of the campaign of the RVF.  
For this reason, in the cases in which the attacks have ended rather recently and there 
are still people known to be psychologically engaged in such forms of action, silence may 
rather reflect a temporary lull in the terrorist acts, for example due to operational problems 
or organizational disputes, than signal a permanent abandonment of their terrorist 
strategies. 
Second, this study illustrates that the decline of a terrorist campaign should not be too 
closely associated with the demise of any particular organization. Even in the cases of the 
Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army, which certainly were among the 
smallest groups and had little support, the campaign did not end with the dissolution of the 
original organization. Even a brief look at, for example, the situation in Northern Ireland 
and at the Israeli/Palestinian conflict provides further support for this argument. That 
splintering  has  been  common  among  terrorist  groups  is  also  evident  from  the  recent  
RAND study on the end of terrorist groups. Of those 404 groups which were listed in the 
MIPT database and were no longer active, 136 (36 per cent) had ended because of 
splintering.546
This is not to deny that there could be a link between the decline of terrorist campaigns 
and the demise of organizations involved in implementing them. The abandonment of a 
terrorist strategy can bring about major challenges to the organization, as does a collapse 
of the organization bring challenges to the continuation of a terrorist campaign. The point 
is that even if these processes may be interrelated, they do not necessarily coincide. 
Therefore,  in  order  to  fully  understand  the  dynamics  of  terrorist  campaigns,  the  analysis  
must look at the development of terrorist activity beyond the life-span of a single 
organization and take into account whether the campaign is carried on by other 
organizations (or several organizations at the same time), for example, by extending the 
analysis to the level of a terrorist campaign as it was undertaken in this study. 
While in most studies on the end of terrorism, it is at least passingly noted that the 
demise of a particular organization does not necessarily mean that terrorism ends, the 
theoretical discussion would benefit from more precise terminology. 
546 Jones & Libicki 2008, 13. 
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5.2 Role of organizational resources and dynamics 
In most studies that have addressed the decline of terrorism, attention has been focused on 
organizational issues. As we witnessed in the introduction, Martha Crenshaw has 
suggested that the decline of terrorism results from an interplay of the government 
response to terrorism, the strategic choices of the terrorist organization and its 
organizational resources.547 Organizational dynamics are strongly present also in Audrey 
Kurth Cronin’s evaluation, both as conditions that affect the outcomes of counterterrorist 
measures (e.g. killing or capturing leaders), as well as a direct cause of the difficulties in 
the form of internal disputes, failure to attract new recruits or loss of operational 
control.548 In studies of individual disengagement conducted by John Horgan, various 
kinds of organizational considerations have come out as both factors leading to 
disillusionment, as well as constraints for leaving the organization despite increasing 
disillusionment with tactics, political objectives or the organization.549 Furthermore, 
group-related motivations and dynamics also feature strongly in Dipak Gupta’s study on 
the lifecycle of terrorist movements.550
The  courses  of  the  campaigns  under  study  were  affected  by  the  developments  in  the  
organization and resources of the campaign, as well as internal dynamics of the 
organizations in various ways. The overall trend in both cases was that of declining 
membership and organizational capabilities. What is noteworthy, however, is that there 
were major differences in the role that the organizational concerns played in each case. 
This underlines the fact that organizations involved in the use of terrorist strategies exhibit 
major differences when compared. It is not only the terrorist organizations of the different 
waves of terrorism that differ from each other, but as this study demonstrates, even groups 
that are of the same size, operate at the same time and share the ideological orientation, 
can be very different. 
The campaign of the Symbionese Liberation Army in many ways follows the logic that 
the organizational model suggests. Special value was attached to the survival of the 
organization called the Symbionese Liberation Army by its original members and the 
organizational concerns were an important sustaining force in that campaign. After the 
arrest of Remiro and Little, and especially after the LA shootout, the SLA campaign 
became increasingly driven by the need to survive. The case thereby resonates strongly 
with what Donatella della Porta writes about the development of respective Italian and 
German leftist terrorist campaigns.551
The campaign of the SLA also illustrates well the role that group pressure can have on 
those involved.552 It was clearly very strong in the original SLA. One manifestation of this 
was the refusal of all those inside the LA safe house to surrender and to instead be burned 
with the house. The “conversion” of Patricia Hearst can also perhaps be partly interpreted 
as a product of group pressure. While the dynamics of the new composition was different, 
547 Crenshaw 1991. 
548 Cronin 2009b, especially 94–114.
549 E.g. Horgan 2009a & 2009b. 
550 Gupta 2008. 
551 Della Porta 1995. 
552 For discussion on this topic, see e.g. Crenshaw 1992; Horgan 2005, 125–130; Post 1990.  
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group pressure also played an important role in the participation of the new team. In the 
chapter dealing with the campaign, I quoted how the former associates have described the 
“whirlpool” that took them from merely helping the Harrises to survive to conducting 
violent attacks with them. 
The case of the SLA also demonstrates how revenge and survivor guilt may sustain the 
campaign.553 The fact that six members had been killed and two were in prison made it 
morally and emotionally very difficult for the Harrises to give up. Especially the deaths of 
the SLA members were a major reason that led the new associates to help them. 
Furthermore, it seems that the power that the Harrises had over the new associates was 
partly based on their position as being the heirs of the martyrs. 
 Overall, the organizational concerns and dynamics were sustaining forces in the SLA 
campaign. Their role was not, however, this clear cut. Namely, as it was noted in the 
previous chapter, the campaign was halted for months after the LA shootout and when it 
started again, the nature of the attacks had changed. This was partly due to the disputes 
between the Harrises and the new team concerning their terms of cooperation and proper 
strategies. Those disagreements prevented them from pulling together any political action 
in the first months of their cooperation and subsequently paralyzed the campaign. This 
happened again when the disputes erupted later and led the new team to distancing itself 
from the Harrises shortly before the arrests in September, 1975. 
The disputes among those involved also meant that the most ambitious and radical 
plans of the Harrises never materialized. When the Harrises and the new team finally 
reached a compromise about their political actions, the acts that followed were bomb 
attacks instead of murders and kidnappings. These attacks were much less dramatic as no-
one got hurt. However, one should be careful not to overstate the change in strategy. They 
may have been less spectacular than the political murders that the Harrises had planned, 
but all of them were not merely symbolic bombings intended to inflict material damage 
even if the new team might have perceived them that way. That the attacks did not cause 
any casualties was mainly due to operational deficits in conducting those attacks.  
In contrast to the SLA, the Rode Jeugd or its successors never became organizations in 
the strict sense of the term. In fact, there was another rival Maoist group that was not 
involved in violent actions but which organization-wise was closer to the SLA and 
corresponds better with a stereotypical image of a terrorist group.554 The Rode Jeugd 
resembled much more an informal network of activists and had very different kind of 
internal dynamics. It terms of organization, it was not necessarily very unlike the present-
day “ad-hoc networks” and “homegrown” terrorists. In fact, many left-wing groupings of 
the 1970s may have been closer than we may think to “universes of like-minded fanatics 
in which there are galaxies and constellations, networks and ad hoc conspiracies, even 
553 On revenge as a sustaining force in terrorist campaigns, see e.g. Richardson 2006, 113–120; Bjørgo 2005; 
Crenshaw 1981; Silke 2003b. 
554 The group I refer to is the Socialistiese Partij (Socialist Party). It is interesting to note that the former 
members of this group seem to have much more complicated relationship with their past activities than the 
Rode Jeugd members. See Zomeren, Koos van (1987): “De revolutie die niet doorging: Koos van Zomeren 
en zijn Rode Jeugdkameraden”, Vrij Nederland November 7, 1987; Verbij 2005, 102–109; Voerman 1986. 
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individual operators”555, a characterization that Brian M. Jenkins has provided for new 
terrorist organization forms.556
Moreover, whereas the SLA maintained a high group pressure and discipline among 
those involved, in the case of the Rode Jeugd and its successors, the group pressure was 
considerably low and the discipline more lax. In fact, lack of discipline and organization 
was identified as one of the key problems with the Rode Jeugd campaign by the 
participants. A major reason for the almost instant failure of armed struggle in the context 
of the Rode Jeugd was indeed that its members were unable to change their conduct and 
organization to respond to the new tactics of resistance.  
It  is  clear  that  the  maintenance  of  the  organization  called  the  Rode  Jeugd,  or  any  of  
those  that  followed,  was  not  a  priority  in  itself.  When  the  existence  of  the  Rode  Jeugd  
became more a liability than an asset towards 1974, a decision was reached to abolish it. 
However, the abolishment of the Rode Jeugd did not end its members’ involvement in the 
revolutionary struggle. Rather, it was a strategic move that was conducted in the hope of 
finding a way out of the impasse. 
While the case of the Rode Jeugd corresponds weakly in this regard to the hypothesis 
of the organizational model, it does not mean that the kind of incentives that the 
organizational  model  proposes,  such  as  a  hunger  for  action,  social  status,  and  a  need  to  
belong to a group, would not have played a role in the case of the Rode Jeugd. However, it 
would be inaccurate to see the Rode Jeugd or its successors as the sole producer of those 
incentives that made the participation worthwhile. Attaining those incentives did not really 
necessitate the existence of the Rode Jeugd. The more important context for the activities 
was the international community of revolutionary movements in which one could 
participate by taking action for the revolution.  
What is noteworthy here is that neither the Rode Jeugd nor the Rode Hulp and other 
successor organizations defined the social networks for the initiatives undertaken for the 
armed struggle in the Netherlands. In effect, they were rather action names than organized 
groups. In fact, in terms of social structures, the Rode Jeugd and its successor provided 
only a very loose context for the initiatives for armed struggle. A more defining social 
context for the activities were the broader individual networks of the key activists. After 
the Rode Jeugd was disbanded, these networks by and large remained.  
This kind of organization, while it was in many ways perceived as being inappropriate 
for a group involved in resistance, remained partly because those involved withdrew from 
the plans to go underground. Even more importantly, people were not injured in its 
attacks, which also meant that the members had no active need to hide from the authorities 
and nobody depended on the Rode Jeugd for their survival. Therefore, the Rode Jeugd or 
its successor organizations never went into the “survival mode”.  
What is important is that the differences in organization and internal dynamics seem to 
be connected with how those involved reacted to the backlashes they faced and thereby 
affected the course of the campaign. That the differences in organization may be linked to 
the development of the campaigns has been appreciated to some degree in the discussion, 
for example with regard to the “old” and “new” terrorism where a link has been 
555 Jenkins 2001, 324. 
556 See also Duyvesteyn 2004 & 2007; Hoffman 2001, 426; Tucker 2001, 3–4, who all question whether 
“old” and “new” terrorist groups really differ so much in terms of organization or in other respects.  
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established between the lethality of acts and the differences in organizational structures557,
but the question deserves to be further explored.  What seems particularly significant in 
the light of the case studies is the kind of possibilities that are open to the participants in 
the campaign when they become dissatisfied with the prevailing situation, and how 
susceptible they are for changes in the external environment.  
Regarding these questions, Albert O. Hirschman’s study on the dynamics of exit, voice 
and loyalty in organizations provides tools for analysis and insight. His study seeks to 
explain the ways in which people may react when the quality of the product or service 
deteriorates, whether the provider of the product is a business company, a political 
movement or any other type of organization. According to Hirschman, the customers, or 
those involved in political movements, have basically two alternative ways to respond: 
they can either “exit”, in other words, stop consuming the product, or “voice” their 
dissatisfaction with the hope that it would contribute to the product improvement. The 
balance of exit and voice, he argues, depends on the detail of the institutional design. 
Hirschman  argues  that  exit  and  voice  rarely  coexist.  When  exit  is  an  easy  option,  it  
usually leaves little pressure of discontent to foment voice. Voice, in turn, activates 
effectively only when exit is not available as an option, as is the case with tribes, families 
or  states.  The  dynamics  of  exit  and  voice  are,  however,  further  complicated  by  loyalty.  
This means that being loyal to an organization typically makes exit a more costly 
alternative. At the same time, it does not necessarily automatically lead to the effective 
activation of voice.558
In the cases of the Rode Jeugd and the SLA, the dynamics of exit,  voice and loyalty 
were very different. Starting with the SLA, the original SLA in the time between the 
Foster murder and the LA shootout is an example of a situation where both exit and voice 
are blocked. Hirschman explains that this is typical in such cases where both entrance and 
exit from an organization involve high costs.559 The participation in the SLA meant that 
the individual had to devote all aspects of his/her life in taking part in the organization. 
The rules and dynamics of the group, although not entirely ruling out the possibility of 
exit, made it very difficult. Moreover, the fact that the members were intensively sought 
out by the authorities further complicated exit. According to the available source material, 
there indeed appears to have been little exercise of voice inside the group and they seemed 
to have a strong inclination towards coherence and conformity. 
 The situation was significantly different for the new team. For them, exit was 
possible, but they exhibited strong loyalty towards the organization, or more specifically, 
they shared a commitment to help the fugitives escape and that tied them to the campaign. 
Instead of leaving the Harrises and Patricia Hearst on their own, their new associates 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the plans that the Harrises had and the expectations 
that the Harrises had for the new associates. Following the logic described by Hirschman, 
when that dissatisfaction became more severe, loyalty broke down and the new associates 
started seriously to plan their exit.  
557 This discussion started already before 9/11, see e.g. Hoffman 1997, 4–6; Gurr & Cole 2000, 167–168, 
Laqueur 1999, 5; Ranstorp 1996. For my earlier treatment of the “new terrorism” argument, see Malkki 
2003.
558 Hirschman 1970, 76–86.
559 Hirschman 1970, 92–98.
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In the case of the Rode Jeugd and its successor organizations, exit was an entirely open 
option all the way through for all members and associates. The members also did not face 
high entrance fees, because the membership requirements were relatively low and did not 
exclude living a normal life, including having a job and social contacts outside the group. 
While there was some loyalty towards the organization, this was not that all-pervasive and 
critical to survival, as it was in the case of the SLA. Indeed, many adherents of the Rode 
Jeugd quietly left the organization when they were no longer motivated to take part in its 
action. There were, however, enough members who cared about the future of the 
organization to activate voice. This activation of voice eventually led to the disbandment 
of the Rode Jeugd, but not to the end of the campaign. The disbandment of the Rode Jeugd 
could be understood in Hirschman’s terms as the collapse of an organization in front of 
too powerful a voice.  
 All in all, in the case of the Rode Jeugd, the good opportunities for exit, both in terms 
of leaving the group and possibilities for creating a new kind existence within the larger 
society, enabled the early “retreat” from the use of a terrorist strategy. In the case of the 
SLA,  the  exit-voice-loyalty  dynamic  rather  made  new reluctant  helpers  into  more  active  
helpers and thereby sustained the campaign.  
The starting point of Hirschman’s discussion was a situation where the quality of the 
product had lapsed, and his interest was in seeing how both exit and voice can help an 
organization to recover from it. This means that the dynamics of exit and voice are also 
closely related to how the group reacts to the changes in the external environment.  
It  has  been  pointed  out  many  times  in  organization  studies  that  the  ebb  and  flow  of  
sentiments in the larger society does not affect all organizations equally. One of the early 
contributions arguing this is the seminal article entitled “Social movement organizations: 
Growth, decay and change” by Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, which was published in 
1966.560 They claim that two dimensions of organizations mediate the extent of the effect 
of external developments. The first one is the extent of membership requirements, both 
initial and continuing, and the second one is the extent to which the organizations are 
oriented to changing member behavior or individual behavior versus changing society.561
According to Zald and Ash, the inclusive organizations are more susceptible for the 
ebb and flow of sentiments than are the exclusive organizations. This is because 
“competing values and attitudes are more readily mobilized in an inclusive organization.” 
Furthermore, “members of inclusive organizations are more likely to be subjected to 
conflicts in the face of threats or in the face of competing social movements that appeal to 
other values”. On the other hand, “commitment of members in [an exclusive] organization 
is  less  dependent  on  the  external  success  of  the  organization.  Commitment  is  based  to  a  
greater extent on solidarity and/or expressive incentives than on purposive incentives.”562
As a consequence, the design of the organizations and the requirements and the goals it 
sets for its members can condition the effects of external factors, for example public 
support, on the campaign. Indeed, it seems that the Rode Jeugd, which was closer to an 
inclusive organization, was more susceptible for changes in the external environment than 
the organizationally more exclusive Symbionese Liberation Army was. However, while 
560 Zald & Ash 1966.  
561 Zald & Ash 1966, 330–332.  
562 All quotes in this paragraph Zald & Ash 1966, 331. 
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inclusive organizations are more vulnerable to external influences, this responsiveness 
may be actually help them prevail. Namely, in the recent literature on organization change, 
staying in tune with the external environment has also been identified as one of the critical 
issues in organizational survival.563
5.3 Words and actions: Ideology and self-image as sustaining 
forces 
The question concerning the relationship between one’s ideas and action is not by any 
standard a trivial one, but rather one of the fundamental questions of the social sciences. 
The role of radical ideology in terrorism has been discussed especially in relation to the 
(individual) radicalization into terrorism. By now, it has become clear that it is too 
simplistic to think that the adoption of radical ideology embracing and legitimating the use 
of terrorist strategy would automatically lead to the participation in a terrorist campaign. It 
has been noted that in the individual level, joining a terrorist organization may take place 
before ideological radicalization.564 Moreover, as for leaving terrorism behind, the link 
between the change in ideas and beliefs seems to be equally complex. This process has 
been often referred to as “deradicalization”, implying that the change would deal not only 
with that of actions, but also with beliefs. As John Horgan has convincingly argued, this is 
not an accurate way to interpret the process. Rather, one should speak about 
disengagement and draw a distinction between physical and psychological disengagement. 
Furthermore, it is entirely possible that an individual continues his/her involvement in 
terrorist activities despite deep disillusionment.565
This study provides further support to this line of argumentation. On the level of the 
individuals, it seems that the ideological beliefs of the key participants have undergone the 
most significant changes only after the abandonment of the terrorist strategy and not the 
other way around. My interviews with them during the 2000s indicate that not all of them 
have ever fully “deradicalized” in the sense that they would condemn the use of terrorist 
strategy.  
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that this observation holds mainly for 
the key participants and not for everyone involved in the campaigns. Even though the 
source material does not allow for drawing any definite conclusions, it strongly seems as if 
a significant part of those involved never fully became ideologically radical. I have the 
impression that not all of those who were more marginally involved in the Rode Jeugd and 
its successor organizations had thoroughly internalized the ideology propagated by the 
core members but that their association was sometimes at least as significantly based on 
their friendship with those who were ideologically more committed and/or their hunger for 
action. Furthermore, my research on the campaign of the SLA suggests that people may 
become physically engaged in a campaign without ever developing a commitment to the 
563 See e.g. Burke 2002. 
564 See especially Sageman 2004; on becoming involved in terrorism also Horgan 2005, 80–106; Silke 
2003a; McCauley & Moskalenko 2008. 
565 Horgan 2009b.  
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group’s political goals, or even accepting its methods of action. Some of those people who 
helped the SLA fugitives did it out of their personal loyalty to others involved in helping 
and even participated in the armed actions despite their explicit opposition to armed 
struggle. These observations resonate with John Horgan’s claim that those involved in 
terrorist campaigns may not be as committed as we may tend to think even when they are 
deeply engaged.566
As for the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army, information strongly 
suggests that there is no direct link between strategy and ideology in the sense that the 
decline  of  radical  strategy  would  have  been  a  result  of  the  moderation  of  ideology  or  
political  goals.  In  other  words,  here  was  no  conscious  collective  decision  to  opt  for  less  
radical methods or a revision of political goals and program that would have been 
equivalent to, for instance, the change of course with the Weather Underground that 
manifested itself in the booklet entitled Prairie Fire that was published in May, 1974. 
On the other hand, issues related to ideology and political objectives did play an 
important role in the development of the campaign. It seems that commitment to the 
ideological tenets and chosen methods were mainly a sustaining force, rather than a 
variable that would explain changes in it. Occasionally, though, differences in opinion 
with regard to ideology and methods, as a source of disputes, did halt the campaigns.  
Ideology seemed to provide the framework for analysis and for absorbing new 
information. This observation is hardly surprising. As Martha Crenshaw has noted, the 
psychological research has generally indicated that individual beliefs are usually rather 
more stable than volatile and that even more stable still are the collective attitudes that are 
continuously reinforced by group interaction.567 Another  point  is  that  belief  systems  are  
likely to shape the way that the individuals observe and interpret the developments around 
them. Researchers have referred in this context to theories of cognitive consistency to 
explain that people do not absorb equally all kinds of information, but rather only 
information that supports their existing beliefs, while ignoring disconfirming evidence and 
neglecting to reconsider decisions they have already taken.568
Looking at the case studies, one gets the impression that those involved went to great 
lengths to defend the original ideology and assessment of the prevailing situation. Such 
attempts are evident especially in the communications of the Symbionese Liberation 
Army, and more precisely in those of its original composition. The texts and tapes were 
replete with comments on other people’s opinion in the SLA which the group tried to 
refute. 
Another tendency that points to this direction is that those involved in the SLA’s 
campaign were more prepared to blame their own errors of judgment and planning for 
their lack of success than to question ideology and interpretation of the prevailing 
situation. In a retrospective account of the SLA, the following observations are made:  
The fact that our six comrades were killed and the four of us are captives is not due to the 
invincibility of the state, but to our own mistakes and impatience. There’s no doubt in my 
566 Horgan 2009b, 149–150. 
567 Crenshaw 1992, 34–35. See also e.g. Taylor & Quayle 1994, 35–41.
568 Festinger et al. 1959.  
154
mind that the SLA proved the validity of urban guerrilla warfare as a military/political 
strategy for furthering the revolutionary struggle.569
and: 
The  four  of  us  are  the  last  remaining  members  of  the  SLA.  But  this  isn’t  really  
demoralizing to us because the number of underground revolutionary groups has grown 
and many of these groups are operating in a way that will insure their continued survival. 
Mistakes are unavoidable at this stage, but it’s inexcusable not to learn from your mistakes. 
Many of the principles of the SLA are shared by other groups, and in that sense the spirit 
of the SLA will always be carried on, no matter what the name of the group or 
organization.570
A similar kind of argumentation can be found from the documents produced by those 
involved in the Rode Jeugd campaign. In these documents, the poor state of the 
revolutionary struggle in the Netherlands is explained by the deficits in understanding 
what the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution entails. These deficits had manifested 
themselves in a negative attitude against violence harbored by many leftists as well as in 
the failures to build up organizations that would have both a legal and illegal arm of the 
organization.571
At the same time, the Rode Jeugd members in particular underlined the need for 
sophisticated theory as prerequisite for successful action. Rode Jeugd presented itself in its 
first pamphlet as a mobile group of youths who wanted to educate the protestors about 
Marxism-Leninism to ensure that their good actions would not fail due to their lack of 
perspective.572 When the group faced internal disputes and setbacks, it tried to work out its 
ideology and action program by publishing an internal paper. The last of these papers, 
published in November, 1973, begins with the call for all Rode Jeugd members to put their 
ideas and critiques on paper so that they could put together the best possible program that 
would ensure the development of a correct political line and a political organization that 
would form the basis for revolutionary action.573 The Symbionese Liberation Army also 
continued to reformulate the presentation of its ideology in an attempt to make itself 
understood and to make its actions more efficient, even if it was less preoccupied with the 
classical Marxist-Leninist theory.  
That ideology is important for terrorist campaigns has been noted by several 
researchers. It has been emphasized that the way the terrorist organizations present 
themselves may have an “auto-propaganda” function that can be even more important for 
the  participants  than  the  propaganda  function  vis-a-vis  their  external  audience.  As  
terrorism is a controversial method that is in contradiction with the moral code, its 
569 The last SLA statement, 36. 
570 The last SLA statement, 38. 
571 See e.g. discussion paper by A. van Wijk, W. Oskam and others, April 10, 1976; Marxisties Scholings 
Kollektief: Over de gewapende strijd: Aanzetten tot de stadsguerrilla in Nederland: 1966–1974 Rode Jeugd 
[1976]. 
572 “Rode Jeugd bulletin nr. 1” (Rode Jeugd’s pamphlet, May 26, 1966). 
573 Voorwaarts, November 15, 1973. 
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legitimacy therefore needs to be actively maintained.574 Furthermore, it has been noted 
that groups with a weak institutional structure depend more on ideology to provide 
unity.575 Similarly,  Audrey  Kurth  Cronin  has  argued  that  “[b]ecause  of  their  relative  
weakness, terrorist groups are almost uniquely depending on their driving narrative or 
vision”.576
When looking at the campaigns under study, it transpires that we may benefit from 
being  more  specific  about  what  we  mean  by  ideology.  Ideology  is,  after  all,  one  of  the  
most contested concepts in political science. While the question deserves more effort than 
can be made in this context, I have adopted as my starting point the description given to 
the term by Andrew Heywood. According to him, ideology refers to: 
… a more or  less  coherent  set  of  ideas that  provide the basis  for  some kind of  organised 
political action. In this sense all ideologies therefore, first, offer an account or critique of 
the existing order, usually in the form of a ‘world view’; second, provide the model of a 
desired future, a vision of the ‘good society’; and third, outline how political change can 
and should be brought about […]. Ideologies thus straddle the conventional boundaries 
between descriptive and normative thought, and between theory and practice.”577
The key ideological tenets of the campaigns that fall under the first two categories were 
shared by many leftists at the time. Moreover, quite a few former participants in the 
campaigns still subscribe to their earlier analysis on the existing order and vision of a good 
society.  The  most  interesting  aspect  in  terms  of  understanding  the  development  of  the  
strategy is that last one, “how political change can and should be brought about”.  
These views on how revolutionary struggle should be waged were an important part of 
their self-image. The former members of the Rode Jeugd implicitly underlined that by 
stressing to me that they were not only adherents of Marx and Mao, but were also of 
Carlos Marighella. However, it was not only this viewpoint that defined these 
organizations and set them apart from their competitors. Equally important was the 
commitment to act upon this understanding. The main difference between the Rode Jeugd 
and  other  leftists  was,  according  to  its  own definition,  that  the  Rode  Jeugd will  not  just  
talk about its action program, but will also systematically and unrelentingly implement it. 
As  a  consequence,  all  major  disputes  among its  ranks  were  primarily  about  what  to  do.  
The SLA, respectively, defined itself as a group of real revolutionaries, which entailed that 
they, unlike other leaders of the revolution, would not shy away from doing what needs to 
be done, they would not compromise, even if it meant fighting until the bitter end.  
Thus, the use of armed struggle as method was not merely an outcome of dispassionate 
instrumental calculation, but it was a significant part of how they defined their 
organization  and  themselves  (at  least  in  the  case  of  the  core  members).  In  terms  of  
understanding their commitment to the use of terrorist strategy, it is, in fact, more 
illuminating to look at what kind of qualities those involved attributed to their 
organizations and themselves than to ideology and political objectives per se.  
574 See especially Cordes 1988; also e.g. Crenshaw 1992; Bandura 1990;Taylor & Quayle 1994. 
575 Jasper 1997, 243. This is also argued by Decker and Winkle (1996) on their study on gangs. 
576 Cronin 2009b, 101. 
577 Heywood 2000, 22. This definition is used also in Demant et al. 2008, but without further elaboration. 
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My observations from the case studies agree with what James M. Jasper has written 
about the choice of tactics in social movements and organizations. Irrespective of the exact 
composition of identifications, “tactics are rarely, if ever, neutral means about which 
protestors do not care.”578 According to Jasper, people develop “tastes” for certain 
methods of action so that certain choices appear intrinsically more appealing to certain 
actors. These preferences may be at least partly independent from their efficacy in terms 
of attaining the formal external goals. “They reflect what we believe, what we are 
comfortable with, what we like, who we are.”579 The tactical choices reflect not only 
cognitive  estimations,  but  are  linked  to  morality  and  emotions  as  well.”580 Furthermore, 
Jasper  notes,  winning  is  not  always  everything  so  even  if  the  actions  were  not  likely  to  
reach the objective, they might still be considered “the right thing to do – for the sake of 
personal identity and dignity, and for the broader subculture”.581
Moreover, these tastes may become important sources of identity. Jasper suggests that 
there are several levels of movement identities. The primary identification of activists may 
be either to a particular organization (organizational identity), tradition of activism 
(activist identity, usually involving a history of political activity broader than an 
involvement in one particular organization) or to a style of protest or being in some wing 
of the larger movement (tactical identity).582 What is important in understanding the 
tactical choices that are made is the relative salience of these identifications.  
For the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army, the involvement in armed 
struggle, thus the tactical identity, seemed to be the most important of these aspects. For 
the  Rode  Jeugd,  this  commitment  to  the  method  of  action  seems  to  have  been  stronger  
than the identification with any particular organization, because efforts towards the armed 
struggle also continued in the absence of a real organizational structure. In some respects, 
the commitment to the method exceeded the commitment to the goal: some of them agreed 
to leave for South Yemen even though they could see that it was not in the best interest of 
their long-term objectives.  
 This commitment and identification to a certain tactic explains their reluctance to 
reconsider  the  strategy  and  to  evaluate  it  strictly  only  as  a  means  to  a  political  end.  In  
addition, the way the participants described their organizations seemed to be a good 
predictor of the way their campaigns developed. Both defined themselves as the radical 
edge of the revolutionary movement that was committed to armed struggle. The self-
image of the Rode Jeugd, however, relied heavily on the notion that the Rode Jeugd was 
operating in the metropolises, which at that time were at the periphery of the revolutionary 
action, and accordingly its role was mainly to support struggles going on elsewhere. When 
this could not be done accomplished by conducting their own supportive armed struggle, 
they moved on to providing support for other groups conducting such struggle in other 
ways.  
The SLA, on its part, presented itself as the group who fearlessly did what needed to 
be done, using all means necessary. Since the group had defined itself so strongly as not 
578 Jasper 1997, 237. 
579 Polletta & Jasper 2001, 284, 293. 
580 Jasper 1997, 238. 
581 Jasper 1997, 239. 
582 Jasper 1997, 85–87. On identity and strategy, see also Polletta & Jasper 2001. 
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willing to compromise, it left itself little room for moderation in tactics without touching 
both the core of its reason for existence and the bases of its claim that it was the vanguard 
to be followed.  
This observation correlates in an interesting way with the results of the comparative 
study of the communications of non-violent and violent groups conducted by Allison G. 
Smith. Her analysis shows that while violent and non-violent groups do not differ much in 
what kind of values they attach to their enemy, there are clear differences in what kind of 
values they attribute to themselves.583
5.4 Public support and countermeasures 
In the beginning of this chapter, I argued that significant factors in explaining why the 
campaigns under study ended were the declining public support and countermeasures 
directed against the campaigns. 
In both cases, the countermeasures were often the immediate reason for the de-
escalation in the use of terrorist strategy (in terms of attacks that were successfully 
conducted). As for the campaign of the Rode Jeugd, there were two major turning points 
which both were instigated by the countermeasures taken against the group. The first was 
the  arrests  of  Luciën  van  Hoesel  (December,  1972)  and  Ger  Flokstra  (June,  1973).  The  
second turning point came in the fall of 1976 when Lidwien Janssen was arrested and 
information  about  the  training  trip  to  South  Yemen  became  public.  In  the  case  of  the  
Symbionese  Liberation  Army,  the  first  turning  point  was  the  arrest  of  Joe  Remiro  and  
Russell Little in January, 1974. The second and more significant turning point was the Los 
Angeles shootout in May, 1974 and the third turning point came with the arrests of 
September, 1975. 
The effects that these incidents and the counterterrorism policies in general had on the 
campaigns were, however, dissimilar in many ways. The arrests of Remiro and Little put 
the group on the defensive and led it to step up its activities. The LA shootout was an 
almost  fatal  setback  for  the  SLA  because  the  majority  of  its  members  were  lost  in  that  
incident. Lastly, when Emily and Bill Harris and Patricia Hearst were arrested, the primary 
reason for the existence of the group vanished. Those who were left decided to pursue 
another direction in their lives.  
In  the  case  of  the  Rode  Jeugd,  the  removal  of  the  people  who were  arrested  did  not  
matter  as  such.  What  was  more  dangerous  was  what  those  arrests  implied.  Namely,  the  
arrests of Van Hoesel and Flokstra indicated that the Rode Jeugd’s ranks had been 
infiltrated extensively. These infiltrations were made possible by the open character of the 
organization and the deficits in terms of discipline. The Rode Jeugd was aware that there 
had been infiltrators in the organization before and had tried to strike back by doubling 
agents and using them to feed disinformation, but it ended up on the losing side. What 
made the infiltrations dangerous was not only, or even primarily, the content of the 
information that was leaked out, but rather that the arrests indicated that someone from the 
inner circle could not be trusted with confidential information. Rumors about informants 
583 Smith 2004. 
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and betrayals intensified the conflicts regarding the proper course of action that were 
already in the making. Each of them had their somewhat differing opinions about how to 
conduct the revolutionary struggle most efficiently. There were likewise disagreements 
about what to do with people they knew or suspected of being informants: should they be 
simply kicked out of the organization, or used to confuse the security service by providing 
false information. These problems created by the infiltrations played against the 
background of an on-going dispute over the need for more punctuality, discipline and 
organization and aggravated the already existing distrust and frustrations. 
When several key activists of the Rode Jeugd continued their involvement in 
revolutionary struggle after 1974, they were again confronted with similar kinds of 
challenges which they were not able to solve any better. This time, discipline in action and 
organization as well as good planning would have been all the more important, because 
the authorities were better equipped to act against them than they had been previously. 
The arrests and media attention in 1976 led to the culmination of a burnout and a sense of 
being cornered that had already been mounting. 
One  of  the  starting  points  of  this  study  has  been  that  it  is  not  only  the  direct  
consequences of incidents such as arrests that matter, but also how countermeasures are 
perceived by those involved in the campaigns and what kind of conclusions are drawn 
from them. What is noteworthy in both cases in this study is that those involved expected 
to face severe countermeasures, and in fact, even more severe than they actually did face. 
Furthermore, countermeasures were sometimes rather welcome. The following quote from 
an interview with Luciën van Hoesel, a former key member of the Rode Jeugd, is 
illustrative of this: 
You accepted the repercussions as a kind of role play that went with it. Or more strongly, if 
public prosecutor Peijnenburg had said, you are a fool, we let you go, that would have been 
worse than his claiming that I represented a revolutionary danger to the society.584
When it comes to deterrence, it seems as if the countermeasures against the left-wing 
terrorism in West Germany had an effect that was a stronger deterrent than the measures 
that were used against the Rode Jeugd. When German activists were faced with ever 
harsher repression towards the end of 1960s, the Rode Jeugd members felt they should 
prepare themselves for a similar kind of confrontation. The key Rode Jeugd activists 
expected that they would be either arrested or killed if they continued with the urban 
guerrilla struggle, just as many German activists already had. The fact that they saw it 
coming, made them think again whether it would really make any sense to go that far, 
especially because they would not likely be able to accomplish much before ending up to 
that  situation  because  they  were  not  very  advanced  in  their  skills  and  resources.  In  this  
way, the expectations about the future countermeasures had a deterrent effect. It did not 
lead them to end their involvement in revolutionary struggle, but it did make them 
consider other more efficient ways to contribute to it.  
584 Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 153.  
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In the longer run, the fact that their expectations were not fulfilled weakened their 
motivation to continue their struggle, as Luciën van Hoesel explained in the same 
interview quoted above: 
If you situated my case in Germany, I would have been dead, received a life sentence, or I 
would  still  have  been  a  fugitive.  It  is  actually  too  crazy,  once  you  realize  this.  In  the  
Netherlands, you get so much leeway that the motivation to act falls apart. […] The liberal 
climate in the Netherlands put a stop to terrorism, whereas in Germany, reactionary forces 
artificially sustained terrorism for ten years. 
[…]
The last time we were arrested early in the morning and brought to the bureau with 
BMW’s, the only reaction from the neighbors was: “Hey, you were early up”. In such 
atmosphere, everything just falls apart.585
The SLA basically expected the authorities to strike with all means it had in its disposal. 
Even though the group faced very intensive countermeasures, they appear not to have 
surpassed their expectations. The account of Patricia Hearst gives the impression that the 
SLA members expected the authorities to raid their safe house at any time and thought that 
once they were found, the police would shoot all of them, including Patricia Hearst. 
Furthermore, the countermeasures dideffectively pre-empt the SLA campaign, first de-
escalating it considerably after the LA shootout and finally ending it with the arrests of the 
Harrises and Patricia Hearst in September, 1975. 
However, when looking at the countermeasures, our focus should not only be on how 
they influenced those directly involved in the campaign, but also on how they influenced 
their actual and potential supporters, or the political climate and the public perception of 
the  counterterrorist  measures  in  general.  As  Cronin  notes  in  her  study  on  the  end  of  
terrorism, terrorism is a tripartite phenomenon and the effect of countermeasures is always 
dependent on the way the audience reacts.586
From the case studies it is clear that the effect of the countermeasures was not merely 
based on how much they managed to weaken the coercive capabilities of those involved in 
the campaign or to undermine their morale. The countermeasures also had important 
indirect consequences in terms of how they influenced the potential supporters’ readiness 
to provide active or passive support to the campaign. This observation is corroborated by 
Ted Robert Gurr’s claim that the public support “conditions the effects of almost all public 
policies directed at terrorism”.587 In other words, the perception of the campaign among its 
potential supporters was a key factor in how well those involved in the campaign could, or 
in these cases could not, recover from the setbacks caused by the countermeasures. 
The countermeasures against the campaign of the Rode Jeugd left the general public, 
as well as the larger left-wing community and protest movement, largely disinterested. 
With the institutionalization of the protests, the Rode Jeugd was left alone in the radical 
585 Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 153–154. 
586 Cronin 2008 11. 
587 Gurr 1990, 94. 
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corner as the sole proponent of armed struggle at that moment. The low-key response of 
the authorities to the campaign contributed to the difficulties that the Rode Jeugd and its 
successor groups encountered in recruiting more support. In this regard, the most 
significant things were those that the authorities did not do. In the lack of spectacular court 
cases and outright repression, the countermeasures did not provide the Rode Jeugd with 
new agitation points that it could have used to mobilize the sympathies of the more 
moderate leftists in the Netherlands. In many ways, the countermeasures used against the 
campaign provide a good example of repressive tolerance.  
The countermeasures against the SLA were much more broad, intense and partly 
unprecedented in their severity. The LA shootout was one of the first times when white 
revolutionaries had died in a confrontation with the police. This caused considerable 
outrage, and theoretically, it could have produced deep sympathy and solidarity towards 
the SLA. The SLA members had, however, put themselves in such a position by then that 
even such a dramatic and tragic event did not give them access to the safety nets of the 
radical Left. Even if their common enemy would have helped overcome the disagreements 
about the SLA’s strategy, the SLA had made itself such a high security risk by kidnapping 
Patricia Hearst that few wanted to take high risks for its members. On the other hand, the 
LA shootout did mobilize the new associates to participate in the campaign. 
The  reluctance  of  the  radical  Left  to  help  the  SLA  did  not,  however,  benefit  the  
authorities as much as it could have. Even though the radical Left would have liked to see 
the SLA disappear, their reluctance to get involved in the SLA affair also meant that they 
were reluctant to cooperate with the police. From the countless people whom the FBI tried 
to interview while searching for Patricia Hearst, just as many declined to cooperate as 
agreed to talk. Overall, the authorities were deeply despised by the radical Left. Many on 
the radical Left were afraid that the authorities would use the SLA as an excuse to attack 
the entire Left and they were therefore very much against the measures that were taken.  
From a broader perspective, the case studies underline that the effects of 
counterterrorist measures are highly context-specific. It is unclear if these same measures 
would have been effective in another context. In other words, the approach that was 
adopted in dealing with the Rode Jeugd would probably not have produced the same kind 
of outcome had it been directed against a group that was already more radicalized or 
organized. The fact that no-one had been killed because of the Rode Jeugd’s actions made 
it morally easier to think pragmatically. This approach, in turn, would not have been as 
successful had the Rode Jeugd itself not done such a poor job in protecting itself. With 
regard to following the development of the Rode Jeugd, the authorities also benefited from 
having identified many of its core members years before they got involved in armed 
struggle.  
This brings support for the claim that when the authorities have good intelligence at 
hand, they are better able to disrupt terrorist campaigns. This is one of the major points 
that arise from the case studies collected in the edited volume of Robert J. Art and Louise 
Richardson that examine the history of counterterrorism and terrorism in democracies.588
In contrast, as for the SLA, one of the handicaps that the authorities had was the lack of 
intelligence. This problem was partly due to the negative attitude towards the authorities 
588 Art & Richardson 2007, 565–568. 
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concerning the measures they took against the protest movement, the New Left and the 
black movement, and this had created antagonism among those who could have provided 
the authorities with relevant information.  
The cases also bring further evidence for the claim that harsh repression is not 
necessarily negative from the perspective of those who are involved in the terrorist 
campaign. From point of view of the authorities, it can be rather counterproductive than 
constructive. As for the Rode Jeugd, repression would have most probably accomplished 
just what Adrian Guelke assumed it could, namely it would have provided the Rode Jeugd 
with evidence of the effectiveness of their  campaign and therefore a reason to persist.589
Repression would therefore have given more credit to the activists’ claim that “German 
circumstances” were also developing in the Netherlands. It might have resulted in more 
active and passive support for the urban guerrilla struggle groups. The sympathy towards 
the RAF based on the harsh measures adopted by the West German authorities indicate 
that there most probably would have been more support for the Rode Jeugd and its 
successors had the authorities treated their members more harshly. 
Having said that, repressive measures did work rather well against the SLA, because 
the group had marginalized itself through its own actions very early on and therefore the 
countermeasures did not create such a “boomerang effect” that would have manifested 
itself as considerable active support for the SLA. However, the measures had the 
downside that they created some passive support in the form of a refusal to cooperate with 
the authorities and this was indeed problematic for the authorities. On the other hand, the 
SLA  was  so  marginal  and  isolated  that  it  may  have  died  out  rather  quickly  even  if  the  
authorities had not pursued it. This option, however, was hardly available for the 
authorities since the group had committed one murder and held a hostage. 
To those involved in the campaigns, the declining public support manifested itself 
mostly as a lack of members and supporters. The political milieu surrounding the 
campaigns was very different, but what is common to both cases, is that the campaigns did 
not have many active supporters to begin with, and their numbers declined towards the 
end of the campaigns. Moreover, the participants in the campaigns tried continuously to 
increase their support and membership without success.  
While the countermeasures were clearly one factor that influenced the development of 
the public support, there were also other developments at play.  
The decline in public support has to be interpreted in the general context of the decline 
of the protest movement and in the New Left activism towards the mid-1970s. It was not 
only the Rode Jeugd, its successor organizations and the SLA that were losing support, but 
the crowds involved in protest actions were generally getting smaller. What diminished 
the SLA’s perspectives in particular for gathering support was that it started its armed 
struggle relatively late. By 1973, revolutionary zeal was already on the wane. When the 
SLA was preoccupied with the kidnapping of Patricia Hearst, the Weather Underground, 
the country’s foremost white revolutionary organization, was preparing its new program 
that called for mass-organizing. 
589 Guelke 1995/1998, 180. A similar kind of argument has been put forward by, among others, Art & 
Richardson 2007; Cronin 2009b; Frey 2004; Silke 2003b; Parker 2007; De Graaf 2010. 
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For the Rode Jeugd, the diminishing public support was more due to the general 
developments in the political climate and to the lack of repression than to any Rode Jeugd 
specific matters. The moderate response to protests and reforms in the form of providing 
the protest movements an access to parliamentary politics undermined the claim that such 
tactics  that  the  Rode  Jeugd  propagated  were  necessary  or  that  the  revolution  was  a  
desirable objective in the first place. In this respect, its ideology and strategy became not 
only more irrelevant, but in the Dutch context, to start with, they were actually rather 
irrelevant for most of its potential supporters. 
The reasons for the increasingly low level of public support for the campaign of the 
Symbionese Liberation Army were very typical. This involved all the developments 
mentioned by Audrey Kurth Cronin: its ideology became irrelevant, it became too isolated 
and  it  lost  contact  with  “the  people”  and  it  made  errors  in  choosing  targets  for  its  
attacks.590 The SLA originated from a much more radicalized political milieu but it 
quickly alienated itself by the extremity of its actions. As a result, the little support that 
there was become eroded with the backlash created by the Foster murder.  
Finally, what these cases highlight is the importance of examining the attitudes among 
the potential supporting communities beyond one of being mere support or rejection of 
terrorism or a particular group using such a strategy. Equally important are the attitudes 
towards the authorities. If the surrounding subculture feels threatened by the authorities, 
for example, because of the way that either the current or previous incidents of protest or 
terrorism have been handled, this can become an important handicap for the 
investigations. Furthermore, what may appear as passive support for a terrorist campaign 
to outsiders can just as well be motivated by unwillingness to cooperate with the 
authorities. From the point of view of those involved in the campaign, opposition towards 
the campaign is not the only dangerous development in the wider society, but disinterest 
can be equally damaging. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to provide carefully researched case studies that offer more 
insight into the question of how terrorist campaigns end. From the theoretical point of 
view, the most important observations from this study can be summarized as follows: 
 The demise of a terrorist organization does not necessarily lead to the decline 
of the terrorist campaign. Therefore, the studies on how terrorism ends should 
look  at  the  development  of  terrorist  activity  beyond  the  life-span  of  a  single  
organization. 
 Organizations using terrorism as a strategy can differ significantly in terms of 
their structure, incentives and organizational dynamics, even when they share 
ideological  orientation,  are  of  the  same  size  and  operate  in  the  same  time  
period. Theories on the dynamics of terrorist campaigns would benefit from 
being sensitive to these differences.  
590 Cronin 2009b, 104–110. 
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 The collective ideological beliefs and goals functioned primarily as a 
sustaining force, a lens through which all developments were interpreted. On 
the other hand, it appears that all participants in the campaigns under study 
never fully internalized the radical ideology, but their participation was much 
more based on their friendship with other participants. 
 In  terms  of  understanding  the  development  of  the  terrorist  campaigns,  it  may 
be more instructive to look at how those involved described their organization, 
themselves and their role in the struggle than ideology and political objectives 
per  se.  In  both  cases  under  study,  the  choice  of  the  terrorist  strategy  was  not  
merely a result of a cost-benefit calculation, but an important part of the self-
image of the groups involved in the campaigns. Indeed, the way the groups 
portrayed  themselves  corresponded  with  the  forms  of  action  that  they  got  
involved in.  
 Countermeasures played a significant role in the development of the 
campaigns. However, what is noteworthy is that the countermeasures would 
not have had the same kind of impact had it not been for certain weaknesses of 
the groups themselves. Moreover, besides the direct impact the 
countermeasures had on the campaign, equally important was how they 
affected the attitudes of the larger left-wing community or the public in 
general. In this context, both the attitudes towards the terrorist campaign and 
the authorities seem relevant. 
 The decline of the terrorist campaigns must be evaluated by taking into account 
the general decline of the protest movement and the New Left activism, 
although in the case of the SLA, the decline also resulted from its own 
targeting errors and isolation. 
Another more implicit point that I hope I have made with my research is that conducting 
in-depth case studies on historical terrorist organizations, even those that are perceived as 
marginal, is both entirely possible and meaningful. Such source-based research may 
require some extra time and effort, but it will provide the studies on terrorism with a more 
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